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PREFACE 
My interest in the unitary state was initiated by the debate which took place 
in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s on alternative constitutional models 
for the country. Those advocating a unitary state for a non-racial South 
Africa levelled many accusations at those advocating federal and separatist 
solutions, and vice versa. Up until the 1980s and 1990s, very little academic 
analysis had been undertaken of what the implications of a unitary state might 
be for a non- racial South Africa. In a very preliminary way in a conference 
paper titled, A Unitary Constitution in a Post-Apartheid South Africa, I 
attempted to establish more precisely what the electoral implications of a 
unitary constitution and a single member constituency system might hold for 
South Africa. 
In view of the many variations of state organisation under unitary 
constitutional models, and of the degree of flux in which the South African 
constitutional debate was at the time, I decided to study neighbouring states 
to explore the processes and factors determining their adoption of centralised 
unitary constitutional forms. The belief was that a study of this nature might 
make more information available to states intending constitutional reform, and 
which would enable them to learn from the specific constitutional experiences 
of these states. 
The organisation of the state, and whether power be centralised or 
decentralised, has been debated for perhaps twenty-five centuries. The 
historical debate has often centred around amongst others, general questions 
concerning the best relationship between state and society, centre-periphery 
relations, the state and constitutionalism, or in terms of monism and 
(viii) 
pluralism. The debates which took place in South Africa and in neighbouring 
states over the best form of constitution, are thus nothing new. They have a 
long history and deal with some of the questions of politics which have 
endured for many centuries. 
It is intended that this thesis will provide a basis for a more thorough 
understanding of the origins of unitary constitutional forms, and a 
reassessment of forms that work or do not work. The audience that this thesis 
intends to address are academics interested and involved in the study of 
constitutional issues, and also practitioners involved in reassessing 
constitutional forms. 
The University of South Africa has provided me with generous financial 
assistance in undertaking the field research for my study. Financial 
assistance received from the Centre for Science Development (HSRC, South 
Africa) is also acknowledged. I am extremely grateful to both these 
institutions. The opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at in this 
thesis, are those of the author and are not attributable to either of the 
sponsors referred to above. 
Numerous individuals and institutions have assisted in obtaining material for 
this thesis. The individuals include academic colleagues, interviewees in the 
field, librarians and archivists. I am extremely grateful to all of them. In 
particular I must thank my Promoter, Professor O.J. Kriek. Professor Kriek has 
been an enormous source of leadership and i nspi ration, and on a personal 
level, he has always been approachable and extremely helpful in so many ways. 
I must also thank Professor M. Wiechers of Unisa, who has found time in a busy 
schedule, to comment on drafts of all eight chapters. Finally, I must thank 
(ix) 
J 
Ms M-L. Suttie, Reference Librarian at Unisa, who has spent many hours 
searching for material, and for whom nothing is too much trouble. 
The Harvard method of referencing as laid out by Marlene Burger is followed 
throughout this thesis: see Marlene Burger 1992. Reference Techniques. Eighth 
revision. Pretoria: University of South Africa. 
(x) 
GENERAL NOTE 
An attempt is made to use concepts consistently throughout the thesis. There 
are great differences in the 1 iterature on the usage of concepts. For example, 
concepts 1 ike state, government, structures and institutions are used in 
similar and different senses. In the chapter footnotes, definitions are given 
of these and other concepts as understood and used in this thesis. In cases 
where a particular author is referred to and his/her usage of a concept does 
not correspond with the way it is understood in this thesis, the preferred 
usage is placed between brackets after the concept. 
(xi) 
SUMMARY 
ORIGINS OF THE CENTRALISED UNITARY STATE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BOTSWANA, 
ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA. 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and explain the origins of 
centra 1 i sed unitary con st itut i ona l forms adopted at independence, with speci a 1 
reference to the pre-independence period of colonial rule and the states of 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Since the states of the world are either 
unitary or federal, an attempt is made to distinguish the unitary 
constitutional form from federation by contrasting both concepts. The three 
states under study are identified as centralised and unitary by referring to 
political, historical, legal, administrative and fiscal criteria. The 
theoretical and practical origins and explanations for the adoption of unitary 
constitutional forms in the European and African context are explained. First, 
the theoretical origins of monism, pluralism, dualism, absolutism and 
sovereignty and the thoughts of a number of classical theorists are discussed. 
Next the practical origins, the statements and perceptions by members of 
African nationalist elites supportive of unitary states in Africa in the 
colonial and early post-colonial period are referred to, in partial 
exp 1 anat ion for the adoption of this con st itut i ona 1 form. British 
constitutional practices and precedents are also discussed. 
Further, to explain the origins of the centralised unitary state in Africa, 
the three case studies of Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia come under 
discussion. A four stage conceptual scheme devised by Etzioni and modified for 
the purpose of this thesis is utilised to analyse and explain the origins of 
the centralised unitary state in the three case studies of Botswana, Zimbabwe 
(xii) 
and Namibia. A variety of factors both historical and contemporary, internal 
and external to these countries are identified and analysed. These factors 
include amongst others, early settlement patterns and confiicts, British 
colonial practices and precedents, the perceptions and ambitions of 
nationalist movements and elites, relationships with neighbouring states, the 
climate of opinion, and the requirements of nation-building and political 
stability. 
The thesis is concluded by comparing the experiences of the three countries 
and, setting out several inductive propositions determining under which 
conditions these states adopted centralised unitary constitutional forms in 
preference to decentralised ones, federation or partition. 
Finally, the thesis is concluded by referring in a Postscript to the post-
independence constitutional reassessment in the three countries concerned, the 
constitutional reassessment process in Africa in general, literature 
references to this process, and the prospects for constitutional reform on the 
continent. 
Key terms: Unitary; unitarism; centralisation; centripetal; federation; 
monism; absolutism; Botswana; Zimbabwe; Namibia. 
(xiii) 
ORIGINS OF THE CENTRALISED UNITARY STATE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BOTSWANA, 
ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE ORGANISATION OF THE STATE 
The individual states1 of the world manifest themselves as either unitary or 
federal constitutional forms 2 (Van Vuuren & Kriek 1983:141}. In the 
contemporary world, the overwhelming majority of states have adopted a unitary 
constitutional form. Of the more than 160 states which existed in the world 
at the end of the 1980s, approximately ten percent were organised as 
federations. This figure does, however, vary, depending upon one's definition 
of a federal constitutional form (Duchacek 1986:93; Blondel 1990:229}. These 
constitutional forms are, for the purposes of this thesis, defined in 
chapter 2. 
1 The concept 'state' is used in a number of different senses in the 
literature referred to in this thesis. For the purposes of this study, 'state' 
is considered to have the following characteristics: to be a geographic 
territory extending over a large or small area; to consist of a large or small 
population, which may be culturally heterogeneous or homogeneous; and to be 
severe i gn, i e. to have the capacity to make, change and enforce laws. The word . 
'state' is used by a number of authors, like Bratton (Hyden and Bratton 1992}J. 
and Chazan et al.(1992} as an all-embracing concept that includes what is 
understood by the word 'government'(see 3 below} In this thesis, a distinction 
is made between the two concepts where possible. 
2 A 'constitutional form' refers to either a unitary or federal 
constitution which organises government within a state. 
Every state in the world has a government3 which impacts upon its public 
domain4 • The relationship between the government and the public domain is 
----·-- . - -·- -- - -
organised and regulated, usually by a written body of fundamental l ilW. referred 
--------··--- -·- - -·- -·- -~· . ·- . 
to as ai::onstitution. In addition, states may have rules, either written or 
unwritten, which manifest themselves as conventions and customs, and ordinary 
statute and case law which may assume a constitutional character and function. 
According to Blondel (1990:211}, the word 'constitution' has three meanings: 
First, a 'constitution' may refer to a series of prescriptive 
arrangements which are summarised in the expression 
'constitutional rule' and which tend to refer to a form of 
government which is liberal, emphasises restraint in its 
operation, and gives maximum freedom to its citizens. 
Secondly, a 'constitution' may refer, in a descriptive sense, to 
the actual organisation of government within a state. According 
to this formulation, all countries have a working constitution. 
Thirdly, a 'constitution' may refer to an actual document written 
at a specific time, which establishes a government or governments 
3 All states have structures or institutions (used synonymously in this 
thesis) to perform various functions. A 'government' is, 'that organisation 
in which is vested ... the right to exercise sovereign powers' (Strong 
1966:8). The structures within a state are referred to generally as 'the 
government'. The functions performed by the structures of government are eg., 
the making of authoritative policy, the execution, administration and 
adjudication of policy. Governmental structures may also be organised in 
different forms, eg., either presidential or parliamentary. 
4 The 'public domain' refers to those areas within the geographic state 
where governmental structures administer and regulate activity. It can be 
distinguished from the private domain, in which non-governmental structures 
like political parties and commercial enterprises administer and regulate 
activity. 
3 
within a state, structures, inst i tut i ons5 and procedures, and 
regulates the relationship between them and the public and 
private domains. 
A con st itut ion may be seen as the product of a comp 1 ex interaction over 
varying periods of time, between individual and group actors, both within the 
public and private domains and sometimes the international political system6 • 
This thesis focuses on the constitution in the last-mentioned sense, as an 
actual legal document which provides for the establishment and organisation 
of governmental structures and regulates the relationship between them within 
a geographic state. When referring in this thesis to the centralised unitary 
state, the understanding is that one is referring to the constitutional state: 
that is the state governed in terms of a constitution. All three case studies 
referred to below were constitutional states at the time of independence. By 
contrast, many African states have remained centralised and unitary after 
independence, but not necessarily constitutional. 
1.2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and explain the origins of 
centralised, unitary constitutional forms adopted at independence, with 
v'. 
5 
'Structures and institutions' are sets of political actors, like 
cabinets and parliaments, which perform functions within the state. 
6 The term 'international political system' refers to foreign 
governments which have influenced the constitution-drafting processes for a 
particular country, as distinct from a domestic political system, where a set 
of structures, processes and institutions generally perform those functions 
which may be defined as political. 
4 
special reference to the pre-independence period of colonial rule, in the 
states of Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia. 
This thesis aims, moreover, to lay the foundations for additional attempts to 
explain the origins of unitary constitutional forms in other African states, 
and further to provide a basis for more in depth studies on how centralised 
unitary constitutional forms in other African states may have influenced the 
later political, economic and social crises afflicting them from the 1980s and 
beyond. 
It is maintained by a number of authors, referred to below, that the 
foundations for the post-independence unitary state, which became increasingly 
centralised, were laid during the pre-independence period. The institutions 
and structures of the African state as it exists at the present time, is a 
legacy of colonial rule and has become a problem for much of Africa. By 
describing and explaining the origins of centralised unitary constitutions as 
important devices for the organisation of the colonial state, this study will 
contribute to the reassessment of the performance and constitutional forms of 
centralised unitary states in the post-independence period which have had 
varying degrees of success or failure. Processes of 'reassessment', 
'reconsideration', 're-examination' or 'reform' of constitutional forms and 
institutions are taking place at present in a number of African countries. It 
is therefore believed that this thesis will partly assist in solving the 
problem of reassessing constitutional forms in Africa with a view to devising 
more suitable constitutions. 
It is not the purpose or within the scope of this thesis to study in depth the 
1 ater processes and the successes or fa i 1 ures or consequences or impact of the 
5 
post-independence centralised constitutional unitary state. Only brief 
reference will be made to the reassessment or reform process in the 
Postscript. 
The consequences or impact of the centralised constitutional unitary state 
have many dimensions, political, economic and social. The specific linkage 
between the centralised constitutional unitary state, the centralised unitary 
state and performance in the political, economic and social spheres is only 
tentatively being explored and debated in the 1 iterature at present and 
usually falls under the general heading of the reassessment of the African 
state. A great deal of field work is necessary and still needs to be 
undertaken on this issue. 
The field work necessary to undertake an investigation of this nature is also 
not within the scope of this thesis. Some of the literature pertaining to the 
reassessment of the African state and decentralisation trends will however be 
referred to in the Postscript (chapter 8). 
In the context of Africa, this thesis is concerned with the centralised 
constitutional unitary state which exercises its authority at the territorial 
level over geographic entities established by earlier colonial rule. It is, 
moreover, concerned with the origins of the centralised constitutional unitary 
state established at independence as opposed to a centralised non-
constitutional unitary state, a decentralised unitary state or federation, or 
a partitioned state. Different degrees of centralisation or decentralisation 
occur within the states of the world. What is considered to be a centralised 
unitary state is defined in chapter 2. The centralised unitary state happens 
to be preponderant in the African context. 
6 
1.3 THE UNITARY STATE IN AFRICA 
Unitary constitutional forms are important organisational and regulatory 
devices among the states of the world, and particularly in Africa. Of the more 
than fifty states on the continent of Africa only Nigeria is considered, by 
most observers, to be a true federal state. Some observers al so considered the 
Interim South African Constitution, 1993 and the final South African 
Constitution, 1996 to be federal in character. There are a number of reasons 
for the preponderance of unitary states on the African continent. Politics in 
Africa takes place, although not exclusively, around the associations and 
agencies (structures or institutions) within the geographic state. The 
organisation of the public domain has an important bearing on political, 
social and economic processes within the state (Chazan et al. 1992:37). 
Africa, both before and after independence, has shown a particular propensity 
for 'statism' 7• Statism manifests itself in the concentration of political, 
economic and social activity within the state. At various times in the 
colonial and post-colonial history of Africa, leaders both in and outside of 
Africa have chosen to re-structure the public domain in order to strengthen 
central authorities. One of the structural devices employed has been that of 
the unitary constitutional form, drafted during, or very often inherited from, 
the pre-independence period of colonial rule. 
From about the 1980s, as mentioned above, most African states have been beset 
7. 'Statism' refers to an approach followed by Political Scientists, notably 
Chazan et al. (1992:20 et seq.I). It succeeds the underdevelopment and 
modernisation schools as approaches to the study of the politics of Africa. 
Those following this approach focus on the state apparatus (governmental 
structures), its expansion and uses and abuses of power, and its relations 
with domestic groups and the international co11V11unity. 
7 
by major political, economic and social crises, such as problems of 
legitimacy, declining economic growth rates and increasing unemployment 
levels. A number of scholars, like Young and Wunsch, maintain that these 
crises can partially be explained by referring to Africa's colonial and 
constitutional inheritance {Gifford & Louis 1988; Wunsch & Olowu 1990). As 
Young points out, most of the present crises lie, in part, in the 
characteristics of the state created during colonial rule {the colonial state) 
and can be traced back to the early stages of its construction {Gifford & 
Louis 1988:2). 
Wunsch argues that colonial rule was characterised by, 'centralizing, elitist, 
and {sometimes) absolutist features', which have survived the post-
independence period (Wunsch & Olowu 1990:29). Wunsch and Olowu argue that 
ethnic conflict, political inefficacy, administrative weaknesses, and economic 
stagnation can, in part, be understood as being caused by attempts over the 
last two decades to impose a high level of centralisation in contemporary 
African states (1990:1 et seq.). Further, Wunsch and Olowu hold that what has 
become the centralised state (defined in chapter 2 below) or, in their 
terminology, the 'overcentralised state' has failed in Africa, and that there 
is now a need to re-think the distribution of political power. They argue that 
the overcentralised state has contributed to the slowing down of economic 
development and has brought misery and starvation to millions of people on the 
continent {1990:7 et seq.). 
Healey and Robinson refer to the use, by independent African governments, of 
colonial structures to contra l pl ura 1 ism, to strengthen and extend centralised 
admi ni strati ve structures and to facilitate authoritarian rule ( 1992: 15). They 
claim that: 
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The autocratic and hegemonic imperatives of the colonial state 
endured beyond independence and provided the organisational 
framework for its post-colonial successor. The statist legacy 
was to persist and deepen after independence {1992:22-23). 
The performance of the post-independence centralised state is further being 
reassessed in terms of the notion of 'governance'. A 'governance' approach to 
state performance relates to issues of state responsiveness and 
accountability, and the impact of these factors on political stability and 
economic development. 
As pointed out above, the general trend within the African state has been 
towards a high degree of centralisation and, in the process, the state 
{government) has become 'weak' or 'soft', that is it has lost the capacity to 
carry out many of its functions. The consolidation of power at the centre has 
meant that the state {government) needs to extract considerable resources from 
society - that is the public and private domains - most of which it spends on 
itself. The 'weak' or 'soft' state (government) is also characterised by an 
incapacity to promote economic development, a decaying economic and social 
infrastructure, the enfeeblement of the rules of the political game, 
insufficient state legitimacy and inadequate state {government) coercive power 
{Bratton & Rothchild in Hyden & Bratton 1992:263). 
Zartman refers to 'Collapsed States, The Disintegration and Restoration of 
Legitimate Authority'. State collapse he says, involves the breakdown of the 
governmental superstructure and also that of the societal infrastructure. A 
collapsed state is an extreme case of a governance problem where a regime 
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after having been in power for a long time, loses the ability to satisfy the 
demands of various groups in society (Zartman 1995:7-8). Zartman argues the 
case for the 'reconstruction' or 'reconstitution' of the African state. This 
issue is given further consideration in the Postscript (chapter 8). 
Chazan, Ravenhill, Mortimer and Rothchild, in a combined study, also advance 
reasons for this re-examination of state (government) power. Many states were 
unable to gain the trust of their populations; states (governments) developed 
costly and unwieldy administrative and coercive apparatus; public funds were 
misused; support dwindled for state (government) leaders; and formal 
institutions were unable to fulfil even basic tasks (Chazan et al. 1992:64-
65). They refer to the phase of 'reconsideration of state [government] power' 
through which African states were moving in the 1980s and 1990s (1992:64). 
This is given further consideration below. 
Statements on the origins of independence constitutions in the literature tend 
to be general in nature. For example, Chazan et al. note that the, 
political frameworks [constitutions] devised at the time followed 
either variations on the British Westminster model of 
parliamentary democracy or the more centralist model of the Fifth 
Republic in France. Jn each case, special pacts were made with 
the inheritors, and special provisions were introduced to take 
local conditions and specific colonial interests into account 
(1992:45). 
In this general statement, no indication is given, for example, of the 
'special pacts' or 'specific colonial interests' taken into account in the 
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adoption of constitutional forms at the time of independence. Similarly, a 
matter discussed in chapter 3 below, very little indication is given as to the 
adoption of a particular constitutional form, whether unitary or federal, in 
studies dealing with·specific countries. 
As referred to above, the foundations for the centralised post-independence 
state (government) were laid in the colonial period. An analysis and 
explanation of the origins of one of the foundations or dimensions of the 
post-independence centralised unitary constitutional form could thus 
contribute towards an understanding and reassessment of the performance of the 
post-independence African government. The assumption is that before one can 
reassess contemporary constitutional forms, one has to understand the origins 
of earlier constitutional forms. 
1.4 LITERATURE ON THE UNITARY STATE 
Little has been written specifically on unitary constitutional forms in 
general, or on their origins and application in Africa, in particular. By 
contrast, there are many publications on federations and federal ism, its 
successes, failures and prospects in the First and Third Worlds. Among the 
many examples are Wheare (1963), Riker (1964), Currie (1964), Mawhood (1984(a) 
and (b)), Burgess (1986) and Elazar (1991). 
Very little reference is made in the literature to the origins of and specific 
reasons for the adoption of unitary constitutional forms at the time of 
independence from colonial rule, either in the First World or the Developing 
World. The assumption in this thesis is that constitution drafters have had 
a choice between adopting centralised or decentralised unitary or federal 
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constitutional forms. The literature on Africa, during the pre-independence 
and independence periods, deals largely with the politics of that period 
rather than the specific choices and factors involved in adopting unitary or 
federal constitutional forms. The literature deals, for example, with goals 
of African leaders, and the political instruments used to achieve those goals. 
'The search for political stability' is one such goal aspired to by leaders 
of African nationalist movements at the time of independence (Heeger 1974:47). 
Another desired goal of African leaders, is that of 'nation-building' (Rivkin 
1969:7 et seq.). A number of political instruments have been used to achieve 
these goals before and after independence, for example, the centralisation of 
political and administrative power, personalised rule, one party rule and 
military involvement in the governing process. The acceptance of a unitary 
constitutional form is only one device for realising these goals. It is 
maintained in this thesis that institutional and particularly constitutional 
forms as important organising devices within the African state, have been 
downplayed and even ignored in the literature and by elites. The importance 
of constitutions and constitutional ism is now again coming into focus as 
referred to in the Postscript (chapter 8). 
One of the few debates reported in the published literature concerning the 
desirability or non-desirability of unitary or federal constitutional forms 
in the African context took place in 1908-1909 at the National Convention of 
the former South African colonies. General J.C. Smuts, a future South African 
Prime Minister, argued strongly in favour of a unitary South African state 
(Napier:1991). 
With rare exceptions, one being Rivkin (1969), the published literature on the 
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politics of Africa to the north of the Limpopo river has little to say 
specifically on the unitary state as a stabilising and nation-building device 
in the newly independent African state. Another exception was the debates 
concerning the merits or demerits of a unitary or federal constitution by 
Obafemi Awolowo, who wrote in 1966 on the choice of an appropriate 
constitution for Nigeria. Because Nigeria was a multilingual and multinational 
country, he maintained that a federal rather than a unitary constitution was 
best suited to its needs. 
More recently, a new interest in unitary forms of government and unitarism in 
Europe and Africa has developed, giving rise to a body of literature on the 
topic. This has resulted from a reassessment by European and African countries 
of their unitary constitutional forms in the light of the need, for example, 
for better governmental structures, greater governmental accountability, and 
economic development. 
Some examples of published literature on European unitary forms are a report 
by the Royal Commission on Local Government in England 1966-1969; Alen 1975; 
Page & Go 1 dsmith ( 1987) ; and Toon en ( 1987) . 
Examples of the published literature on African unitary forms, usually dealt 
with under the headings of centralisation/centralism or constitutional ism or 
the role of institutions and constitutional reform, are Mawhood {1983, 1987, 
1989), Shivji (1990), and Wunsch & Olowu (1990), Aron (Ellis 1996) and Drame 
(Ellis 1996). 
In South Africa a renewed interest in the unitary state came to the fore in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, as a result of ongoing political and constitutional 
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changes. The literature on unitary constitutional forms and South Africa has 
appeared mainly in the form of conference papers, for example, Napier (1989), 
the Newick Park Initiative (1990) and Asmal (1990). 
1.5 A THEORETICAL MODEL 
There is no theoretical model presently in existence for the specific 
description, analysis and explanation of the origins of unitary constitutional 
forms. 
Mawhood has devised a model of state formation in tropical Africa, which will 
serve to situate the evolution of the pre-independence centralised unitary 
colonial system within the context of the broader historical evolution of the 
state in Africa (1989:242). Although Mawhood's theoretical model refers to 
tropical Africa, it will also be applied to Botswana and Namibia, whose land 
mass falls partly to the south of the Tropic of Capricorn. In terms of 
Mawhood's model, the state in tropical Africa has undergone seven stages of 
evolution. These are as follows: 
Stage l: 
Stage 2: 
Stage 3: 
Until the late 19th century, rule in tropical Africa 
was by ethnic or kinship units. The modern state had 
not yet been defined; 
Between the years 1880-1914, colonial rule was 
imposed over the present area of Africa with military 
support; 
In the early 20th century administrative patterns 
were influenced by Napoleonic or British-Indian style 
rule; 
Stage 4: 
Stage 5: 
Stage 6: 
Stage 7: 
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Between 1919-1960, some regional organisation was 
established, together with the patchy introduction of 
autonomous local government, which was more generally 
established in the 1950s; 
In the 1960s, the newly independent African 
governments became committed to centralised action, 
reg i ens were suppressed and 1oca1 government was 
weakened or abolished; 
In the 1970s, weak autonomy was granted to local 
units, but under central administrative control; 
In the 1 ate 1970s and onwards, autonomous 1oca1 
governments were created in some states. 
Chazan et al. refer in their study, in even greater detail than Mawhood, to 
the constructions of the public arena (domain) since independence. These 
authors identify the following three phases through which the post-
independence African state has evolved (1992:46 et seq.). 
Phase 1: 
Phase 2: 
The Concentration of State Power. This phase refers 
to the first few years of independence, when the new 
leaders of African states attempted to reorganise the 
public realm (domain) so as to concentrate power at 
the political centre. Institutions permitting 
formalised opposition to the ruling group, like 
quasi -federa 1 provisions in pre-independence 
constitutions, were eliminated. 
The Elaboration of State Power. During the 1960s and 
1970s, African leaders further moulded the various 
Phase 3: 
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components of government, including the public 
sector, the coercive apparatus, the legal order and 
political institutions, in order to expand 
centralised state control. 
The Reconsideration of State Power. By the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, most African states were undergoing 
an organisational crisis during which they began to 
re-examine the heavily centralised statism of the 
first few decades of independence. 
The above provides an outline of the general pattern of state evolution in 
tropical Africa. There are a number of deviations from this pattern, for 
example, the experiences of Zimbabwe and Namibia which became independent much 
later than most countries in Africa. The content of this thesis roughly 
coincides with Stages 2 to 4 of Mawhood's model. Phase 3 of Chazan et al. is 
significant for its reference to the 'reconsideration of state power' or 
'reassessment of state power' and the re-examination of inheritances from the 
colonial era, an issue briefly dealt with in the Postscript. 
Etzioni (1965) has devised a four stage conceptual scheme (which he refers to 
as a paradigm) of state integration applicable more particularly to European 
integration, which is explained in chapter 3 below. A modification of this 
conceptual scheme is used in this thesis to order and conceptualise the 
processes according to which centralised unitary constitutions have been 
adopted in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia. In terms of this conceptual scheme, 
as modified, the African state evolves from the pre-centra 1i sed stage, through 
a centralisation stage, a take-off stage, and finally enters a termination 
stage. This conceptual scheme is suitable for the evolution of the African 
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state in the pre- independence period, however, it would require further 
modification to accommodate the post-independence Stages 5, 6 and 7 and Phases 
l to 3 of the Mawhood (1989) and Chazan (1992) theoretical models, as referred 
to above. 
The pre-independence stages, as mentioned above, are relevant to the post-
independence stages in the evolution of the African state, in so far as they 
have laid the foundation for an increasingly centralised state from the time 
of independence until the 1970s. 
1.6 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1.6.l The origins of constitutions 
Constitutions have a political content and cannot be viewed simply as neutral 
legal documents. All constitutions have an ideological basis. The political-
legal nature of a constitution is determined by a number of factors, amongst 
which are included ideology and culture, a country's history and international 
criteria (Van Maarseveen et al. 1978:234). The approach in this thesis is to 
describe and explain these and other factors which have impacted upon or 
influenced8 the origins of African constitutions. 
A further methodological issue is that of whether a constitution is 
specifically a product of the country itself rather than of another country. 
Van Maarseveen and Van der Tang refer to original and derivative 
8 Factors or forces both strong and weak 'impact' upon or 'influence' 
constitutional forms. 'Influences' are considered to be weaker than 'impacts'. 
Reference in this thesis will be made to factors 'impacting' upon 
constitutional forms which will include weaker 'influences'. Both 'impacts' 
and 'influences' nevertheless change constitutional forms. 
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constitutions, and autochthonous and allochthonous constitutions (1978:259). 
Original and derivative constitutions are also referred to as creative and 
imitative or stereotyped constitutions. An original constitution refers to a 
new political-legal document drafted for a particular country. A derivative 
constitution refers to a constitution derived, in part or in full, from a 
constitution of another country. 
The distinction between autochthonous and allochthonous refers to whether a 
constitution emanates from within a country itself, or whether it has been 
imposed from outside or borrowed from elsewhere. These distinctions are not 
clear-cut. An initial constitution can, for example, be allochthonous, and a 
successive constitution can be a derivative of this constitution or an 
original autochthonous constitution bearing no similarities to the previous 
one. Similarly, a constitution can be autochthonous and later derivative. 
Van Maarseveen and Van der Tang (1978:259) caution, however, that 
constitutions are seldom completely original, but are always based upon what 
has gone before. These distinctions are therefore purely ideal types. 
The issue then is the degree to which the constitutions of the three case 
studies referred to in this thesis have been created anew, derived from what 
has preceded them, or been derived from the country itself or imposed from 
outside. In this thesis these determinations are based upon the degree to 
which a constitution differs from a previous constitution, and the degree to 
which decision-making was undertaken within the boundaries of the country or 
outside its borders. 
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The origins of constitutions can only be established through empirical 
description and analysis and, on occasions, subjective judgements. The 
distinctions based on the origins of constitutions can be employed in 
referring to those of Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia. They are of use and 
importance in determining the origins of the main inputs to the respective 
con st itut ion-drafting processes. For example, if a con st i tu ti on is considered 
to be allochthonous and is drafted by the British Colonial Office, then the 
important factors impacting on this process must be sought in British 
constitutional philosophy and practice. The stages in the drafting of an 
allochthonous constitution therefore have to be analysed. Further reference 
is made to these stages in chapter 4. 
1.6.2 The written document and practice 
The written document that contained the principles of the constitutions for 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia, respectively, at independence, is the focus 
of this thesis. A further concern is the degree of centralisation or 
decentralisation of power in the respective states. 
A written constitution does not always reflect the practical implementation 
of constitutional principles, like the degree to which power is centralised 
or decentralised within a state. Constitutional principles in practice may be 
implemented to the letter, partially implemented, implemented only a number 
of years after the acceptance of the constitution, or they may be totally 
ignored. Constitutions moreover vary in their scope. What might be a 
constitutional principle in one constitution might be excluded from another. 
A careful comparison of constitutions is necessary to ensure that they include 
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similar constitutional principles providing for example for the centralisation 
or decentralisation of power. 
As far as the practical implementation of constitutional principles is 
concerned, depending upon the degree to which an independence constitution 
differs from the preceding constitution, its implementation may lag behind the 
written document. For example, in the case of independent Namibia, regional 
admi ni strati ons only became operational about three years after independence. 
Empirical measures of centralisation, which are discussed in chapter 2 below, 
can consequently only be applied once structures provided for in the 
constitution have been created and are operational. The times at which 
empirical measures of centralisation have been applied will thus vary between 
the case studies, depending upon when practical realities reflect 
constitutional provisions. 
Constitutions may not have much of an impact on the lives of a state's 
citizens in circumstances of military rule, or where a single person, or what 
is termed a 'personal ruler' rules. The three case studies under 
consideration, as already referred to above, are regarded as constitutional 
states, that is, states which function in terms of the principles of a written 
constitution. 
The locus of political power and decision making may also shift without any 
amendment to a constitution. In recent decades in many states, whether unitary 
or federa 1, the locus of power has moved towards central authorities 
(governments) (Blonde l 1990) . 
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This thesis aims to describe and explain the factors which contributed to the 
formulation of a written centralised unitary constitutional document at a 
specific point in time, that is, at independence. 
1.6.3 The descriptive and explanatory methods 
In order to explain the origins of the centralised unitary constitutional form 
one needs to describe the realities that formed the environment for its 
evolution. Description contributes towards explanation. Explanation may be 
undertaken in terms of reasons, causes and functions served (Van Dyke 1960:22 
et seq.). 
Political phenomena result from the actions of human beings. One therefore 
needs to explain the actions of individuals and groups in so far as their 
constitutional preferences are concerned. This may include, for example, 
individual leaders and political groupings. One needs, moreover, to explain 
the causes for actions, to explain a condition or a state of affairs that has 
contributed to a particular constitutional form. These may include, for 
example, early colonisation processes and geographic factors. Finally, 
political structures may perform certain functions within a state. A 
centralised unitary constitution may, for example, perform the function of 
nation-building. 
More generally, in order to explain in a comprehensive manner the origins of 
the centralised unitary state, reference must be made to existing empirical 
and normative theories; the views and ideologies of African elites; and 
instances where centralised unitary constitutions have been adopted. Implicit 
in much of the process of political enquiry is comparative analysis, the 
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function of which is to identify uniformities and differences and to explain 
them (Macridis in Lewis et al. 1978:16). 
In the final chapter of this thesis an attempt is made to explain the most 
important factors determining the origins of a centralised unitary 
constitutional form in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia. References are thus 
made, in a comparative context, to these three case studies. 
1.7 APPROACHES 
Approaches denote the criteria by which relevant data are se 1 ected for 
description and explanation. 
The evolution of a constitution can be described and explained in terms of a 
number of approaches and explanatory hypotheses. These include the following: 
historical, elite, ideological, and functional approaches (Van Maarseveen et 
al. 1978:237-238; Van Dyke 1960:116 et seq.). Explanatory hypotheses are 
posited at the beginning of each of the discussions of the three case studies. 
These hypotheses suggest tentative explanations for the evolution of the 
unitary constitutional form. They are used, together with Etzioni 's conceptual 
scheme, to further organise the case study content. The hypotheses posited are 
later confirmed in the body of the relevant case study. 
1.7.1 The historical approach 
Constitutions are the products of history. In terms of this approach, 
historical factors are identified and connections made which explain the 
evolution of a particular constitutional form. This thesis covers an 
22 
historical time period. The general approach to the thesis material is 
historical and therefore the three approaches referred to below can be seen 
as supportive of this approach. 
1.7.2 The elite approach 
Much of the analysis in this thesis focuses on political or leadership elites, 
since it was a relatively small number of decision makers who influenced the 
adoption of unitary constitutional forms in the three countries concerned. 
Elites are those who possess most political power and make the most important 
political decisions in, or for, the population of a state. 
Elites contribute towards constitution making over a period of time. They also 
have ideological, functional and psychological objectives in opting for one 
constitutional form in preference to another. Thus the elite approach must be 
utilised in combination with other approaches. 
1.7.3 The ideological approach 
This approach involves value judgements, that is the values that contribute 
towards a particular constitutional form. Characteristic of this approach is 
the advocacy by political leaders of a strong centralised government. 
Reference is made to some of the contemporary thought of African leaders which 
has contributed to the adoption of unitary constitutional forms in order to 
delineate the ideological climate prevailing at the time of their adoption, 
particularly in Africa. 
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1.7.4 The functional approach 
Constitutions are one of many phenomena in a society. They are also a 
component of the socio-political system. The questions of whether a 
constitution creates, preserves or effects a socio-political system is 
described and analysed in this study. 
1.8 RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 
In the literature on African constitutions (referred to in chapter 4 below}, 
the reasons for the adoption of federal constitutional forms are generally 
spelled out, as are the objections to federal constitutions. The reasons for 
the rejection of unitary constitutional forms are also given, although not in 
any great detail. The positive arguments in favour of unitary constitutional 
forms, by contrast, receive little attention. Often, arguments in favour of 
federations are, by implication, arguments against unitary constitutional 
forms. Thus a number of inferences have to be made. 
As African states, the written material on Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia is 
relatively easily researched, since reports on debates held in the pre-
independence legislatures are readily accessible, as are other archival 
sources. The studies of Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia also involve research 
in the field. 
A number of techniques have been followed in this study in eliciting the 
required information. 
Elites involved with or knowledgeable about the independence processes of the 
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respective countries under consideration have been interviewed. Further, 
primary sources have been consulted, inc 1 udi ng contemporary newspapers, 
legislative council debates and archival collections. Secondary sources have 
also been consulted. 
The reasons for adopting one or other constitutional form are not always 
spelled out. Often subjective judgements have to be made as to whether the 
reasons advanced, or views taken, are, in fact, supportive of unitarism and 
a unitary constitutional form. For example, the support for the creation of 
a single legislative council within an ethnically divided territory may also 
be taken as support for a unitary constitutional form. 
1.9 FURTHER RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This thesis focuses on the detail of the pre-independence period of three 
particular African states. It focuses, moreover, on a single dimension of the 
constitutional evolution of the three states. This sets up possibilities for 
similar research undertakings. 
Other African states could be included as research topics on the origins of 
the centralised unitary state, in order to be able to generalise more widely 
and with a greater degree of accuracy. 
Further, other centralising structures, like the role of the executive, the 
single political party and bureaucracy could be researched. A more in-depth 
analysis of ideology and its impact on the creation of the centralised unitary 
state could also be examined. The analysis of the evolution of the 
increasingly centralised unitary state could be extended into the post-
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independence period. The impact or consequences of the centralised unitary 
state and contemporary linkages between constitutional form and political, 
economic and social decay and conflict could be examined on a broader scale 
than has already been undertaken, through empirical field research, as 
referred to in the literature above and in chapters 4 and 8. 
A tentative start has been made in this thesis to devise and refine empirical 
indicators for degrees of centralisation within the state. These indicators 
could be further refined. 
As Bratton and Rothchild point out, in the rapid rush towards decolonisation 
and the crystallisation of authoritarianism, little opportunity was given to 
African leaders to legislate for a form of government rightfully their own 
{Hyden and Bratton 1992:284). In establishing such governments, Africans need 
to understand the origins of the centralised unitary state and the nature of 
the relationship between the state and society. Africa is at present 
undergoing a process of democratic transformation and the origins of existing 
political structures need to be understood before they can be reformed. 
1.10 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
Before an in-depth analysis of the origins of the centralised unitary state 
can be undertaken, clarification is necessary concerning the definitions of 
concepts relating to unitary and federal states and the centralisation and 
decentralisation of power. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis is devoted to an exposition of the usage of key 
concepts. 
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Chapter 3 contains a brief overview of the evolution of the historical unitary 
state and some of the theory, both normative and empirical. The evolution of 
the historical state is important for an understanding of the distribution of 
power in the contemporary state, as well as of some of the assumptions upon 
which the contemporary state is based. Both descriptive and prescriptive or 
normative theories on the state are discussed where they rel ate to its 
historical evolution. 
Chapter 4 contains an overview of the literature on the arguments for and 
against the unitary state within a general African context, as spelled out by 
African leaders and commentators on Africa's constitutional and political 
evolution. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 deal with the adoption of centralised unitary 
constitutional forms in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia, respectively, at the 
time of independence. The material contained in these chapters is based upon 
field work interviews, archival and other primary and secondary sources. The 
evolution of the centralised unitary state is traced back to the early 
colonisation period. In each of the case studies several hypotheses are made 
and later confirmed. 
Chapter 8 makes some general conclusions on the origins of centralised unitary 
constitutional forms, and compares the experiences of Botswana, Zimbabwe and 
Namibia as constitutional states at the time of independence. A number of 
inductive propositions are advanced, based upon the three case studies, as to 
when an African state is likely to adopt a centralised unitary constitutional 
form. In a Postscript, reference is made to constitutional reassessment in 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia in the post-independence period; the 
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reassessment process in Africa and literature sources; and the prospects for 
constitutional reform on the continent. 
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Chapter 2 
DEFINITIONS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the literature, imprecision and disagreement abound on the definition and 
use of political and legal concepts such as 'unitary', 'unitarism', 
'federation', 'federalism', 'centralisation', 'decentralisation', 
'deconcentration' and 'devolution'. The aim of this chapter is to define and 
explain these concepts as they are used in this thesis. Definitions of these 
concepts will serve, first to identify centralised unitary states as case 
studies; and secondly, to demarcate the scope of the thesis, and the factors 
and debates contributing to and surrounding the origins of centralised unitary 
constitutions in the three case studies of Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia. 
Further, it is intended that these definitions will also contribute to a 
greater clarity and consistency in the usage of these concepts by those 
writing on related issues. In this chapter, some of the political, historical, 
legal, administrative and fiscal dimensions of the above-mentioned concepts 
and other related ones will be focused upon. 
2.2 UNITARY, UNITARIAN, UNITARIST, UNITARIANISM, UNITARISM, UNIFIED AND 
UNIFICATION 
2.2.1 Unitary 
An agreed upon definition of the word 'unitary' is central to this study. The 
Oxford English Dictionary (1989:78} defines 'unitary' in generic terms as: 'Of 
or pertaining to, characterized by, based upon, or directed towards unity'. 
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Unity must be distinguished from union which is a condition for the 
establishment of a federation. 
As a political application, although not frequently used, the word 'unitary' 
may refer to the form of state (government) executive. One can refer to a 
'unitary' or monoceph{, ous executive, where the head of state is a 1 so the head 
of government, or to a dualistic or bicephalous executive, where the functions 
of head of state and head of government are divided between two offices 
(Selassie 1974:22). The word may also be used in an historical sense when 
referring to the creation of unitary parliaments from feudal structures 
existing in England from the thirteenth century onwards (Anderson 1979:114). 
Besides political and historical applications, the word 'unitary' has 
mathematical and physics applications which are not of concern in this thesis 
(Mackey 1989; Rogawski 1990). 
The word 'unitary' is used on occasions in conjunction with the word 'state' 
(Strong 1966:80). The 'state' is defined in chapter 1 as having a geographic 
territory extending over a large or small area, a large or small population, 
and having sovereignty, that is having a political organisation and the 
capacity to make, change and enforce laws. 'Unitary' refers, in this sense, 
to the constitutional form within the geographic state. 'Unitary' may also be 
used in conjunction with 'constitution' when it is taken to refer to the 
actual document establishing institutions and regulating relationships. In 
terms of definitions by Strong (1966:84) and Alen (1975:13), there are two 
essential qualities of a unitary state and unitary constitution: the central 
V' 
be supreme; and there must be an absence of 
subsidiary 
or authority must 
J. b d. sovereign o 1es. 
government 
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For the purposes of this thesis, the definitions of Strong (1966) and Alen 
(1975) are followed. The problem of what is understood by a 'central 
government or authority' and 'subsidiary sovereign bodies' will be discussed 
below. 
2.2.2 Unitarfan 
A 'unitarian', according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is one 'advocating, 
promoting, or directed towards national unity, union, or centralization in 
government and administration'. The concept may also be used to refer to 'an 
advocate of national or political unity; one who supports the union of several 
states into one confederation under a central government'. The concepts 
'unity' and 'union' are explained below (1989:77). The word 'unitarian' thus 
refers to a person or group advocating the centralisation of government and 
administration within existing state boundaries. The word 'unitarian' was used 
frequently in the nineteenth century to refer to the unification movements in 
Argentina and Italy. It was also used by A.V. Dicey, a leading English 
constitutional lawyer writing in the late nineteenth century, to distinguish 
a unitary from a federal system of government (1967:155). Dicey referred to 
'unitarian' and 'federal' systems of government. Used in this sense, the word 
'unitarian' has since fallen into disuse. 
2.2.3 Unitarist 
The word 'unitarist' can similarly refer to one 'advocating, promoting, or 
directed towards national unity, union, or centralisation in government and 
administration' (Oxford English Dictionary 1989:77). The word 'unitarist' has 
its applications in contemporary constitutional discourse. 
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2.2.4 Unitarianism 
The concept 'unitarianism' refers to persons 'accepting, professing or 
advocating the doctrines of unitarianism; belonging to a religious body or 
sect of unitarians' (Oxford English Dictionary 1989:78). According to Wright, 
'unitarianism' refers to a 'liberal movement which developed within the 
congregational churches of New England in the eighteenth century, emerging as 
unitarianism in the nineteenth'(l976:3). Dicey also used the word 
'unitarianism' to refer to the unitary constitutional model (1959:139). This 
term used in a constitutional sense has also fallen into disuse, and since 
about 1910 the word 'unitarism' has gained frequency for referring to a 
unitary constitution (Oxford English Dictionary 1989:78). 
2.2.5 Unitarism 
'Unitarism' is then understood to refer to the belief in and the existence of 
a unitary state. It will be used in this sense in this thesis. The word 
'unitarism' may acquire additional meaning if compared with the concepts of 
'federation' and 'federalism'. 
2.2.6 Unified and unification 
Newton, writing in 1923, refers to 'federal' and 'unified constitutions' in 
the context of the forming of associations between states. Where a part of the 
sovereignty of the associating states is placed in the hands of a common 
authority, he refers to a 'federation', and where a more complete association 
is formed between two or more states, he refers to 'unification'; and the 
written instrument regulating this relationship between the citizens and the 
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sovereign power, as either a 'federal' or a 'legislative union' (1923:2). Lord 
Durham who comes under discussion in chapter 4 below, refers to 'federal 
unions' and 'legislative unions' (Coupland 1945:Ivi). Both usages of the terms 
'unified constitution' and 'legislative union' have, however, fallen into 
disuse. 
2.3 FEDERATION AND FEDERALISM 
'Federation' and 'federalism' have been defined by numerous authorities, 
v ' i including, for example: Wheare (1963), Strong" (1966), Dicey (1967), Alen 
(1975), Van Vuuren & Kriek (1983), Duchacek (1986), Burgess (1986) and Elazar 
(1987). 
Burgess, quoting King defines federation as, 
'an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign 
state, and distinguished from other such states solely by the 
fact that its central government incorporates regional units in 
its decision procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis' 
(1986:17). 
Federations usually come about when independent states give up some of their 
independence to achieve union rather than unity. According to Strong, 'union' 
refers to the establishment of a federation, by states ceding certain 
sovereign powers to a central authority, whereas 'unity' refers to the ceding 
of all sovereign powers to a central authority and the creation of a unitary 
~tate (1966:104). A union of formerly sovereign states creates a federation, 
while a unity of formerly sovereign states creates a unitary state. 
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A conceptual distinction between federalism and federation with particular 
reference to Western Europe is drawn by Burgess. In terms of his definition, 
../ 
the federal principle is an organising one and federation is the 
organisational form that corresponds to this principle (1986:17). According 
to Burgess: 
Federalism informs federation and vice versa, but it is al so 
intricately woven into the discussion of 'pluralism' and 'plural 
societies' . . . . "Pluralism reflects a much broader theoret i ca 1 
concern than federal ism. But federal ism can still be fitted 
within it" (1986:19-20). 
The notion of pluralism is referred to in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
'Federalism', when shorn of its European cultural and historical context, can 
be taken to mean 'ideological position, philosophical statement and empirical 
fact' (Burgess 1986:20). 'Federalism' can then be regarded as signifying, 
the recommendation and (sometimes) the active promotion of 
support for federation. This can take the form of an overtly 
prescriptive guide to action and/or a normative judgement upon 
the ideal organisation of human relations and conduct. It can 
also be viewed as empirical fact to the extent that it recognises 
/ diversity - broadly conceived in its social, economic and 
political contexts - as a living reality, something which exists 
independent of ideological and philosophical perceptions .... The 
way people live their lives and organise themselves is 
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intrinsically federal, it is a natural social reality expressive 
of multiple roles, aims and identities (Burgess 1986:20). 
'::,.\Burgess holds that there may be federalism without federation, but there can 
be no federation without some matching variety of federalism (1986:21). He 
does, however, point out that these perspectives are 'contentious and 
contestable'. 'Federalism' he says, derives its meaning from its context. 
It appears that 'federalism' is therefore embedded in the political culture 
of a political system. More specifically, a component of a federalist 
political culture may be the sentiment existing amongst populations who see 
local and regional authorities in their territorial state as the authorities 
they may look to for governmental performance in certain defined areas. They 
may also show their loyalty to and identify with these tiers of government, 
and protest against encroachment upon the legislative and administrative 
competencies of the same. 
It is maintained in this thesis that 'unitarism' can then be regarded as the 
converse of federalism and refers to the, active promotion of support for a 
unitary constitutional order. It can also be a normative judgement upon the 
ideal organisation of human relations and conduct. Further, 'unitarism' can 
be viewed as an empirical fact in that while it recognises diversity in its 
social, economic and political contexts, it attempts to ignore or minimise 
that diversity. 'Unitarism' like 'federalism', might also be embedded in the 
political culture of a state. A unitarist may promote unitarism within a 
state, that is, the belief in, or the creation of a unitary state. In terms 
of a unitarist political culture, the central and highest authority may, in 
a similar way, be regarded by the population as the authority through which 
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they express themselves politically, with which they identify, and to which 
they pledge their loyalty. 
Similarly, unitarism can exist in a political culture within a federation, 
just as federalism can exist without federation but as a component of the 
political culture of a unitary state. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the words 'unitary' and 'unitarism' will be 
used. 'Unitary' I take to refer to a formal constitution, and 'unitarism' to 
the philosophy and processes underpinning the adoption and functioning of a 
unitary constitutional model. 
2.4 THE UNITARY STATE 
In terms of the definition derived from those of Strong and Alen, there are 
two essential qualities of a 'unitary state' as established in terms of a 
/ 
constitution: 'the supremacy of the central government or authority'; and the 
absence of 'subsidiary sovereign bodies'. These two qualities need to be 
explained in greater detail. 
2.4.1 Supremacy of the central authority 
In order to make and enforce laws, the state must have a supreme authority 
which is referred to as a government and is further defined in chapter I 
above. Government is, '"that organisation in which is vested ... the right to 
exercise sovereign powers"' (Strong 1966 :8). A government must al so have 
military power or control over the armed forces, legislative power, and the 
power to tax and spend revenue. Central authorities or governments can consist 
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of a number of different structures each performing different functions. For 
,/ 
example, government can be parl iamenta;:J or extra-parliamentary as in the 
British and American political systems; there might be a clear separation of 
powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary; government might be 
presidential or parliamentary in nature; the executive may be monocephalous 
or bicephalous, or power might be exercised through the personal rule of an 
individual, as is the case in a number of states in Africa. 
One can also refer to unitary and federal constitutional forms where 
sovereignty is either concentrated or divided between central and lower tiers 
of government. What is important for the identification of the unitary state, 
- --"- '' 
is that political power is exercised by a single supreme government within the 
state. The structure of the central government, whether for example, it be 
presidential or parliamentary or elected on a constituency or proportional 
basis, is not of importance in defining the unitary state. Second- and third-
tiers of government may nevertheless exercise power on behalf of a central 
government either as provincial, regional, district or local administrations 
as occurs in the three case studies under consideration in this thesis. Power 
can be highly centralised or decentralised for a state to also qualify as 
unitary. 
2.4.2 Subsidiary sovereign bodies 
The meaning of the concept 'sovereignty' has been vigorously debated in the 
literature. Strong says that: 'The pro bl em of sovereignty is one of the utmost 
difficulty' (1966:80). Sovereignty is a key concept in the identification of 
unitary or federal constitutional forms. Raphael in an attempt to explain the 
concept of sovereignty claims that: 
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To say that the State is sovereign is to say that the State has 
supreme or final authority in a community, that its rules 
override the rules of any other association (1970:51). 
The historical evolution of the idea of sovereignty is discussed in chapter 
3 of this thesis. 
Writing about the English constitution, Dicey avers that parliamentary 
sovereignty is the right of parliament 
to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person 
or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament (1967:40). 
The question arising from this is, at what point is a subsidiary authority 
sovereign or not? In what circumstances has the central authority the right 
to override legislation of a subsidiary authority? No clear answer to this 
question can be found. 
If a constitution does contain a special procedure to amend the powers of a 
subsidiary authority, then that con st i tut ion must be federa 1 in nature. 
However, as Strong points out: 'Federalism [federation] is, in fact, of 
varying shades of completeness and exactitude'(l966:65). Although a 
constitution may incorporate a special amending procedure, in the process of 
identifying unitary and federal constitutions, one must, for example, examine 
the structures and functions performed by subsidiary authorities. Although 
subsidiary structures exist, they may have minimal functions or powers 
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allocated to them, for example, they may be simply advisory structures. The 
means of identifying a unitary or federal constitution may therefore lie in 
the degree of centralisation, decentralisation or deconcentrat ion provided for 
in the state concerned. 
In relation to both unitary and federal constitutional models, the concepts 
of 'autonomy' and 'devolution' are also used. 'Autonomy' is often applied 
imprecisely to refer either to powers exercised by second-tier authorities as 
sovereign powers, or decentralised or deconcentrated powers. The concepts of 
decentra 1 i sat ion and deconcentrat ion are defined below. The concept of 
autonomy may refer to the exercise of decentra 1 i sed, deconcentrated or 
devolved powers at second- and third-tier levels of government. A lower tier 
of government may be autonomous, but not sovereign. The concept of devolution 
should refer to the allocation of powers to a lower tier of government to be 
exercised as sovereign powers. Devolution is therefore one of the 
characteristics of a federation, in which lower tiers of government are 
sovereign in the exercise of certain powers. These powers cannot be removed 
except by special legislative procedure. This is the sense in which these two 
concepts are used in this thesis. If one uses the term 'autonomous 
authorities', one needs to qualify whether the term refers to sovereign or 
non-sovereign authorities. 
2.5 CENTRALISATION, DECENTRALISATION, DECONCENTRATION AND THE UNITARY STATE 
According to Duchacek, 'no national government, whether democratic, 
authoritarian, or totalitarian, finds it physically possible, administratively 
effective, or politically wise to enact and enforce all rules from the centre' 
(1986:59). Rule-making and rule-enforcing powers are thus divided vertically 
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and horizontally, that is, hierarchically in terms of appropriate super-
ordinatioland subordinatfll'n and co-ordinately in terms of specific functional 
or geographically determined responsibility (Duchacek lg86:59}. 
In terms of the vertical distribution of legislative and executive powers, 
certain powers may be granted to different tiers of government or territorial 
units below that of the central government. Similar powers distributed 
vertically by the central government may al so be granted to a number of 
territorial units within the same state, hence the horizontal distribution of~ 
powers. The scope of authority granted to territorial units can vary greatly 
from state to state. This authority can also vary over time, and according to 
leaders' personalities. Such vertical distribution of authority is referred 
to as 'decentralisation' or 'deconcentration'. As a corollary to the 
decentralisation of power, one can speak of the 'centralisation' of political 
power. 
The definition of the concepts 'decentralisation', 'deconcentration' and 
'centralisation', and the measurement of the degree of 'central i sat 1 on' or the 
converse, the degree of 'decentralisation', elicit a great deal of debate and 
disagreement in the literature. An attempt will be made below to formulate a 
definition of the concepts 'centralisation' and 'decentralisation' by 
referring to a number of authorities in the field. 
The concept of centralisation is relatively simple to define and yet it is 
complex to measure (Blondel 1990:223, Fesler 1965:536-537). Indicators of the 
extent to which decisions are taken at or away from the centre are 
impressionistic and therefore unsatisfactory. Blondel defines the concepts of 
'centralisation' and 'decentralisation' as follows, 
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if one were to list all the decisions taken in a country by all 
the public bodies, that country would tend to be centralised if 
the proportion of the decisions taken by the central authorities 
was large to very large and tend, on the contrary, to be de-
centralised if the proportion was small to very small (1990:223). 
The difficulty with this definition is the relative implication of what is 
meant by 'decisions taken'. Individual decisions, for example, can have large 
or small implications for the population of a country. As Blondel (1990) 
points out, this approach too is likely to be impressionistic and therefore 
unsatisfactory. 
Gellar say that 'centralization is a somewhat static term that simply refers 
to the concentration of formal power within a single political authority' 
(Wunsch and Olowu 1990:131). This is yet another impressionistic definition. 
While the term tells us something about the structure of formal power, it does 
not tell one much about the relationship between the centralised state and the 
rest of society. The centralised state, for example, functions differently in 
France, which is a political democracy, from Africa, where the centralised 
state is formally powerful but in practice not all-powerful. Reference was 
made in chapter 1 to the 'weak' or 'soft' state, which is the condition 
typical of many African states. Once again this is a subjective definition. 
According to Alen, the concepts 'centralisation' and 'decentralisation' may 
be elucidated with the question of whether all activities are carried out by 
the same structures for the whole state, or whether certain activities are 
carried out by different structures for distinct groups in the state 
(1975:13). Alen introduces the idea of different structures as a requirement 
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for decentralised government. This definition is useful in so far as 
centralised and decentralised governmental and administrative structures can 
be identified through legislative provision and practice, but it does not 
reveal much about degrees of centralisation and decentralisation. 
Alen further identifies a number of legal criteria for centralisation of power 
in a state ( 1975: 14-15). In terms of these criteria, the centralised authority 
has, in pri nci pl e, no legal personality separate from that of the state. 
However, this is not an absolute criterion for the existence of a centralised 
state. Often legal personality is, for practical reasons, awarded by central 
government authorities to lower levels of government. The decisive legal 
criterion for a centralised authority is, according to him, the hierarchical 
capacity of the central authority to carry out its functions without a 
specific law empowering it (1975:14-15). In terms of Alen's legal criterion 
for a centralised state there is a co-incidence with the earlier definitions 
of a unitary state - 'the hierarchical capacity of the central authority'. 
Alen also distinguishes between political centralisation and administrative 
centralisation (1975:16): the former refers to uniformity in legislation, and 
the latter to uniformity in the execution of laws and their administration. 
For the purposes of the quantification of centralisation through the use of 
fiscal measures, the emphasis is placed on legislative centralisation, that 
is the decision making by legislatures which becomes embodied in legislation 
providing for the allocation of money by government. 
As mentioned above, there are different tiers of authority to which power can 
be decentralised. Political decision making can be decentralised from the 
centre to lower structures. Further, administrative decision making may be 
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transferred from the centre to lower structures, including autonomous and 
semi-autonomous organisations 1 i ke parastatal s. This process may be undertaken 
in two ways, either by deconcentration or decentralisation. The locus of 
decision making, as referred to by Alen (1975) above, either at the political 
or administrative levels in the public domain, is important in determining 
whether a state is centralised or decentralised. 
In the case of many African states, political parties may be important 
decision makers, highly centralised and often hardly distinguishable from 
state structures. Because of the difficulty, in many cases, of distinguishing 
the political party from government structures, political party inputs to 
decision making, where they occur, are not distinguished from what would 
generally be considered government inputs. 
Mawhood refers to the 'deconcentration' of decision making (1993:1). 
Administrative authority is delegated to officials, and may be amended or 
withdrawn without having to follow any legislative procedures. By contrast, 
decision making and administrative bodies may be created as bodies separate 
from the nat i ona 1 centre, in which l oca 1 representatives are given the 
authority to decide upon public matters. Their ability to operate in this way 
is provided for in ordinary legislation. This process, which Mawhood (1993:2) 
refers to as 'decentralization', is unlike devolution as referred to above, 
where power is allocated to lower authorities by a central authority and is 
entrenched constitutionally through a special amending procedure. It is, as 
has been mentioned, one criterion for federation. 
The decentralisation and deconcentration of powers to lower tiers of 
government are delegated by a central government. They may also be retracted 
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by the central government, without having to follow any special legislative 
procedure. 'Delegation' refers to the process of entrusting decision-making 
power to a lower tier of government. 
2.5.l Centralisation and the unitary state 
The degree to which the decentralisation of power is characteristic of a 
federal system of government, while the centralisation of power is 
characteristic of a unitary system of government, is by no means clear. In 
this regard Blondel claims: 
It is only on average that unitary states have fewer 
'decentralising' characteristics than federations it is 
therefore not possible to demonstrate rigorously that federal 
countries are more decentralised than unitary states (1990:231-
233). 
Centralisation or decentralisation of power is also considered to be part of 
the capacity of a particular authority to make decisions. The greater the 
decision-making capacity of a particular authority, the more power that 
authority possesses. The distribution of this decision-making power determines 
whether a state is centralised or decentralised. 
Further, elected decision-making structures at a second-tier level of 
government are also not a good indicator of levels of centralisation or 
decentralisation. An elected authority may have very little decision-making 
power, and therefore a particular state may be considered to be centralised. 
To achieve greater certainty on whether a particular state may be considered 
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to be centralised, quantitative measures need to be devised. 
2.6 QUANTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF CENTRALISATION 
This thesis is concerned with the identification of centralised unitary states 
by the degree of power exercised by formal structures at the first, second or 
third-tiers of government as provided for in a constitution. Political and 
legal criteria have been described above according to which a distinction may 
be drawn between a unitary and federal constitution. As pointed out, unitary 
and federal states can be centralised or decentralised. The need then is to 
utilise an empirical measure or measures in addition to political, legal and 
administrative ones, to determine whether a state is centralised or 
decentralised. Many of the indicators, discussed above, are merely 
impressionistic. 
One can identify different administrative structures and legal competencies, 
and count, for example, the number of decisions made by different tiers of 
government, but these measures still do not indicate the degree of 
centralisation or decentralisation of power within a state. 
Krane believes that: 
Fiscal indicators of concentration/devolution of national control 
possess the highest utility for macrocomparative research because 
of their continuity over several decades and their 
manipulability, which facilitates rearrangement into comparable 
measures despite differences in national accounting practices 
(Picard and Zariski 1987:37). 
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Smith has also devised a number of quantitative measures of centralisation or 
decentralisation which may be used for comparative purposes (Jones 1980:138-
141). To identify the centralised unitary states according to the parameters 
of this thesis, quantitative and fiscal measures devised both by Krane and 
Smith are utilised and modified where necessary. 
Although Krane and Smith refer to additional measures, like the ratios of 
revenue collected by different tiers of government and the ratios of personnel 
employed by them, these measures will not be used, because of the difficulty 
in obtaining the relevant statistics. 
Two measures are used here. First, total central government expenditure is 
calculated as a percentage of total government expenditure including that of 
regional and local authorities over a calendar or financial year. Secondly, 
total central government expenditure is expressed as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). 
2.6.1 Assumptions 
My general assumption when employing fiscal measures of centralisation, is 
that the greater the amount of money expended by that government or authority, 
the greater its ability to influence the behaviour of individuals or groups. 
This authority can be described as being more or less powerful than another 
authority, in that it can affect the behaviour of others1 • 
1
• The notion of 'power' is understood to refer to the ability of a 
person or group to affect the behaviour of other individuals or groups in 
specified ways, by the threat or imposition of some form of sanction. 'Power' 
in this thesis is understood to refer to a relationship between the ability 
of a central authority to allocate or withdraw fiscal resources and thereby 
secure compliance by lower tier authorities (Roberts 1971:171 P). 
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My contention is that when more than fifty-percent of expenditure is expended 
by the central government in a state, that state can be said to be 
centralised. 
2.6.2 Explanation and application of fiscal measures 
The benefit of using fiscal measures is that they take the identification and 
measurement of the centralisation and decentra 1 i sat ion of pol iti ca 1 power 
beyond political and legal criteria. Although an attempt has been made above 
to define a centralised unitary state in terms of constitutional and legal 
criteria, discrepancies may exist between legal form and practice as referred 
to in chapter 1. 
As far as the first measure is concerned, actual total central government 
expenditure as obtained from a budget is expressed as a percentage of total 
expenditure expended by regional and local governments within a particular 
country in a particular calendar or financial year. The assumption is that 
expenditure of income, whether derived from taxes raised by central, 
provincial or local authorities, is indicative of the power possessed by those 
tiers of government. This is, however, not a perfect indicator as budgets of 
provincial and local authorities may, to varying degrees, be subject to the 
approval of the central authority; or certain allocations or transfer payments 
from central authorities to second- and third-tier authorities may have 
conditions imposed upon their utilisation. Requirements of this nature would, 
in turn, diminish the power of provincial and local authorities. A further 
problem with this measure, and particularly in the developing countries, is 
that statistics for second- and third-tier government expenditure are not 
always readily available. Estimates therefore have to be made. 
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As far as the second measure is concerned, developing countries generally 
publish their nation a 1 accounts, or income and expenditure accounts for 
particular periods of time. National income can therefore be used as a rough 
indicator of the degree of centralisation or decentralisation of power within 
a state. It is the basic measure of economic activity and represents the total 
output of an economy over a given accounting period. The total value of output 
produced within a state's borders is referred to as gross domestic product 
(GDP). National income may be analysed in terms of a circular flow of income. 
The total value of goods and services produced by the factors of production 
like industries and government activities, is roughly equal to the incomes 
paid to those factors of production, which may include taxes and subsidies. 
Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that decisions are taken 
by central authorities to allocate income collected. The greater the level of 
expenditure by the central authority in relation to the total economy, the 
more centralised are the decision-making structures and po 1 it i cal power within 
that state. It should, however, be recognised that not all economic decisions 
are made by governments. This measure therefore is only a general indicator 
of where the major decision-making authority of a state lies. GDP is also not 
a completely accurate measure of national economic activity because of under-
counting and over-counting of the value of goods produced. 
However approximate the measure is, it is useful in a comparative context, as 
there is no generally accepted norm prescribing the degree to which a 
government should be involved in an economy. Some comparative statistics of 
expenditure and lending minus repayments as a percentage of GDP for a 
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particular year at the central government level are: 2 France (1982) 57; 
Sweden (1982) 71; United Kingdom (1982) 50; United States of America (1982) 
38; Kenya (1981) 33; and South Africa (1981) 31 (Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into Taxation 1986). For the purposes of this thesis, if expenditure 
amounts to 30 percent and more of GDP, then government is considered to be 
substantially involved in an economy. 
2.7 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
Confusion abounds in the literature as to the definition and criteria for a 
unitary state, a centralised state and the relationship between the two 
concepts. The constitutional state and the notion of constitutional ism date 
from the time of the Greek city state. Concepts 1 ike unitarism and the unitary 
state have been recognised by academics and others only from about the early 
nineteenth century, although some of the theory behind these concepts dates 
back several centuries. Some of the early theoretical understanding concerning 
these concepts is discussed in chapter 3. 
Four criteria for the definition and identification of centralised unitary 
states are used in this thesis: namely political, legal, administrative and 
fiscal criteria. However, these criteria are not yet watertight. Some of the 
difficulties in defining these concepts have been pointed out above. 
Impressionistic criteria, in addition to the four explained above, still need 
to be used. 
2
• Further refinement of this indicator of centralisation is necessary. 
These ratios vary over time. Al so accounting procedures may vary between 
countries. The average for these three countries was 47 per cent. To make a 
real comparison of government involvement in an economy, one needs a more 
representative sample of the countries of the world. 
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These four criteria will be applied in chapters 5, 6 and 7, in the process of 
justifying the identification of the three case studies as centralised 
constitutional unitary states. 
As far as can be ascertained, no contemporary theory under the heading of 
'unitarism' has been spelled out. A theory of 'centre-periphery relations' has 
been identified and perhaps comes closest to explaining the origins of the 
unitary state. Theories of the state and practical applications of unitarism 
will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
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Chapter 3 
THE THEORY AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRALISED UNITARY STATE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has two aims: first to analyse some of the theories prescribing, 
describing, explaining, and conceptualising the processes that contribute to 
the creation of the centralised unitary state; and secondly, to analyse the 
historical origins of the centralised unitary state in terms of the notions 
of sovereignty and nationalism. 
The theory in this chapter deals mainly with the centralised unitary state in 
a world context, whereas in chapter 4 some of the literature and theory 
pertaining, in particular, to the centralised unitary state in Africa will be 
surveyed. 
3.2 THEORY AND THE CENTRALISED UNITARY STATE 
The word theory has various meanings. Van Dyke (1960) discusses a number of 
meanings of 'theory' and categorises these under three headings: theory 
defined as thoughts, conjectures, or ideas; theory defined as the consummation 
of explanation; and theory defined as a conceptual scheme. The meanings of 
these three categories will briefly be examined as they relate to the theories 
described in this chapter. 
3.2.l Theory defined as thoughts, conjectures and ideas 
In terms of this category, 'political theory is political thought or political 
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speculation, and all three terms involve the expression of political ideas or 
"philosophizing about government"' (Van Dyke 1960:89). Also under this 
category, theories concerning the desirability and the means of promoting a 
sovereign centralised government will be discussed. 
3.2.2 Theory defined as consununation of explanation 
Theories, according to Van Dyke, deal mainly with description. The fuller the 
description is, 
the more likely it is to include explanation; that is, the more 
likely it is to include statements describing connections and 
interrelationships among phenomena so as to give knowledge of 
reasons for, or causes of, actions or conditions (1960:100). 
Theories which fall into this category do not only describe but explain the 
'how' and 'why', that is, for example, how governments may be constituted, or 
why they are constituted in a particular way. 
3.2.3 Theory defined as a conceptual scheme 
Besides theory being political thought or explanation, it can also be regarded 
as a conceptual scheme, that is, a set of interrelated concepts which reflect 
thought and convey it. Concepts are, 'the product of a discriminating 
intelligence, which puts things that are alike into a distinct category, and 
names them' (Van Dyke 1960:96). 
Once concepts have been formulated, there is, in terms of this theory, the 
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likelihood of a deliberate attempt to establish future relationships, which 
could lead to the formulation of yet more concepts, some of which will be on 
'"higher levels"' (Van Dyke 1960:96). For the purposes of this thesis, theory 
in this category constitutes a view concerning the stages and processes 
through which unification within a state evolves, rather than an explanation 
of that process. Etzioni's theory of 'political unification', formulated in 
1965, falls into this category. 
3.3 THEORIES DEALING WITH THOUGHTS, CONJECTURES AND IDEAS 
While a number of theories fall into this category, only some of the key 
theories dealing either directly or indirectly with the centralised state will 
briefly be discussed here. 
3.3.1 Monism, pluralism and dualism 
Monism is a term that provides a general description for theories which adopt 
a particular view as to the most desirable state. Monism addresses the nature 
of the state at a philosophical level. It is contrasted in the literature with 
the concepts of pl ura 1 ism and dua 1 ism (Lipson 1981: 134 et seq.) . These 
interrelationships will be illustrated below by reference to specific 
definitions. 
The meaning of the term, 'monism' is not spelled out in great detail in any 
specific body of literature, nevertheless it can be related to the philosophy 
behind the unitary state and unitarism. 'Monism' is used in commentaries like 
those of Mabbott (1958), Lipson (1981) and Vincent (1987) to label various 
theorists, some of whom are discussed below. Monism is implicit in some of the 
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ideas of these theorists. The theoretical advocates of a single, supreme 
sovereign, like Bodin for example, may be described as members of a 'monist' 
school of thought, although they are seldom labelled as such in the respective 
texts. 
Monism is described by Roberts (1971) as: 
The belief that the state is, and should be, the supreme and 
ultimate source of the laws regulating a society. While Monism 
does not exclude the existence of subordinate political or other 
social groups, it does deny that they possess any autonomous 
legal powers against the supremacy of the state (1971:129 M). 
This definition is somewhat imprecise in that Roberts (1971) does not indicate 
what is meant by 'autonomous legal powers'. If it implies that the 'subsidiary 
sovereign bodies' (referred to in chapter 2) have no place in terms of monist 
thought, then monists can be likened to a unitarist school of thought and the 
belief in a unitary state. 
The Oxford English Dictionary fails to define the concept with any greater 
precision. 'Monism is the notion ... that in any society there must be one 
supreme power or authority and this must be lodged in the state' (1989:1001). 
The 'state' is an ambiguous concept. If it is taken to refer to the central 
government or authority (as defined in chapter 2 above), then on the occasions 
when theorists are described as 'monists', they may also be termed 
'unitarists'. There is, however, not an exact correlation between monism and 
unitarism. Monism is a philosophical notion referring to the nature of the 
state rather than a specific constitutional order. 
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Mabbott distinguishes between 'abstract monism' and 'concrete monism.' 
Abstract monism, 
is the theory that the State is the only association necessitated 
by the moral and psychological nature of man and that all others 
are to be prohibited or destroyed (1958:119). 
Hobbes and Rousseau are considered to be 'abstract monists'. 
'Concrete monism' according to Mabbott, 
is the theory which welcomes within the State associations of all 
types but attempts to make them part of the State machinery, 
subordinated to its needs and its officers in every particular 
(1958:120). 
In my view, Figgis (referred to below), may be considered to be a 'concrete 
monist', although he is also labelled a pluralist. Concrete monists may 
perhaps be described as permitting a greater degree of plural ism in the state. 
Lipson attempts to illustrate a monist view of society by comparing it with 
the pluralist and dualist views (1981:135). In the monist view, 
society is, or ought to be, a unity; and for it to be unified, 
there must be a tie that binds .... Men are distracted by the 
conflicting claims upon their allegiance of separate, and often 
rival, associations. The remedy for this is to discover some 
highest good that includes and supersedes the lesser. Next, it is 
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necessary to recognise one association as responsible for 
attaining that highest good. To this let the remaining 
associations be subordinated. Thus society can become and remain 
unitary in purpose and in organization {Lipson 1981:135). 
According to a pluralist view of society: 
The strivings of mankind cannot, it is argued, be folded within 
the embrace of one supreme good or final end. Men reach out for 
ends in the plural, not for one end in the singular; and as their 
purposes are plural, the structure of society must be likewise 
{Lipson 1981:135). 
Lipson elaborates further on the distinction between the monist and pluralist 
views of society. The pluralist, 'stresses the role of society as a richly 
creative matrix of varied behaviour' whereas the monist, 
is all for unity and for the virtues he hopes will accompany it -
order, harmony, and singleness of purpose ..•. To unify society, 
it is not enough for people to feel that they belong together. 
The sentiment must be fortified with organization that 
establishes orderly and harmonious relations between groups by 
institutional procedures {Lipson 1981:136). 
The dualistic view saw politics as a field co-equal with but separate from 
that of the church. Although dualism was practised during the medieval period, 
it was considered to be a failure, ushering in a new era of monism. 
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The state, Lipson (1981) claims, performed over the centuries an integrating 
function and assumed a monistic character. This role will be analysed when the 
historical state is discussed. 
The concepts, 'abstract monism', 'concrete monism', 'pluralism' and 'dualism' 
can perhaps be viewed along a continuum. 'Abstract monism' might represent a 
belief in complete and total state centrism and control; whereas a 'dualistic' 
view might be supportive of a minimalist state and a high degree of 
decentralisation within the state. In terms of contemporary constitutional 
forms, 'abstract monists' might be associated with highly centralised unitary 
states; 'concrete monism' with a less centralised unitary state; 'pluralism' 
either with a decentra 1 i sed unitary state or a federation; and 'dua 1 i sts' with 
federation or even confederation. The dividing lines between these concepts 
are by no means cl ear-cut. This is because these concepts rel ate to the 
philosophical and sociological underpinnings of the state. They do not 
specifically prescribe a constitutional form. 
In interpreting these concepts further, in terms of a monist view of society, 
the idea of sovereign authorities within a state would not be acceptable, 
either to the abstract monist or to the concrete monist. Nor would a federal 
constitutional form (as defined in chapter 2 above) satisfy either. By 
contrast, a pluralist view of society would be accommodative of such a federal 
constitutional form, and a pluralist might accept a unitary state in which 
autonomous entities were accommodated. 
The monistic state as an historical phenomenon can be dated from about the 
tenth century B.C., whereas the notion of the unitary constitutional form and 
state is of more recent origin. The notion of the centralised unitary state 
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has thus, from about the early nineteenth century, become recognised as the 
organising structure for a monistic conception of society. 
The thoughts of selected c 1 ass i cal and modern philosophers who may be labe 11 ed 
as monists, as well as one modern pluralist, will now briefly be referred to. 
3.4 MONIST AND PLURALIST PHILOSOPHERS 
3.4.1 Aristotle 
One of the earliest references in the 1 iterature to monism appears in 
Aristotle's The Politics, written in the third century B.C. In his opening 
paragraph, Aristotle notes: 
Our own observation tells us that every state is an association 
of persons formed with a view to some good purpose. I say 'good' 
because in their actions all men do in fact aim at what they 
think good. Clearly then, as all associations aim at some good, 
that one which is supreme and embraces all others will have also 
as its aim the supreme good. That is the association which we 
call the State ... (Aristotle 1962, translation:25). 
In another reference, to law and sovereignty, Aristotle maintains, 
laws rightly framed ought to be sovereign, also that officials of 
government, whether individually or in committee, have sovereign 
power to act in all those various matters about which the laws 
cannot possibly give detailed guidance; for it is never easy to 
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frame general regulations covering every particular {1962:126). 
The central authority in a state, in his view, should not be inhibited in any 
way from pursuing its goals. According to this view, authorities sovereign in 
certain matters would not be tolerated within the Greek city state of his 
time: devolution of power in a federal state would not be acceptable to him. 
3.4.2 Machiavelli 
Niccolo Machiavelli completed the writing of the Prince in the year 1513, at 
a time when his native Italy was hopelessly divided. He desired a strong state 
capable of imposing its authority on a divided Italy. In his advice to princes 
or political leaders of the time, Machiavelli says that those who build their 
power on the people, winning their general allegiance, need not despair in 
adversity. However, principalities usually undergo crises during a transition 
from limited power to absolutism. Princes accepting absolutist rule usually 
rule directly or through magistrates. In times of adversity, these magistrates 
are able to depose the prince, either by positive action or by refusing to 
obey him. When the danger comes, the prince has little time to seize absolute 
authority. Therefore, Machiavelli claims, the prince must devise ways in which 
to ensure that his citizens are at all times and in all circumstances 
dependent upon him and on his authority {1961:70-71). 
Machiavelli's belief is in strong centralised rule and implicit in his 
thinking is that there should be no legal constraints, that is, constitutional 
constraints, on the exercise of the power and authority of the ruler. An 
absolutist ruler could then only function in a unitary state. 
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3.4.3 Bodin 
In the year 1576, Jean Bodin, a French citizen, published the Six 7ivres de 
la repub1ique (The Six Books of the Conunonwea1th), a work which was occasioned 
by the French civil wars, and was written with the avowed purpose of 
strengthening the king (Sabine 1937:399}. Royal power was seen as the 
mainstay of peace and order and Bodin sought to raise the king, as the centre 
of national unity, above all religious sects and political parties. Bodin's 
thinking, which represented a move toward strong government, was one of the 
first detailed expositions of the notion of sovereignty. 
The Six Books of the Commonwealth achieved a great reputation in its day, as 
it took the idea of sovereign power out of the limbo of theology in which the 
theory of divine right had placed it. By so doing, it led to both an analysis 
of sovereignty and its inclusion in constitutional theory (Sabine 1937:399}. 
The relationship between sovereignty and divine right is discussed below. 
Prior to the writings of Bodin, France had been torn apart by religious 
conflicts. Bodin refers extensively to these in an attempt to resolve them. 
He also refers to 'princes' and sometimes 'kings', who were the leaders or 
rulers in the state of his time. Bodin saw the sovereign princes of his day 
as creations of God who had to be revered and respected, and accorded due 
honour. Those who condemned their sovereign or prince, condemned God, which 
Bodin considered inconceivable. 
Sovereignty, according to Bodin, was the 'absolute and perpetual power vested 
in a commonwealth' (Bodin 1576:25}. A commonwealth, he considered to be 
synonymous with a state which could be either a monarchy, aristocracy or 
democracy. Sovereignty was perpetual in that it could be conferred either on 
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a person or a group of persons for a period of time by a prince. Perpetual 
authority, according to Bodin, lasted for the lifetime of him who exercised 
it. However, sovereignty awarded to a prince with conditions attached was 
neither properly sovereign nor absolute. A sovereign could not be subject to 
the commands of another. A prince, in Bodin's view, was also above the law and 
could not be bound by his own laws. Sovereign princes were, moreover, not 
bound to keep the laws of their predecessors. If they were so bound, they were 
not, properly speaking, sovereign (Bodin 1576:30-31). Bodin was thus in favour 
of absolutist rulers. As regards what might be termed the decentralisation or 
devolution of power to lesser authorities or 'Estates', Bodin says that it is 
erroneous to maintain that, 'the authority of the Estates is superior to that 
of the prince. Such doctrines serve only to encourage subjects to resist their 
sovereign rulers' (Bodin 1576:31). Lesser authorities could thus be seen as 
arenas for non-compliance with absolutist rulers. 
Bodin does allow room for the existence of 'Estates', but says that they 
should in no way qualify or diminish the sovereignty of a king. Bodin can 
therefore be labelled as a 'concrete monist'. The principal mark of sovereign 
majesty and absolute power, according to Bodin, 'is the right to impose laws 
generally on all subjects regardless of their consent ... ' (Bodin 1576:32). 
Four attributes of a sovereign prince are listed by Bodin. First, he should 
have the power to make law binding on all his subjects without the consent of 
any superior, equal or inferior being necessary. Secondly, he should be able 
to declare peace and war with neighbouring states. Thirdly, an attribute of 
sovereignty is the power to institute the great offices of state 
(government). This latter attribute refers to the ability of the sovereign to 
appoint high officials of state (government), and to authorise as well as to 
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confirm appointments made by lower officials acting in terms of delegated 
powers. Finally, a prince should be the last resort of appeal from all courts. 
If, in the last instance, his subordinates could not appeal to him, this would 
make them sovereign equals with himself {Bodin 1576:43-46). 
In a concluding observation on sovereignty, Bodin states, 
the rights of sovereignty should never be granted out to a 
subject, still less to a foreigner, for to do so is to provide a 
stepping-stone whereby the grantee himself becomes the sovereign 
{Bodin 1576:49). 
In Bodin's view, a well-ordered state must have an indivisible source of 
authority. Sovereignty must reside in one place. Bodin was clearly firm on the 
need for a sovereign central government to address the societal problems of 
his time. 
3.4.4 Hobbes 
Hobbes, taking up the issue of sovereignty in his Leviathan, published in 
1651, went further than the earlier philosophers. He argued that sovereignty 
could not be divided but was located either in one man, or in an assembly of 
more than one; and into that assembly either every man hath a right to enter, 
or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the rest (Hobbes 
1651:186). 
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Hobbes continues, 
where there is already erected a sovereign power, there can be no 
other representative of the same people, but only to certain 
particular ends by the sovereign limited. For that were to erect 
two sovereigns; and every man to have his person represented by 
two actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that 
power ... (Hobbes 1651:187). 
Hobbes continued, that if people were to live in peace, sovereignty could not 
be divided. If sovereignty was divided, this would create conditions of war 
within a state, which was contrary to the end for which the state was intended 
(Hobbes 1651:187). 
It may be deduced that Hobbes would clearly be opposed to federation in which 
sovereignty was divided in terms of a constitution, since he would see the 
potential for conflict under this constitutional form. 
3.4.5 Rousseau 
Rousseau published his Du Contrat Social (The Social Contract) in 1762. As an 
alternative to his notion of mankind's continuing in a state of nature, 
Rousseau held that only by coming together and pooling their strength could 
human beings maintain themselves. They must develop some sort of central 
direction: 
'Some form of association must be found as a result of which the 
whole strength of the community will be enlisted for the 
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protection of the person and property of each constituent member 
' (The Social Contract, 1762:255). 
In elaborating on his notion of the general will, Rousseau says the following, 
'each of us contributes to the group his person and the powers 
which he wields as a person under the supreme direction of the 
general will and we receive into the body politic each individual 
as forming an indivisible part of the whole' (The Social Contract 
1762:257). 
A definite emphasis is placed, in Rousseau's thinking, on the need for strong, 
centralised governments. 
3.4.6 Marx 
The Communist Manifesto first published by Karl Marx in 1848 became the 
accepted creed of millions of leaders and followers the world over (Taylor in 
Marx 1967:7). The Communist Manifesto and Marx's subsequent writings have 
generated a large body of literature refining and interpreting his original 
writings. This body of literature published under labels like Marxism-Leninism 
became the orthodoxy in much of the developing world including the African 
continent (Bauer in Drachkovitch 1966:150). 
Although Marx does not refer specifically to constitutions in his The 
Communist Manifesto, he refers to the need for centralisation within the 
state. Marx argues for the formation of the proletariat into a class, to 
overthrow what he perceived to be the bourgeoisie supremacy of his time, and 
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place political power in the hands of the proletariat. The proletariat he 
further argued, would amongst others, use its political supremacy to 
centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state; including 
credit, communication and transport (Marx 1888:chapt.2). Like the 
aforementioned authors, Marx in his earliest writing, places a definite 
premium on centralisation of power within the state. 
3.4.7 J.N. Figgis 
Writing in 1913, Figgis, an English academic writer, reformulates what might 
be described as the absolutist doctrine of sovereignty as subscribed to in the 
literature of his time. Every right in a state is the creation of a single and 
indivisible sovereign, whether it be a monarch or a legislative assembly: 
No prescription, no conscience, no corporate life can be pleaded 
against its authority, which is without legal limitation. In 
every state there must be some power entirely above the law ... 
to ta 1 k of rights against it is to talk of nonsense (Hirst 
1989:123). 
Figgis continues by explaining that in a situation where rights are demanded 
from the state, that state, 'is in a condition of incipient dissolution and 
anarchy is already setting in' (Hirst 1989:123). The doctrine of the absolute 
state is limited in practice. Society is, in fact, comprised of a hierarchy 
of groups like the family, school, town, county, union and church, which must 
be restrained from acts of injustice to one another. To achieve this a strong 
power is necessary for regulating the interaction between such groups (Hirst 
1989:124-125). Figgis would therefore not concede that groups other than the 
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central government be either sovereign or autonomous. 
3.4.8 Observations on the above theorists 
An attempt has been made above to define monism, and to isolate some of the 
justifications advanced by selected theorists for the creation of centralised 
authorities. These justifications are largely philosophical and sociological 
in nature. As is pointed out by Laski and this observation applies to the 
theorists above, no theory of the state is ever intelligible save in the 
context of its time (1948:i). 
Some of the common threads in these justifications are as follows: there is 
a general belief in promoting the common good, which can only be achieved 
through one body or one association, usually the state (government); the state 
(government) is considered to be the organising mechanism for bringing society 
together and for promoting order, minimising conflict and providing for the 
protection of the citizenry. Arising from this is an important question: How 
have these thoughts contributed towards the creation of centralised unitary 
states in the real world? Have they impacted upon constitution makers? 
The subsequent Marxist-Leninist 1 iterature for example, has had a speci a 1 
appeal to leaders and elites in the former colonies and developing countries. 
One of the reasons for this appeal was the perceived political and military 
success of the former Soviet Union which was associated with economic 
development and central planning, and the widespread belief in the 
possibilities of engineering in social affairs. Further, Marxism-Leninism 
implied, as Marx in his own writings did, a concentration of power in the 
hands of government, thereby being able to control society. The incentive to 
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attain and retain political power was thereby increased (Bauer in Drachkovitch 
1966). The construction of a centralised unitary state was an obvious 
corollary of this belief. 
Moreover, many leaders and leadership elites in the post World-War II period 
received education in France, the United Kingdom and the United States and 
came into contact with liberal and Marxist groupings. In France, the influence 
of the trade union movement and the ideas of Rousseau were particularly 
important. In the United Kingdom, leaders came into contact with the left wing 
of the Labour Party and the Communist Party, and in the United States concepts 
of equality as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's 
ideas about '"government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people'" (Andra in 1965). These ideas are likely to have been contributory 
factors in the adoption of centralised unitary states in the African context. 
3.5 SOVEREIGNTY, NATIONALISM AND THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 
There is no definite point in history at which one can say that the unitary 
state or the centralised unitary state came into being. Some form of 
recognisable state (as defined in chapter 2) can, however, be identified in 
the late medieval period, that is in the 1500s. The constitutional state, that 
is the state in which the operation of government is restrained by law, dates 
from about the eighteenth century. Coupled to the constitutional state is the 
notion of constitutionalism, in which the constitution protects the citizen 
from arbitrary actions of government. Many of the themes embodied in the 
constitutional state can be traced back for several centuries. 
The origins of centralised unitary constitutional forms in contemporary Africa 
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cannot be understood without reference to the historical evolution of the 
modern-day nation state and, in particular, to the development of the notions 
of sovereignty and nat i ona 1 ism. Sovereignty was, in turn, supported and 
explained by the theories of the 'divine right of kings' and 'absolutism', as 
will be explained below. As mentioned in chapter 2 above, for a unitary state 
to exist, sovereignty must be located in a central government or authority. 
The notion of sovereignty is thus central to the existence of the unitary 
state. 
Camilleri maintains that the history of sovereignty parallels the evolution 
of the modern state (1992:11). The notion of 'sovereignty' is, according to 
him, 
part of the more general discourse of power whose function is not 
only to describe political and economic arrangements but to 
explain and justify them as if they belonged to the natural order 
of things. Sovereignty in both theory and practice is aimed at 
estab 1 i sh i ng order and c 1 arity in an otherwise turbu 1 ent and 
incoherent world. Its historical function has been to act as a 
'fundamental source of truth and meaning', to distinguish between 
order and anarchy, security and danger, identity and difference 
(1992:11). 
The 'more general discourse of power' to which Camilleri refers, includes 
discussion of the theoretical notions of 'the divine right of kings', the 
'absolutist state' and the 'constitutional state'. These notions are discussed 
below. The practice aimed at 'establishing order' was in part explored during 
the discussion of the theorists above. In responding to the issues of their 
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time and to periods of upheaval, they pleaded for something supreme in their 
respective states. What might be referred to as monistic sovereignty had a 
definite role to play in such circumstances. 
In order to understand the notion of sovereignty, one needs to turn to 
historical Europe, which is the cradle of the modern sovereign state. 
3.5.1 Historical Europe 
From about the ninth and tenth centuries, the Roman Empire began to 
disintegrate and this ushered in the medieval period in Europe and the system 
of feudalism. The essential feature of feudalism was the division of land into 
small units under the control of lords or barons. The feudal system consisted 
of a maze of small kingdoms, principalities, duchies, quasi-autonomous 
institutions and churches. No clear demarcation between the domestic and 
external spheres of organisation, no sharp dividing line between 'public 
territories' and 'private estates' existed during the feudal era (Camilleri 
1992:12). 
During the Medieval period, however, both rulers and ruled were subject to a 
universal legal order which reflected and derived its authority from the law 
of God. The church provided, 'the feudal order with an overarching, 
organisational and moral framework transcending both l ega 1 and pol it ica 1 
boundaries' (Camilleri 1992:12). 
By the end of the fifteenth century, Europe was comprised of some 500 more or 
less independent political units, somewhat akin to Africa at the end of the 
nineteenth century. At about this time, the old feudal order was in visible 
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decline. With the growth of trade and the manufacturing classes, the 
introduction of royal taxes, and the exclusion of certain independent 
political entities in the Italian peninsula, power in Europe became 
centralised in the monarchies. These monarchies developed central institutions 
that made and enforced law, employed educated and competent civil servants, 
hired armies of mercenary troops and rationalised the collection of taxes. 
Some of the theorists of the time responded to the need to strengthen 
monarchies, while at the same time removing divisions within their respective 
societies. The notions of the 'divine right of kings', and the 'absolutist 
state', which overlap one another, were philosophical responses to the need 
for stronger and more centralised states. 
Returning to the evolution of the historical state, Camilleri mentions several 
factors which contributed to the trend towards centralisation. The 
achievements of the Renaissance in art, 1 iterature and philosophy were 
particularly important in the secularisation of 1 ife and the concomitant 
decline in the spiritual and temporal authority of the church. Political power 
thus became concentrated in the hands of the European monarchies. Moreover, 
the revival of Roman Law, 
corresponded to the needs of the absolutist state and the spread 
of capitalist relations in towns and country. The strong 
attachment of Roman civil law to the notion of absolute private 
property provided the legal basis in Renaissance Europe for the 
growth of private commodity production and exchange in both 
agriculture and manufacturing. Similarly, though somewhat 
contradictorily, the Roman conception of absolute empi ri ca 1 power 
(enshrined in public law} became a potent weapon for the 
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administrative centralization and territorial integration of the 
European monarchies (Camilleri 1992:13). 
Camilleri further maintains that with the Reformation and Counter-Reformation 
and the subsequent wars of religion, the emerging authority of the secular 
state appeared to be the most effective remedy for the widespread religious 
and political disorder that had engulfed Europe (1992:13-14). 
Batchelder and Freudenberger argue that the innovations in gunpowder weapons 
initiated the move towards more centralised bureaucratic structures in Europe. 
Bureaucratic centralisation they argue, was an efficient response to providing 
a logistical system for a defensive strategy for the centralised coordination 
of the infantry of the time (1983:11-12). 
3.5.2 Sovereignty 
It was in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that the idea of sovereignty 
gained ascendancy. At this time sovereignty was thought of as the supreme 
authority of a person, monarch or emperor. As the state at the end of the 
Medieval period became more integrated, so the notion of sovereignty became 
more inclusive. This understanding of sovereignty gave way to the notions of 
the 'divine right of kings' and 'absolutism' and 'absolute sovereignty'. 
3.5.3 The Divine Right of Kings 
J.N. Figgis refers in 1896, to the 'Divine Right of Kings', a theory of 
politics which prevailed throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Arising out of a reaction to papal pretensions to power, this theory had a 
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very definite role to perform in the development of society at the time. 
Monarchy was, according to this theologically based theory, a divinely 
ordained institution, and kings were accountable to God alone. Sovereignty was 
vested in the king, whose power was incapable of legal 1 imitation. All 
constitutional forms and assemblies existed entirely at his pleasure. This 
theory of the Divine Right of Kings was an early expression of the idea of 
sovereignty, which was given content by, for example, Bodin and Hobbes 
(Figgis, 1896). It embodied the idea of centralised sovereignty, referring 
essentially to the supremacy of a single central authority. 
In time the divisions between religion and politics became less distinct, 
while the acceptance of monarchy was, in fact, an acceptance of some form of 
central authority and rule. The acceptance of a centralised sovereign gave way 
to the notion of absolutism as defined below. Absolutist theory laid the 
foundation for the later idea of constitutional ism and constitutional theory, 
which was first and foremost a theory of limitation. The idea of 
constitutional ism underpins much of the thought concerning the role of the 
state that continues into the present century. 
3.5.4 The absolutist state 
The absolutist state replaced the system of feudal domination which had relied 
upon the institution of serfdom as a mechanism for fusing economic 
exploitation and politico-legal coercion at the molecular level of the 
village. The apparatus of legal and political coercion was shifted upwards 
towards a centralised, militarised summit, and henceforth referred to as the 
'absolutist state' (Camilleri 1992:14). 
In the absolutist state, 
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the rulers claim absolute, or total, power by virtue of personal 
attributes, the authority or the nature of the laws they 
interpret and apply, rel i gi ous authority, the recognition of some 
form of 'necessity' rulers must reject any external 
l imitation on their powers, such as custom, . . . an autonomous 
constitution which stands above the laws of the ruler, or claims 
by other social organisations (e.g. the churches, trade unions}, 
to possess degrees of power in their own spheres (Roberts 
1971: IA}. 
The major characteristic of the absolutist state was thus its centralisation 
of power, together with the absence of constitutional restraints on the 
exercise of that power. 
Consequently, political power in the absolutist state was held in the hands 
of a monarch or king rather than local political organisations. In the earlier 
medieval state, this form of local political organisation was an inevitable 
consequence of limitations on the means of communication. A large political 
territory was not governable except by a kind of federalism that left to local 
units a large measure of independence (Sabine 1937:332}. The move towards the 
absolutist state was facilitated by the extension of the ease of communication 
which became incompatible with local monopol isation and control. Larger 
profits could be made by the merchant who had access to every market. 
Standardisation of prices, quality of goods and conditions of employment, for 
example, had to be undertaken by governments larger than the medieval 
municipality. The interests of the merchant were thus on the side of strong 
government in the person of a king. 
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By the early sixteenth century, absolute monarchy was rapidly becoming the 
prevailing type of government in Europe. One of the earliest commentaries on 
the absolutist state was that of Machiavelli. Writing in 1513, he offered his 
commentary on the five Italian city states of his time. The state for 
Machiavelli was an organisation of force which ensured security of persons and 
property. Its success, given the dangers posed by internal corruption and 
external enemies, ultimately depended on 'a strong hand and a clear 
intelligence at the helm'. Only the shrewd and resourceful 'prince' could 
bring to fruition the aspirations of his people, and give expression to the 
moral and civic character of society. Machiavelli had made great strides 
towards the notion of the 'omnipotent legislator', yet he fell short of a 
general theory of political absolutism (Camilleri 1992:16). 
By the end of the seventeenth century, most of the dynastic states of Europe 
had developed centra 1 i sed l ega 1 and admi ni strati ve systems over cl early 
defined territories. The absolutist state therefore became responsible for a 
territorial dimension of society. Increasingly it took over the defence of its 
territory and extended itself to economic functions. Sovereignty also acquired 
an external dimension. International relations were conducted between states 
displaying territorial integrity, legal equality, and sovereignty. The theory 
of sovereignty became an important element of absolutist theory, which in 
itself has religious and other relationships with constitutionalism, like 
despotic rule, dictatorship and personal rule. 
The absolutist theory of the state was most vigorously developed by the French 
and, in particular, Bodin, referred to above. In the nineteenth century the 
state became distinguished from other institutions by its supreme coercive 
power. It acquired legal sovereignty which meant that it could enforce law 
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through the exercise of this power, or through the threat to use it. By the 
second half of the nineteenth century, most countries had written 
constitutions, providing for some form of representative institution and 
thereby limiting the previous absolutist powers of governments. The locus of 
sovereignty became proscribed by a written document. 
In the twentieth century, numerous critics have questioned the explanatory 
value of the concept of sovereignty (Camilleri 1992:31). One of the arguments 
surrounding the question of sovereignty is whether the fragmentation of 
political power is 'antithecal to the internal meaning of sovereignty, with 
its emphasis on the existence of a central power in every state' (Camilleri 
1992:31). Can one speak in purist terms of a single sovereign body or divided 
sovereignty in the contemporary state? Authority is decentralised to lesser 
and greater degrees in both unitary and federal systems of government, as was 
pointed out in chapter 2 above. 
The answer to this question lies in whether one adopts a monist or pluralist 
view of society. Further, in determining whether sovereignty is divided, one 
needs to look at the realities of the state in particular. If authority is 
decentralised, one must determine whether it is entrenched by means of special 
legislative provisions. If so, the state fulfils one of the criteria arrived 
at in chapter 2 for being classified as a federation. 
3.5.5 Nationalism 
The ideal of nationalism has been a driving force in Europe ever since the 
French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. It has overwhelmed 
s.ome of the better reasoned arguments advanced by theorists for a centra 1 i sed 
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state. Essentially nationalism in Europe embodied a belief that all those who 
shared a common history and culture should be autonomous, united and distinct 
in their respective states. People shared a national ideal that they were part 
of one of many distinctive nations of the world. Internal to the state, 
nationalism also involved solidarity between sometimes diverse groups for the 
securing of certain political ideals, such as freedom from foreign rule and 
sovereignty. Since complete freedom to act and undivided sovereignty are 
incompatible with federation, nationalists often preferred to set up states 
of their own in which they would have undivided sovereignty. In Europe, the 
unitary state has fulfilled this ideal (Smith 1979:3-4). A similar ideal 
prevailed in Africa before independence. This will be referred to in chapter 
4 below. 
3.6 THEORY DEFINED AS THE CONSUMMATION OF EXPLANATION 
3.6.1 Shils 
Shils (1982) provides an explanation for the effectiveness of authority and 
the maintenance of order in society. His book, The Constitution of Society, 
refers to the sociological composition or make up of society rather than to 
legal institutions. Much of his thinking deals with the relationship between 
what he terms the 'centre' and the 'periphery' of society. Since Shils (1982) 
deals at great length with the constitution of society, reference will only 
be made to some of the main points in his explanation. 
While studying various aspects of Western, Asian, and African societies, Shils 
developed a number of his theoretical observations. He takes as his departure 
point that, 
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a good society is one without conflict .... Rulers have almost 
always wished their realms to be free of conflict; they attempt 
to prevent or to suppress those who could initiate active 
conflict against them .... Conflict is generally regarded as 
something made necessary by ill-will, misfortune, injustice, 
undesirable scarcity, or historical inevitability. In contrast 
with this, a unified society, one in which conflict has been 
eliminated, is generally thought to be a good thing (1982:3). 
Shils continues that the Reformation settlement, which declared that the 
religion of the ruler should also be the religion of his subjects, was one 
sign of the desire of rulers not merely to gain the submission of their 
subjects, but also to integrate them into a single society through the 
uniformity of beliefs. When nation a 1 ity became an object of pass ion ate 
devotion and when its realisation and protection became a criterion for 
defining the boundaries and legitimacy of states and societies, rulers found 
what was to them an almost ideal basis for the integration of the societies 
over which they held dominion. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the rulers of most advanced countries tended to integrate their 
societies through nationally comprehensive legislation and, by the penetration 
of their authority into every part of their society, through the expansion of 
administration and policy up to the outer limits of their borders (1982:4). 
Since the end of World War II, the problem of the integration of societies has 
become an urgent practical concern in much of Asia and Africa. Shils states 
that: 
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Col on i al governments for most of their careers sought to do 
little other than to maintain internal peace and to maintain 
their own authority. After independence, the new indigenous 
governments attempted to do more. They have attempted to 
'develop' their societies ... they have attempted to arouse their 
populations into a sense of the urgency of national development. 
In the course of these efforts, they have been made more aware 
that their societies are riddled with traditional divisions into 
castes, linguistic and ethnic groups, tribes and nationalities, 
religious communities, and locally bounded societies which are 
distrustful of and in conflict with each other and resistant to 
the central governmental authority of their newly sovereign 
states. They have believed themselves to be repeatedly in danger 
of disintegration ... (Shils 1982:6). 
These new states have contained centrifugal forces which have served to weaken 
central governments. The concern then for leaders is to hold the diverse parts 
of society together. They have suffered from crises of national integration. 
All rulers, whether of a totalitarian, authoritarian or liberal persuasion, 
seek the integration of their societies, though admittedly, to different 
degrees. 
The term 'integration' is used frequently by Shils (1982), who defines it as, 
the structural sum of the parts; it is what makes the whole of 
society more than the arithmetic sum of its parts. We are 
concerned, then, with the structures and processes through which 
the ensemble of the diverse parts of a society - activities, 
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beliefs, re lat i ans and institutions - are held together ... 
(1982:9). 
Integration is an important problem for leaders of new states. Populations in 
new states are generally not formed into an integrated society. If one extends 
Shils' arguments, centralised unitary states can be utilised by leaders as 
integration mechanisms. 
The main factors, according to Shils, which establish and maintain a society 
are a central authority, consensus, and territorial boundedness. Every 
society, besides having a centre, has a periphery. According to Shils: 
The centre consists of those institutions (and roles) which 
exercise authority - whether it be economic, governmental, 
political, military - and of those which create and diffuse 
cultural symbols - religious, literary, etc. - through churches, 
schools, publishing houses, etc. The periphery consists of those 
strata or sectors of the society which are the recipients of 
commands and of beliefs which do not themselves create or cause 
to be diffused, and of those who are lower in the distribution or 
allocation of rewards, dignities, facilities, etc. (lg82:59). 
In some societies there is a more intense relationship between the centre and 
the periphery than in others. However, in more recent times, the periphery has 
acquired some of the fundamental qualities once thought to be the monopoly of 
the centre. One major consequence of this change in the culture of modern 
societies has been decolonisation and the growth of nationalist movements in 
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the colonial territories, and the resultant establishment of many new states 
in Asia and Africa. 
Integration, according to Shils, occurs in two directions, vertically and 
horizontally: 
A society is vertically integrated in a hierarchy of power and 
authority and a status order; it is horizontally integrated by 
the unity of the elites of the various sectors of life or 
subsystems of the society The intensity of vertical 
integration differs among societies. Federations are less 
intensely integrated vertically than unitary regimes 
(1982:72-73). 
3.6.2 Concluding remarks 
Although Shils does not use the concept, vertical integration can be 
considered as a support for the centralisation of institutions and power. The 
greater the degree of integration of structures, the greater the degree of 
centralisation of power. The centralisation of power, however, does not 
necessarily coincide with the integration of structures. An individual leader, 
for example, might wield a great deal of power, but all structures under his 
control may not be centralised. 
Like the classical philosophers referred to above, Shils explains the 
centralisation process in terms of the need to minimise conflict within a 
society. Unlike the classical theorists, he writes of the need to integrate 
society and the notion of nationality. He also introduces the idea of 
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development, which has led to the strengthening of the centre in many 
countries. These themes are echoed by a number of authors and spelled out in 
the literature on nation-building in Africa referred to in chapter 4. 
3.7. THEORY DEFINED AS A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME 
An example of theory of this nature is a study by Etzioni (1965), which he 
entitles, Political Unification. A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces. 
Although this study is categorised under the heading of a theory, Etzioni 
himself considers it to be a paradigm which he says is more than 
a perspective but 1 ess than a theory. It provides a set of 
interrelated questions, but no account of validated propositions. 
It provides a 'language', a net of variables, but it does not 
specify the relationships among those variables. It is less vague 
than a mere perspective, providing a systematic, specific, and 
logically exhaustive set of foci for research and speculation. A 
paradigm is often a stage on the way from an old perspective to 
a new theory (1965:2). 
Etzioni's paradigm, 
provides a set of dimensions for the study of a process, 
specifically one that affects the relations among units, as 
contrasted to their internal structure .... We are particularly 
interested in the unification of already existing nations, but 
the paradigm applies also to the development of other 
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unifications, such as the evolution of national bonds among 
tribes, villages, or feudal fiefs (1965:3}. 
It is the latter internal unification process which took place within colonial 
boundaries; and the end result of that process, resulting in the creation of 
centralised constitutional unitary states, which is the subject of this 
thesis. 
Etzioni 's paradigm wi 11 therefore be used and described as a 'conceptual 
scheme', for the three case studies under analysis, dealing with the adoption 
of centralised unitary constitutions in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia, in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7, below. The adoption of the centralised unitary 
constitution was, in each instance, the end result of a particular process 
which will be described and explained in each case study. 
Etzi oni says that four major quest ions can be asked about every process 
contributing towards 'unity' within a state or a 'union' between states. The 
four questions are as follows: 
Under what conditions is it initiated? What forces direct its 
development? What path does it take? And what is the state of the 
system affected by the process once it is terminated? (Etzioni 
1965:14}. 
Each of these questions is suggestive of a progression in the development of 
unitary states and federations. This progression can be viewed in terms of 
four stages as outlined by Etzioni (1965:15}. Each of these is discussed 
individually and, for the purposes of this thesis, modified where necessary 
87 
to fit the circumstances of the African continent and the case studies. 
Etzioni (1965:14) takes into consideration the interplay between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable, which drives the progression 
towards unification or union that is unitary and federal states. The dependent 
variable for the purposes of this thesis is an end result, the creation of the 
centralised constitutional unitary state. There are a number of independent 
variables or factors determining this progression, for example, colonisation 
processes, the role of ideo 1 ogy, the ro 1 e of independence movements, the 
existence of unitarist and federalist political cultures and geographical 
factors. 
These variables or factors are referred to in this thesis as centripetal or 
centrifugal forces. Although referred to, for example, by lbele (1971:128) in 
relation to democratic systems, they are understood here to refer to forces 
contributing towards the centralisation of power (centripetal) in a unitary 
state, or those contributing towards the decentralisation of power 
(centrifugal) in a decentralised unitary state, federation or partitioned 
state. It is hypothesised that if the centripetal forces within a colonial 
African state are stronger than the centrifuga 1 forces, then that state 
becomes a centralised unitary state or a centralised constitutional unitary 
state. 
It is also argued in support of the idea of a progression from one stage to 
the next, is that institutions evolve into their present forms from 
recognisably similar structures that came into being at some time in the past 
to achieve a specific purpose. Institutions in terms of this argument, are the 
'carriers of history' (David 1994:205). Following Etzioni's conceptual scheme, 
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the history from the one stage of the unification process carries through to 
the next. 
The unification process in the African colony may be conceptualised in terms 
of four stages: I) the pre-centralised stage; 2) the centralisation stage; 3) 
the take-off stage; and 4) the termination stage. 
3.7.l The pre-centralised stage 
There are a number of questions which can be asked about the nature of the 
pre-centralised African colony in order to determine the factors which 
contributed towards its later centralisation. What was the purpose or 
motivation for the early colonisation of the territory? What was the nature 
of the early colony, that is, to what degree was the political culture 
fragmented? What resources were available for colonising the territory? To 
what degree did the geographic size of the territory impact upon the 
establishment of administrative and executive structures? By raising these and 
other questions, the conditions might be recreated which laid the foundations 
for the beginning of the centralisation process. 
3.7.2 The centralisation stage 
According to Etzioni: 
Socio-economic processes like unification do not proceed in a 
trial and error fashion. Once initiated they tend to follow one 
of a limited number of patterns .... Which pattern they follow is 
in part determined by the kind of integrating power that various 
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elites exercise and that the evolving union commands (1965:37). 
In launching a unification endeavour, one must have a clear conception of the 
integrating powers which exist. They may include coercive power like a 
military force, utilitarian powers like economic sanctions, or powers like 
propaganda and unification movements. 
When studying a process or the formation of a polity, social scientists speak 
of the initiation period. This period may coincide, for example, with the 
granting of a charter, or the establishment of movements 1 i ke pol iti ca 1 
parties. An important consideration under this heading is the role of elites 
in the centra 1 i sat ion process. An elite 'refers to a unit that devotes a 
comparatively high proportion of its assets to guiding a process and leading 
other units to support it' (Etzioni 1965:45). An elite may be a person, a 
group of persons, or a government. Under this heading, Etzioni also refers to 
internalisation which is 'the process in which control of a system is taken 
over by member-elites from external elite-units' (1965:48) who thus guide the 
process. 
3.7.3 The take-off stage 
'Take-off' occurs when a process has accumulated enough momentum to continue 
on its own. The process of unification and centralisation is reinforced by 
factors like historical precedent, external factors such as international 
opinion, and internal ones such as the opinions of elites and an evolving 
political culture. The determinants of take-off are varied. Centralisation of 
one sector can result in centralisation of another. The scope of the central 
authority begins to increase and citizens identify with one central authority. 
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Once the centralisation process has taken off, the question arises as to how 
much centralisation is necessary to achieve a stable state. A further question 
which arises is, in what order are the different sectors of the particular 
society centralised and which sectors need to be centralised for a stable 
state. Through the posing of these and other questions, the structure of the 
centralised unitary state begins to be debated. 
3.7.4 The termination stage 
The termination stage is reached when a final centralised unitary constitution 
is enacted and levels of centralisation and decentralisation remain basically 
unchanged for a considerable period of time. At this stage, the scope of state 
authority reaches to a 11 pol it i cal communities, although it might not exercise 
control over all those communities. The cut-off point for the purposes of this 
thesis is the enactment of a centralised unitary constitution in the three 
case studies analysed. 
3.7.5 A critique of Etzioni's conceptual scheme 
A fifth and sixth stage could be added to the conceptual scheme (which is one 
of its weaknesses) to accommodate the three post-independence stages of 
Mawhood (1989) and Chazan et al. (1992) as set out in chapter l. It could be 
postulated that unitary states reach a degree of centralisation that no longer 
serves the interests of its citizenry and good governance. States then begin 
to reassess their centralised unitary constitutional forms and opt for degrees 
of decentralisation of power or even federal, partition or confederal 
constitutional forms. It is not the main purpose of this thesis to analyse the 
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post-independence evolution of the African state in any great detail 1• 
Despite the aforementioned weakness of Etzioni's 'conceptual scheme', it will 
be utilised in this thesis as it is the most suitable available for organising 
and explaining the evolution of the centralised unitary state in the case 
studies referred to below. 
3 .8 CONCLUSION 
Many circumstantial factors existed in Africa similar to those operating at 
the time of the pre-modern and modern European state, which produced similar 
arguments in favour of a centralised constitutional state (government). Some 
of these arguments will be analysed in the next chapter. 
There are a number of parallels that can be drawn between the evolution of the 
European state and the former Africa colony. Europe in the Medieval period was 
a highly fragmented continent consisting of numerous small polities, as was 
the case on the African continent in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, when the continent was formally colonised. Internal factors, such as 
better methods of communication, resulted in increased centralisation and the 
evolution of the constitutional state. Centralisation was, moreover, necessary 
to do away with the evils of feudalism. Centralisation in the African context 
was necessary to destroy divisions along tribal and ethnic lines. 
In Africa, the centralisation process was initiated by the imposition of 
colonial rule. The practical realities of administering large territories, 
1
• The extension of Etzioni's 'conceptual scheme' to accommodate the 
post-independence period in the African state, requires further refinement. 
The aforesaid is a preliminary view of how the 'conceptual scheme' might be 
extended. 
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often with limited resources, and the need to consolidate power within those 
territories, as well as to ensure peace, contributed towards the 
centralisation of decision-making structures within the state. 
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Chapter 4 
SURVEY OF SELECTED LITERATURE SOURCES ON THE ORIGINS OF THE CENTRALISED 
UNITARY STATE IN AFRICA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aims of this chapter are: first, to describe the specific origins of 
written constitutions, more particularly those of British origin as referred 
to in the literature; and secondly, to survey some of the literature 
explaining the creation of centralised unitary state in Africa. This chapter 
will then provide some of the contextual explanation for the origins of 
centralised unitary constitutions as described and explained in the case 
studies. 
4.2 ORIGINS OF WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS 
In chapter 1, reference was made to original and derivative constitutions, and 
autochthonous and allochthonous constitutions: constitutions originating 
either inside or outside a country, or both inside and outside a country. 
Further, it was mentioned in chapter 1 that written constitutions are of a 
pol it ica 1-1 ega l nature, and are determined by a number of factors, like 
ideologies and culture, a country's history and existing political and 
constitutional order, and international criteria. Additional factors include 
hi stori ca 1 precedents, phil osophi cal tr ad it ions and ideology, reports of 
constitutional commissions and committees of experts, resolutions passed by 
political parties and movements, the influence of elites and strong 
personalities, socio-economic factors, interest groups and conflict 
situations. The nature of African society and the challenges facing African 
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leaders at the time of independence have al so been important factors in 
determining the type of constitutional form adopted. 
These and others may be expressed in constitutional terms through the feelings 
or will of a population; or through the impact that members of a parliament, 
a constituent assembly, government department or institution might have on the 
drafting of a document; or through experts drawn in to participate in the 
drafting of a constitutional document. 
It is seldom possible to pin-point one specific input responsible for a set 
of constitutional principles. Different combinations of criteria generally 
impact on the final content of a written constitution. In order to explain why 
a particular constitutional design evolves, one has to analyse a number of 
factors involved in a particular case. At certain stages in the historical 
development of a continent or country, some inputs might be more important 
than others. 
Much of the literature fails to explain the exact factors determining the 
adoption of centralised unitary constitutional forms by specific African 
states, it describes the circumstantial factors, and intellectual and 
ideological climates in which the constitution-drafting process took place. 
4.2.1 Theoretical perspectives 
There are a number of theoretical perspectives, as distinct from theories, 
under which the centralised unitary state in the African context may be 
studied and explained. The literature seldom focuses specifically on the 
unitary state itself. Many of the theoretical perspectives in the literature 
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are suggestive of the origins and role for the centralised unitary 
constitutional form in Africa. For example, Welch (1966), spells out efforts 
to create suprastate political unions in West Africa; Barrows (1976) and Shils 
(1982) stress centre-periphery relationships; Shivji (1991), the state and 
constitutional ism; Stark (1986) and Mawhood (1989) write on 'state formation' 
in Africa; Wunsch and Olowu (1990) and Deutsch and Foltz (1963) stress nation-
building, national integration, state structures and political systems; 
Glickman writes on state-centrism and ideology (Ergas, 1987); Neuberger (1986) 
writes on national self-determination; Rivkin (1963) stresses environmental 
determinism; Selassie (1974) stresses neo-presidentialism; Coleman and Rosberg 
(1970) stress political parties and national integration; Markovitz (1977) 
stresses class; and Zolberg (1966), the function of ideology in the 
centralisation process and the creation of the unitary state. No holistic 
theory on the creation of the centralised constitutional unitary state exists. 
Embedded within these theoretical perspectives are occasional references to 
the unitary state in Africa. Very little recognition is given in this body of 
literature to the centralised constitutional unitary form as an important 
organising principle within the state. 
The approach in this chapter is eclectic and references are made to selected 
theoretical perspectives which attempt directly or indirectly to explain the 
creation of centralised unitary states in Africa. The theory discussed in this 
context will be that arising out of the thoughts, conjectures and ideas of 
selected academics and African leaders writing specifically on Africa. By 
studying this theory, many of the inputs into the constitution-making 
processes will be captured. 
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4.3 LITERATURE 
4.3.l Literature categories 
The 1 i terature on the con st itut ion-drafting processes in Africa can be 
classified as either published or unpublished. This chapter is c.oncerned with 
the survey of the published literature, that is material derived from sources 
such as books, journal articles and the resolutions of international 
institutions. The case studies in chapters 5, 6 and 7 will be based upon both 
published and unpublished sources. 
4.3.2 Published sources 
The published literature relating to the adoption of centralised unitary 
constitutions can be divided into three broad categories: 
First, texts on early imperial constitutional policy and 
African constitutions; 
secondly, a body of academic literature appearing from the 1960s 
largely suggestive of the factors contributing to the unitary 
state and the pre-independence centralisation process in Africa; 
and 
thirdly, a body of literature reporting the writings and speeches 
of former African leaders suggestive of the factors contributing 
to the adoption of centralised unitary constitutions, and dealing 
with re so 1 ut ions passed by i nternat i ona 1 institutions on the 
subject of African unity and Pan-Africanism. 
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4.4 EARLY IMPERIAL CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS 
4.4.l The Durham Report 
The Durham report is one of the most thorough analyses of the advantages and 
disadvantages of unitary and federal constitutional models for developing 
countries. The Report itself and its impact on British colonial constitutional 
development will thus be described in fairly great detail, since this thesis 
is mainly concerned with territories formerly under British rule. Namibia was 
indirectly under British rule until the lg30s, when South Africa became 
legally independent from Britain. 
In the year 1838 the Earl of Durham, John George (later Lord Durham), was 
appointed by the government of the United Kingdom as High Commissioner and 
Governor-General, 
to inquire into, and, as far as may have been possible, to adjust 
all questions depending in the said Provinces of Lower and Upper 
Canada, or either of them, respecting the Form and Administration 
of the Civil Government thereof respectively (Coupland 1945:4). 
The Report, which was produced as a result of this enquiry, became known as 
the 'Durham Report' and was published on 11 February 1839. This Report is of 
significance here because it influenced the later development of British 
Commonwealth constitutional law and philosophy, although the degree to which 
it did so has been debated. 
The political and social issues which Lord Durham was called upon to address 
99 
were those of 'rebellion, foreign invasion, and utter exhaustion and 
depopulation' (Coupland 1945:140). Durham made two main recommendations in his 
Report. In his first recommendation he advocated the replacement of the 
existing system of representative government with responsible government. The 
second main recommendation, which is of particular interest, concerned what 
he referred to as the 'legislative union' of Upper and Lower Canada. 
Underlying the issues confronting the populations of the two provinces were 
relationships between the majority English population and the minority French 
population. In his Report, Durham described this conflict as follows: 
I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state: I 
found a struggle, not of principles but of races; and I perceived 
that it would be idle to attempt any amelioration of laws or 
institutions until we could first succeed in terminating the 
deadly animosity that now separates the inhabitants of Lower 
Canada into the hostile divisions of French and English (Coupland 
1945:15). 
The population of Upper Canada was estimated at 400 000, the English 
inhabitants of Lower Canada at 150 000, and the French at 450 000. 
With regard to constitutional reform, Durham stated: 
I rely on the efficacy of reform in the constitutional system by 
which the Colonies are governed for the removal of every abuse in 
their administration which defective institutions have 
engendered. If a system can be devised which shall lay in these 
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countries the foundation of an efficient and popular government, 
ensure harmony, in place of collision, between the various powers 
of the State, and bring the influence of a vigorous public 
opinion to bear on every detail of public affairs, we may rely on 
sufficient remedies being found for the present vices of the. 
administrative system (Coupland 1945:140). 
Lord Durham pl aced great faith tn the reform of the canst i tut i ona l form 
existing at the time to address the political and social evils confronting 
Lower Canada. 
In order to remedy the problems experienced by Lower Canada, he proposed a 
fusion of the government with one or more of the surrounding provinces. Durham 
continued: 'I find in union [sic] the only means of remedying at once and 
completely the two prominent causes of their present unsatisfactory condition' 
(Coupland 1945: 159). He proposed two kinds of union - federal and legislative. 
Although the concept, legislative union, was not actually referred to by him, 
it can, according to Coupland, be equated with centralised unitary government 
(1945:lvi). 'Union' is taken by Durham to refer also to 'unity', that is the 
process involved in the creation of a unitary state. Durham produced a number 
of justifications for and against one or the other form of union - federation 
or a unitary state. 
In Durham's view, a federal union would result in 'a weak and rather cumbrous 
government'. He reports in the first person, 
a Colonial Federation must have, in fact, little legitimate 
authority or business, the greater part of the ordinary functions 
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falling within the scope of the imperial legislature and 
executive I became aware also of great practical 
difficulties in any plan of federal government, particularly 
those that must arise in the management of genera 1 revenues, 
which would in such a plan have to be again distributed among the 
Provinces (Coupland 1945:159-160). 
Considering the fee 1 i ng of the French population at the time, Lord Durham 
believed that any power which they might possess in a federal union, had the 
potential to be used against the British government (Coupland 1945:160). His 
response to this problem was to propose that the Province be subjected 'to the 
vigorous rule of an English majority' (Coupland 1945:161) and he advocated a 
policy of assimilation to address the problem of the relations between English 
and French Canadians. 
Lord Durham mentioned further factors justifying a unitary system of 
government for the two Provinces. He said that: 
The union of the two Provinces would secure to Upper Canada the 
present great objects of its desire. All disputes as to the 
division or amount of the revenue would cease. The surplus 
revenue of Lower Canada would supply the deficiency of that part 
of the upper Province .... The completion of the projected and 
necessary line of public works would be promoted by such a union. 
The access to the sea would be secured to Upper Canada. The 
saving of public money, which would be ensured by the union of 
various establishments in the two Provinces, would supply the 
means of conducting the general Government on a more efficient 
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scale than it [had] yet been carried on. And the responsibility 
of the executive would be secured by the increased weight which 
the representative body of the United Province would bring to 
bear on the Imperial Government and Legislature (Coupland 
1945:162-163). 
Although Durham was primarily concerned with the problems of Upper and Lower 
Canada and their uni on, he questioned whether uni on of a 11 the British 
provinces of North America could not obtain similar advantages. Such a union, 
Durham believed, could settle the question of 'races', it could enable all the 
Canadian provinces to co-operate for common purposes, and above all, it could 
form a great and powerful people who possessed the means of securing good and 
responsible government for themselves (Coupland 1945:163). 
Further advantages of a legislative union were advanced by Durham: union of 
the North American Provinces, he said, would in effect counter-balance 
whatever tendencies existed towards separation by individual provinces 
(Coupland 1945: 164), and further, to prevent the extl!ns ion of American 
influence, this could be done by promoting a North American (Canadian) 
nationalism which would elevate small and unimportant communities into a 
national society of greater importance (Coupland 1945:165). 
Two further advantages of a legislative union were mentioned by Durham. They 
were, first, that it would, 
elevate and gratify the hopes of able and aspiring men. They 
would no longer look with envy and wonder at the great arena of 
the bordering federation [the United States of America], but see 
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the means of satisfying every legitimate ambition in the high 
offices of the Judicature and Executive Government of their own 
Union (Coupland 1945:166). 
Secondly, on a more practical level, Durham believed that in a legislative 
union, government departments would gain greatly both in economy and 
efficiency, by being placed under a common management (Coupland 1945:168). 
4.4.2 The impact and significance of the Report 
Coupland considers the historical impact of the Report on British Commonwealth 
constitutional development to have been its establishment of the principles 
on which the British Commonwealth of nations has been built (1945:vii). He 
further claims, with regard to the Report, that: 
It has long been recognised as the greatest state document in 
British imperial history. It became, to use a cant phrase, the 
Magna Carta of the Second British Empire (1945:xlvi). 
Martin is more cautious in his assessment of the place of the Report in 
British Commonwealth History. He maintains that after its publication in 1839, 
the Report was not particularly supportive of British foreign policy. However, 
the question of Irish Home Rule Legislation in 1886 led to its revival, while 
South Africa, in the early years of the twentieth century, 'elevated it to 
mythological proportions' (Martin 1972:84). The Durham Report was re-issued 
in 1902, the first re-issue since the 1839 edition and became important 
reading for Colonial Office officials. It subsequently was consulted by those 
involved in drafting a constitution for the Colony of the Transvaal in the 
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early 1900s. Several clauses from the latter constitution were also 
incorporated in the Rhodesia constitution of 1923. 
The connection between the Durham Report and constitutional developments in 
Southern Africa are of further importance for this thesis. In 1905 the ninth 
Earl of Elgin was appointed as Colonial Secretary. Elgin himself was the 
grandson of Durham, and the son of the Elgin who had introduced responsible 
government into Canada in 1867. The ninth Earl of Elgin regarded both the 
Durham Report and Walrond's biography of his grandfather as essential reading 
on the question of the Transvaal constitution. He gave a copy of Walrond's 
biography to his Under-Secretary, Mr Winston Churchill, and required the West-
Ridgeway Committee which went to South Africa, to read the Report. The 
Committee quoted this Report in its own report (Martin 1972:88) and Churchill 
was later directly involved in negotiating the detail of the 1923 Rhodesia 
con st itut ion. It is therefore likely that some of Durham's perspectives 
influenced his thinking in this regard. 
Martin concludes that the Durham Report has contributed most of what has been 
humane in the imperial experience and nearly all that is still alive in the 
Commonwealth today. But while the Commonwealth cannot be understood without 
an appreciation of the spirit of this document, 'it by no means follows that 
Commonwealth history should be viewed solely through it' (1972:100). Jennings 
(1962:243) considers the Report to be the greatest of British state papers. 
The Report is significant because of the arguments which have emerged from it 
to be used by con st itut i ona l draughtsmen in the twentieth century. The 
diminution of conflict was of major concern to Durham. Areas for conflict 
should be reduced, like possible disputes over the distribution of revenue 
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which would be necessary in a federation. Further, conflict could result over 
the possible secession of a state or province in a Canadian federation. To 
reduce the potential for conflict, the majority needed to dominate at the 
political level. Two further arguments in favour of a unitary state were those 
of the efficiency and prestige resulting from membership of a large political 
unit. Similar arguments were raised by African leaders more than a century 
later in the process of drafting independence constitutions. 
4.4.3 The drafting of British colonial constitutions 
Besides the philosophical factors which impact upon the constitution-drafting 
exercise, the methods of drafting a constitution, are also important. Elias 
{1962), in describing the British methods of drafting constitutions, states 
that there are five possible ways of bringing colonial constitutions into 
being: by Order-in-Council; by Letters Patent; by Royal Instructions; by Local 
Ordinance; and by Act of Parliament {1962:39). The most popular method, he 
says, is by Order-in-Council. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, an Order-in-
Council was issued in 1889 granting a Charter to the British South Africa 
Company, whereas Letters Patent were issued providing for the 1923 Responsible 
Government Constitution. In the case of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the 
Independence Constitution of 1966 was brought into being by an Act of the 
British Parliament. 
The important point about the British approach to constitution drafting, is 
that it provided for very little public participation, either directly or 
indirectly through public representatives. It was a closed process undertaken 
most often by the legal staff of the British Colonial Office {Jennings 
1963:70) unlike the Namibian constitution-drafting exercise of 1989-1990, 
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which involved numerous participants, both local and international, and was 
eventually finalised in a Constituent Assembly. The independence 
constitutions, in the cases of Southern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate, were the intellectual products of a limited number of 
individuals or what are referred to as elites. Therefore, a study of the 
perspectives of only a small number of drafters is considered sufficient in 
this thesis (as pointed out in chapter 1), to explain the origins of British 
sponsored constitutions for Botswana and Zimbabwe, in particular. 
A further important point about the British constitution drafting process was 
that the British sought to impose a model on the colonies as similar to the 
Westminster model as possible. On the other hand a degree of autochthony was 
permitted by allowing input from local inhabitants (Madden in Robinson 1963:1-
2), as was the case with the 1923 Southern Rhodesia Constitution. 
Schaffer (1965-66) writes on the 'theory of preparation' for the new states 
within the British Commonwealth. This theory propounded the idea that the new 
states in the Commonwealth were prepared for a Westminster constitutional 
model or form through a deliberate process of training and institutional 
change. However, Schaffer debunks the theory of preparation alluded to by 
Wight (1952) below. He maintains that preparation for the Westminster model 
came very late in the decolonisation process and the model itself became a 
tactic of negotiation and a symbol of independence. The idea was that the 
final Westminster con st itut ion (a centralised unitary form) negotiated at 
independence could be a useful and permanent guiding line for new states. 
Schaffer, writing in the 1960s, maintained that it was a faulty model which 
could be filled with 'many different spirits'(l965-66:61-62); an early 
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suggestion by an academic writer that it was not well suited to African 
conditions. 
4.4.4 Early constitutional texts on Africa 
One of the early texts published in 1924, dealing partly with the 
constitutions of Africa, is entitled, The Constitution, Administration and 
Laws of the Empire, by: A. Berriedale Keith. It deals largely with the content 
of the constitutions of the former Empire. Offering one of the few 
explanations in the book on the British constitution-making process, the 
author remarks: 
Complex as constitutional law always is, its complication is 
greatest by far in the case of the Empire, which has grown rather 
by hazard than by conscious purpose, developing in the process 
protean shapes of constitutional relations. The process has been 
rendered possible by the British willingness to compromise and 
reluctance to insist on strictly logical results (Keith 1924:4). 
Keith holds that the ingenuity of creating effective institutions for 
disparate dominions, such as the federations of Canada, the Commonwealth of 
Australia and the Union of South Africa, manifested itself at an early stage. 
He continues: 
Less ingenuity has perhaps been shown in the realm of municipal 
and local government, a topic which though it falls essentially 
within the sphere of constitutional law, is yet of relatively 
minor importance (Keith 1924:4). 
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Keith writes too of the 'avoidance of undue legalism' of the British 
government, which has assisted in devising constitutions as diverse as those 
mentioned above (1924:4). The English constitution, he claims, lies at the 
root of all constitutional ism in the Empire. Throwing further light on the 
sources of Colonial and Protectorate constitutions, he says these, 
are curiously varied as a consequence of the complex history of 
the Empire. Early colonial law was dominated by the conception 
that Englishmen carried with them the law of England, and that if 
they settled any where, the only constitution which the Crown had 
the right to grant was one based on the English model of a 
representative legislature (1924:267). 
Jennings al so refers to the acceptance of Adam Smith's mid- nineteenth century 
belief that the prosperity of Britain at the time would be assured by 
maintaining law and order and providing efficient administration in the 
colonies. The Whig theory at the time was that this could be done by extending 
British institutions to the colonies (1962:234). 
Although not specifically stated by Keith (1924) and Jennings (1962), it would 
be expected that the unitary constitutional model would be adopted as the 
model in British colonies and protectorates. Keith affords further insight 
into British colonial constitutional pol icy when he refers to, 'The Government 
of the Native Races', by which he means the black inhabitants of the colonies. 
He says that, 
while it is the prime duty of the Imperial Government to secure 
peace and order by the suppression of tribal warfare and of the 
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slave trade and slave raiding, it is essential that the 
administration of the native territories should be conducted on 
the basis of enabling the natives to learn to rule themselves 
•.•• The financial burden imposed by an administration through 
imported officers is a grave burden; it renders it necessary to 
impose taxation, which in itself may be light, but which none the 
less presses heavily on natives with scanty means, and it does 
little or nothing to develop the power of the natives for self-
government (1924:121). 
This policy has important implications for the distribution of power within 
former colonies, particularly with white settler minorities like 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (referred to in chapter 6 below). 
In a further text published in 1952 by Martin Wight entitled, British Colonial 
Constitutions 1941, he deals largely with the legal relationship between the 
United Kingdom and its Colonies, Protectorates, Mandated and Trust 
Territories, and the content of specific constitutions. Like the period about 
which Keith (1924) writes, no mention is made of municipal and local 
government. In this text, some insight is given into the centralisation of 
power and the absence, in colonial governments, of a process of constitutional 
development or what is referred to above by Schaffer (1965-66) as the 'theory 
of preparation'. In the Dependent Empire (those parts of the Commonwealth that 
had not attained self-government and independence from imperial control), 
judicial power preceded the stage of legislative power. All dependencies, 
according to Wight, acquired legislative authorities and in the early stages 
of legislative development, this power was conferred on a single person, the 
high commissioner or governor, who was thus himself properly ca 11 ed the 
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legislature. The legislature and executive were united in a single autocratic 
officer who, in turn, was responsible to nobody except the Secretary of State 
(Wight 1952:20). 
The next step in the process of constitutional development in dependent 
territories was the establishment of legislative councils which were composed 
mainly of official members, but could also contain a number of nominated 
unofficial members. Unofficial nominated members eventually gave way to 
elected officials, which assumes increasing power within the legislature. 
When the legislature succeeded in subordinating the executive to its will, by 
acquiring the power of appointing and dismissing members of the government, 
responsible government would then come into existence (Wight 1952:33). 
The significant point about the evolution of British colonial government is 
that it was a process dominated by the centre of the political system. Power 
was generally devolved from a representative of the Crown to representative 
and responsible legislatures following a British unitary constitutional model. 
Political power, nevertheless, remained centralised, as is pointed out by 
Wunsch (1990) below. 
Wight maintained that dependent territories were subject to the legislative 
authority of the Crown-in-Council (1952:88). This meant that only the British 
Parliament could legislate for territories in certain constitutional areas. 
One of these areas concerned the uniting, federating or dividing of colonies. 
Wight maintains that in terms of British constitutional doctrine, a colonial 
legislature, unlike a sovereign legislature, is created for a specific 
purpose, and cannot redefine its functions by establishing a federation or 
providing for a division of legislative powers without the concurrence of the 
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British legislature (1952:89). There was also the principle of 'repugnancy' 
as provided for by the Colonial Laws Validity Act, passed by the British 
parliament in 1865. This principle permitted colonial legislatures to make 
amongst others, laws concerning the constitution, powers and procedures of 
their respective legislatures which should not be in conflict with any Acts 
of parliament, Letters Patent, Order-in-Council or Colonial law in existence 
at the time. The principle of 'disallowance' came into effect in terms of the 
Statute of Westminster, 1931 whereby the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth 
of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and the 
Irish Free State and Newfoundland were excluded from the principle of 
'repugnancy' as provided for in the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 (Wheare 
1960). The Bechuanaland Protectorate and Southern Rhodesia nevertheless 
remained subject to this provision in the aforementioned Act. There was 
therefore a legal constraint on the recreation of the colonial political order 
in Africa. 
The presumption then was towards the maintenance of centralised authorities. 
Power was devolved onto a central authority from an external authority. Any 
redistribution of power had to be from the top down, which in small sparsely 
populated states was not always a viable proposition. 
In terms of the above, the British constitution-drafting process was not a 
well defined process. It was largely a response to the circumstances of the 
time. The tendency however, was to follow British precedent. As Jennings 
(1956:21) points out, wherever Britain ruled, her constitutional ideas 
prevailed in the newly independent territory. 
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4.5 TEXTS WRITTEN FROM THE 1960s 
The nature of African society, and challenges confronting African leaders at 
the time of independence, constitute an important theme in the writings of a 
number of authors from the 1960s onwards. 
Several authors, for example, Panikkar (1961), Wallerstein (1961), Mansur 
(1962), Sigmund (1963), Deutsch and Foltz (1963), Emerson (1963), Rivkin 
(1963; 1968 and 1969), Geertz (1963), Currie (1964), Zolberg (1966), Coleman 
and Rosberg (1970), Nwabueze (1973), De Smith (1977), Markovitz (1977), 
Collier {1982), Neuberger (1986), and Wunsch and Olowu (1990) have attempted 
to explain the nature of African society, and the challenges confronting 
African leaders at the time of independence. An insight into these issues 
assists one in general terms, in understanding the reasons for the adoption 
by contemporary African leaders of the centralised unitary constitution, as 
a necessary legal tool for achieving their political objectives. 
Panikkar (1961) is one of the few early authors to specifically spell out 
arguments in favour of the adoption of unitary constitutions in African 
states. One of the problems confronting newly emergent states, he believed, 
was to consolidate their unity. If regional autonomy were granted, that is, 
if federa 1 con st i tut ions were adopted, that would encourage 'the a 1 ready 
existing fissiparous tendencies' (1961:81) within African states. By contrast, 
a unitary state would discourage this tendency. A further argument in favour 
of a unitary state, according to Panikkar, was that economic development, 
particularly in poor countries, required central planning. The central 
direction of resources beneficial to the whole nation required a strong 
central government. A further argument in favour of a unitary system of 
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government, and against a federation, was that in a federation a multitude of 
officials and ministers appointed at the regional level would waste the 
financial resources of the new state (Panikkar 1961:81). 
Wallerstein views the adoption of centralised unitary constitutional models 
in terms of power relations within the independent state. Independence, he 
says, transfers power to individuals and structures internal to the state. 
There are many internal claimants to the exercise of this power. The 
consequence of this is that, unless the power is effectively exercised by a 
central agency, and unless the rules of the power game are generally accepted 
by a 11 the competitors, disintegration and secession become not merely 
possible but probable (1961:85). 
Wallerstein continues that the external enemy, as a forge for national unity 
within the African state, disappears after independence: 
The removal of the prod to unity - that is, colonial rule -
combined with uncertainty, disillusion, and hence opposition, 
created by the new government, inevitably causes the ethnic, 
regional, and other particular interests which had temporarily 
held back their claims to reassert them (1961:87). 
African states at independence had not had the time to develop a political 
culture accommodative of opposition groupings. Opposition, according to 
Wallerstein, 
takes the form of a claim to regionalism - a demand for at least 
decentralization in a unitary state, federalism in a 
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decentralized state, confederation in a federation, or total 
dissolution of a confederation. Inevitably, some regions will be 
richer (less poor) than others, and if the ethnic claims to power 
combine with relative wealth, the case for secession is strong 
(1961:88). 
Emerson (1963) similarly emphasises the need for unity and strong government 
to tackle the difficult problems of the African state. 
Geertz writes in terms of primordial attachments in modernising societies. 
Primordial attachments he identifies as: assumed blood ties; race; language; 
region; religion and custom (1963:112-113). These primordial attachments may 
be, and it varies from society to society, be acclaimed as the preferred bases 
for the demarcation of autonomous political units. This is what leadership 
elites fear and it is expressed time and again in their writings. 
The question then is how do African leaders hold their countries together? 
Leaders of new states which are about to attain independence, seek integrating 
institutions. There are a 1 imited number of integrating institutions which may 
be used. For example, rapid economic development may increase the penalties 
of disintegration. Another may be the single party, ideology and the heroic 
leader. In terms of this perceived need, decentralisation was simply 
incompatible with the requirement for national integration. Centralisation of 
power was a simple answer to the need to hold the state together. 
Rivkin (1963; 1968 and 1969) is another one of the few academic authors who 
has explicitly delineated the reasons for the adoption of centralised unitary 
constitutional forms in Africa. 
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Rivkin says that in almost every case, the new states of Africa have inherited 
state structures derived from those of the former colonial powers. The 
tendency, he says, has been for former British, French, and Belgian 
territories to emerge with governmental institutions reflecting those of their 
former metropolitan rulers. Mansur (1962:102) also emphasises this factor. 
More often than not, the critical decisions on state structure were reached 
in the final stages of pre-independence negotiations between the metropolis 
and the territory which was about to become independent (1963:131). Rivkin 
maintains too that local government in former French and Belgian Africa and 
in large parts of British Africa never developed during the colonial era into 
a source or repository of effective power (1963:140). The emphasis here is on 
the inheritance from colonial rule of unitary constitutions and subsequent 
modifications. Most former colonial African constitutions were unitary with 
the notable exception of Nigeria. 
Rivkin also emphasises the trend towards authoritarianism and the perceptions 
of federation as just i fi cat ions for unitary con st i tut i ona l models. Independent 
Ghana, according to Rivkin, has provided much of the rationale for centralised 
unitary states in Africa. Former President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was 
particularly influential in the centralisation process within his country and 
also in the wider Pan-Africanist movement. His role in the latter movement 
will be briefly discussed below. 
A unitary structure, according to Rivkin, has frequently paved the way for the 
emergence of authoritarian political systems and the implication of this is 
that authoritarian political systems are a necessary corollary of a unitary 
constitutional form. 
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In this regard Rivkin contends that: 
The choice of authoritarian systems by African leaders has been 
rationalized on the ground that political stability for its own 
sake and as a necessary precondition of economic growth precludes 
debate, difference, and dissent, all of which are equated with 
disorder (1963:153). 
The general pattern then in almost all of the new African states has been to 
follow the Ghanaian precedent of adopting a unitary state model (Rivkin, 
1963:137). Rivkin argues further that the rationale offered for the unitary 
one-party state structure is that in the given circumstances of Africa it is 
the most efficacious and practical structure for nation-building and economic 
development (1969:48). 
Nkrumah, together with the Convention People's Party (CPP) of Ghana at the 
time of independence in 1957, according to Rivkin, vigorously opposed any 
attempt by opposition groups and parties to establish an internal federal 
governmental structure. They contended that a federal structure was a type of 
organisation that a new state the size of Ghana with its problems of cultural 
and tribal diversity could ill afford and they viewed such a federal structure 
as divisive. The British government, with its own tradition of a unitary 
state, accepted this position (1963:136). 
The experience of Ghana as the first post World War II sub-Saharan country to 
gain independence, provided the prototype (with the exception of the federal 
system of Nigeria) for the independence constitutions of most African states. 
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Centralised unitary governments Rivkin comments, 
have proven to be more consonant with the development of 
authoritarian systems than with democratic systems. They 
generally provide a structure which concentrates power at the 
centre and more readily allows for one-party control and 
manipulation .... They also allow for the concentration of the 
leadership elite at the centre to the exclusion of the rest of 
the country ... (1963:152). 
Rivkin further emphasises the point that the colonial legacy of Africa has 
also exerted influence at other levels in the political organisation of new 
states. For example, the colonial legacy has played a significant role in 
determining the structure of local government, and the recognition and 
preservation of regional differences based on cultural, tribal, or economic 
grounds. The colonial legacy has also continued to play a role in one guise 
or another through district or provincial commissioners, in regulating 
political activity and the acceptance and use of preventive detention acts, 
restrictive citizenship practices, and the use of restrictions on the press 
and rights to freedom of assembly (1953:132). 
The important point is that the methods of governing in the colonial unitary 
state provided an important legacy for the independent African state. This 
legacy also facilitated the centralisation of power before and after 
independence, since unitary constitutions are more easily amended than federal 
con st i tut ions. Moreover, this process has been accompanied by the 
transformation of parliamentary to presidential systems of government at 
different stages in most countries on the continent. 
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There is a clear preference among African leaders for authoritarian political 
systems after independence, which are combined with unitary state structures, 
to produce strong one-party systems of the left or the right. Federation might 
be incompatible with a single party system, as federal units might harbour 
strong minority parties which could frustrate African leaders' political 
objectives, one of them being nation-building. The decentralisation implicit 
in federalism could prove incompatible with the centralisation implicit in a 
one-party structure (Rivkin 1969:48). The concept of unity in practice 
throughout the length and breadth of the continent has, for the one-party 
states, come to mean uniformity. 
Writing in 1968, Rivkin argues in a critical tone, that in previous years it 
had become quite fashionable to denigrate the importance of canst i tut i ona 1 and 
governmental structures in the newly independent states. Most African states 
chose 'centra 1 i zed unitary state structures [con st itut ions] with authoritarian 
political structures and systems'(1968:19). Rivkin (1968) maintains that the 
critically important institutional framework for development in Africa has 
been overlooked. Constitutional limits on the functioning of governments have 
not been spelled out and this has made it impossible for truly national 
institutions representative of the country as a whole to grow and develop. 
Institutions are dominated by the party or a small group of individuals 
creating uncertainties and impacting upon development efforts (1968:17). This 
is another early criticism of the centralised unitary state which is now being 
reassessed, as referred to in the Postscript, chapter 8. 
Besides detailing the arguments for the unitary state in Africa, Rivkin (1969) 
also details those against federation and decentralisation. His argument is 
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based on the assumption that federations are more decentralised than unitary 
systems of government. Federalism in radical nationalist circles 'is a dirty 
word', according to Rivkin, and is frequently viewed as 'a nee-colonialist 
device to keep newly independent African states weak, divided, and vulnerable 
to a new colonial intrusion'(l969:86}. 
Former Presidents Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, who were 
opposed both before and after independence to decentralised institutions, 
removed, after independence, degrees of decentralisation and federation 
inherent in their independence constitutions. Nkrumah's objections to 
regionalism, balkanisation, decentralisation and federation within existing 
state boundaries will be analysed below. 
The anti-federalist view sees federation and balkanisation as attempts to keep 
individual states weak and thus submissive to European domination. During 
independence negotiations, so the anti-federalist thesis goes: 
the irreconcilable and scheming former colonialists are viewed as 
seeking through constitutional and political devices, such as 
federalism, and those institutions commonly associated with it, 
multiparty political systems, local self-government, and 
entrenched bills of rights, to prevent the development of strong, 
unified and economically as well as politically independent 
African states. Thus federalism is seen as a refined 
neocolonialist extension of the colonial balkanisation practice, 
designed to enfeeble or split up independent African states 
(Rivkin 1969:87). 
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In many formerly British ruled African states a policy of 'indirect rule' was 
applied. However, traditional or local government structures are not 
sufficiently well established or widespread (with few exceptions) to resist 
centralising tendencies. In any event, Rivkin says, 'there is nothing in the 
unitary structure that can be viewed as a built-in regulator of the trend 
towards centralisation comparable to that which exists in federal structures' 
(Rivkin 1969:96). 
There is little motivation for unitary states with one-party structures or 
dominant-party structures to seek new problems in the form of independent 
interests and power bases. Thus the unitary state has been accompanied by the 
centralisation of political power and the concentration of that power in the 
capital city. 
S.A. de Smith in his book, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions, 
published in 1964, writes on 'Westminster Export Models', drafting techniques, 
the later advent of 'presidentialism' and the centralisation of political 
power. De Smith's arguments on post-colonial Africa will also be referred to 
at some length, since they are indicative of the colonial legacy. 
Under the heading 'Presidentialism in Africa', De Smith writes of the 
replacement of liberal democratic with autocratic presidential constitutions. 
In general, constitutions in Africa after independence were adapted to provide 
for executive presidents with a fixed tenure of office and the removal of 
ministerial responsibility to the legislature. There was also a concurrent 
move towards single-party rule. These changes were characteristic of both 
former French and British ruled Africa. 
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The trend in Africa after independence has been towards authoritarian rule. 
In analysing the move towards authoritarianism, De Smith provides several 
reasons which harken back to the colonial period. He says that: 
Men who have been denied responsibility for too long, who have 
experienced humiliations because of the colour of their skins, 
who have been told that they are too immature to be entrusted 
with real authority, who have perhaps spent most of their lives 
in a condition of relative poverty, find themselves in power, 
dispensing favours, making big decisions, giving orders to 
European civil servants, addressing enthusiastic mass meetings, 
listened to with apparently respectful attention at international 
meetings, received at the White House and the Kremlin as 
distinguished visitors, and also enjoying the seductive material 
perquisites of high office .... A primary object of political 
activity the world over is to attain power and to hold on to it 
as long as possible (1964:235). 
De Smith does, however, point out that it would be a crude error to ascribe 
the behaviour of African governments solely to self-interest. He advances two 
additional reasons for the trend towards authoritarian rule. Reference will 
be made below to other authors who advance similar reasons. 
First, De Smith argues: 
all the new governments face the problem of building a nation, of 
developing a national consciousness within the arbitrarily drawn 
frontiers inherited from the colonial powers. Almost invariably 
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the main divisive force is not religion, economic interest or 
political ideology but tribal particularism .... If the groups 
are few but powerful, attracting passionate loyalties and 
engendering equally strong antipathies, it may be necessary to 
come to terms with tribalism by agreeing to a federal system of 
government .... But if it has been possible to create a majority 
political party there is a temptation - and one which is seldom 
resisted when the opportunity to succumb to it arises - to move 
in another direction: to insist on the acceptance of a single 
national ideology under a single national leader, and to reduce 
the tribal strongholds by a judicious combination of strong-arm 
methods and material inducements (1964:236). 
Although not spelled out, the end result of this approach must be the creation 
of a centralised unitary state and the dimi nu ti on of any local authority power 
structures. 
Secondly, De Smith contends, 
the economic and social problems of Africa differ not only in 
degree but also in kind from the issues that western governments 
have to face in the twentieth century. A modernising African 
government has implacable enemies: poverty, ignorance, disease 
and inertia. To combat them demands imagination, initiative and 
dedication. It demands strong government operating in an 
atmosphere of urgency (1964:237). 
De Smith returns to the issue of the non-toleration of organised opposition 
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and the clear preference for a single-party state on the part of independence 
rulers. Opposition is seen as divisive. If there are no constitutional 
prospects for an opposition group to accede to power, it might espouse a 
separatist cause, turn for support to a rival neighbouring state, or adopt 
conspiratorial methods with the aid of dissident officers in the police or 
armed forces. 
Despite governmental and regime changes, countries tend to continue with 
previous constitutional forms. Rulers and future rulers tend to view 
constitutional and political orders from the perspective of what is in their 
interests. Where ethnic groups have been excluded from power, they tend to 
favour a unitary form of government (1964:237). 
In Zolberg's (1966) study, Creating Political Order. The Party-States of West 
Africa, he explains the emergence of the centralised state in West Africa in 
terms of ideology and the emergence of the one-party state. He sets the scene 
for the creation of one-party centralised unitary states in West Africa, 
claiming that the assumption of responsibility by the new leaders of African 
states, 'produced a shocking awareness of the magnitude of the burdens of 
government in an underdeveloped country' (1966:39). New African leaders 
measured the levels of development in their new countries by international 
standards and undertook to effect fundamental change through government 
action. National integration was seen as a necessary change to bring about 
integration between disparate tri ba 1 groups. Further, Zol berg says, an 
increased awareness of the importance of the central authorities arose, and 
hence more demands have been directed at them. There are few filters for these 
demands; the social habits that made the leaders very approachable before they 
became officials are not easily unlearned (1966:41). African leaders needed 
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suitable concepts of political organisation, and it was the construction of 
ideologies which fulfilled this need, in particular the one-party ideology. 
As pointed out above, this ideology was best accommodated in a unitary state. 
For many African leaders, 'oneness' or 'national integration' involved a 
strong stand against internal 'federal ism.' Federal ism or political 
decentralisation was seen as 'imrnora l' and subversive of the unity of 
government. Zolberg continues that, 
the notions of separation of powers and of checks and balances 
are incompatible with the mood of 'oneness' ... it is possible to 
detect an overwhelming concern with the avoidance of conflict, 
with rationality, and with order (1966:63). 
Coleman and Rosberg, writing on Political Parties and National Integration in 
Tropical Africa, speak of a, 'process of consolidation' which encompasses a 
number of activities. One of these activities undertaken by ruling party 
elites is the carrying out of a 'set of measures ... designed to strengthen 
unitary one-party rule' (1970:668). The general trend has been to strengthen 
the executive power and this has been achieved through the fusion of the 
functions of president and prime minister into a single powerful executive 
office and the formal creation of uni -party states. A key element in what 
Coleman and Rosberg (1970) (Sigmund 1963 refers to the single or dominant 
party and democratic centralism) refer to as 'uni-partyism' is the need for 
nation-building and modernisation. This requires, according to Coleman and 
Rosberg, a central and 'unitary organization' of power within the state. 
Political parties in Africa are the only structures that can assist in 
achieving these goals (1970:668). 
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Nwabueze writes on the canst i tut ion in emergent states. Referring to the 
former colonies, he says that in only a few cases were constitutions accepted 
by the people of those political systems in a referendum or in a constituent 
assembly elected specifically for that purpose (1973:23). Linked with the 
method of acceptance of a constitution is the question of legitimacy, that is, 
how to make it command the loyalty, obedience and confidence of the people. 
Nwabueze continues that constitutions in emergent states, including Africa, 
are characterised by a certain artificiality in the eyes of the people and are 
remote from their lives and thought (1973:24). The supremacy of the 
constitution as the supreme law may therefore be questioned. The need for 
legitimation, Nwabueze suggests, did not exist at the time of independence in 
former colonies. Constitutions drafted, for example, for former British 
colonies, were drawn up by a few lawyers and professional politicians 
(Nwabueze 1973:31). Nwabueze emphasises the exclusive nature of the 
constitution-drafting process and the impact of colonial constitutional 
values. 
Markovitz describes the atmosphere prevailing at the time of independence in 
terms of decolonisation and the relationship of classes to this process. As 
former colonial powers gradually began to consider the future possibilities 
of independence for their territories, a Westernised African elite (class) 
began to emerge, who were mainly employees in commerce, the bureaucracy and 
service professions. The former colony was dominated by a European elite 
(class) whose departure enabled the new African elite (class), to aspire to 
filling the functional roles of the Europeans. Although this elite might have 
been aware of the 'colonial situation', they rarely questioned it. Politics 
and colonial structures became an aid to their achieving pecuniary gain and 
individual prestige (1977:182). 
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Collier, extending this argument, writes of the process of democratisation and 
the holding of elections. The democratisation process initiated by former 
metropolitan powers served to socialise African elites and to enable states 
to retain semblances of the former colonies after independence (1982:30). 
These African elites, who had negotiated independence and independence 
constitutions, were ready to accept colonial structures with very little 
change (Markovitz 1977:179). It could be argued that one of these structures 
was that of the unitary state. 
A common thread in the above discussion for the rationale behind the creation 
of a centralised unitary state is both the desire to maintain the geographic 
extent of existing political units, as well as the potential for increasing 
their geographic size. There is a strong reluctance to break up existing units 
into smaller political units, to engage in what is referred to by a number of 
writers and African leaders as 'balkanisation'. The term balkanisation refers 
to the processes of dissolution and disintegration which took place in the 
Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The presumption was that an attempt should be made to assimilate 
or integrate (as Shil s 1982 chapter 3 understands the concept) diverse 
groupings within the colonial African state through political and 
constitutional devices in order to facilitate nation-building. 
The minimal or optimal size of a state has, amongst political philosophers, 
long been a topic of debate (Neuberger 1986). Opponents of small states may 
argue that these lack the military power to defend themselves, they have 
insufficient political standing to make their independence meaningful and they 
cannot use the economies of scale, that is mass production, to achieve 
development and wealth. The opposing view is that in small states there is a 
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greater potential for genuine self-government, participation and spontaneity. 
In the African context balkanisation has acquired a meaning of its own. In the 
European sense it resulted in the liberation of many people from colonial 
rule, but also give rise to small, weak states. Many African leaders, like 
Nkrumah of Ghana and Gowen of Nigeria, disliked the concept of balkanisation. 
For Nkrumah, balkanisation in the African context meant 'small, weak and 
unstable states' (Neuberger 1986:96). It was feared by African leaders that 
the acceptance of limited internal balkanisation, that is the reduction in the 
geographic extent of existing colonies, could set off a chain reaction which 
once started would be difficult to contain. Balkanisation was also associated 
with secession and, according to Jome Kenyatta, former President of Kenya, 
once secession were legitimised 'there would be no end to the exercise. Claims 
would heap upon claims and anarchy would be the result'(Neuberger 1986:97). 
Balkanisation was, moreover, seen by African leaders and the All African 
People's Conference held in Tunis in 1960, as 'a way to perpetuate neo-
colonialism' (Neuberger 1986:98). The response to Balkanisation amongst 
African leaders was the promotion of the idea of African unity and Pan-
Africanism. Both are discussed below. 
For Sekou Toure, former President of Guinea, the creation of a 'viable 
national entity' was important. He argued that it should not be necessary to 
think in terms of tribal, ethnic and religious rivalries, thereby suggesting 
that internal balkanisation was unacceptable. He saw an important role for the 
centralisation of power in national institutions and for the Democratic Party 
of Guinea as the so 1 e party in the state in order to a chi eve nati ona 1 
objectives. For this to happen, he further argued that the Guinean state had 
to be democratic, unitary and progressive. Power also had to be concentrated 
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in national institutions to be exercised in terms of the principles of 
democratic centralism (Sigmund 1963:chapt.12). 
For African leaders like Nkrumah, Africa was, in terms of existing colonial 
boundaries, already balkanised and thus it was necessary to move away from 
this state of affairs. Africans had to create greater political units out of 
the existing ones. New federations created from existing states were 
acceptable. For example, Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, supported, in 
June 1960, the establishment of an East African Federation. This was a follow 
on to the establishment by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) of the 
Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in 1958. 
Nyerere, writing in 1966 maintained that at the time of the formation of 
PAFMECA, a belief was held that national boundaries separating different 
organisations were artificial and there was a feeling of mutual sympathy and 
interdependence between similar organisations across these boundaries. African 
unity and integration thus became corner stones of Tanzanian foreign policy 
(Nyerere 1966:5). 
Although not explicitly stated in the literature, the deduction can be made 
that decentralisation and devolution of power in existing states would have 
been seen as a step in the direction of balkanisation and therefore 
unacceptable to African leaders of the 1950s and 1960s. 
The Failure of the Centralized State. Institutions and Self-Governance in 
Africa, edited by Wunsch and Olowu in 1990, although focusing primarily on a 
reassessment of the centralised unitary state in Africa in the post-
independence period, provides some further useful insights into the initial 
establishment of the centralised unitary state. In discussing the colonial 
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inheritance of independent Africa, Wunsch holds that colonial administrations, 
whether British or French, neglected, distorted and sometimes destroyed local 
rule systems through which persons were able to take collective action. Even 
where colonial rule was benevolent, such rule disabled societies in a 
fundamental sense: it removed the necessity for persons to discover, and the 
opportunity for them to sustain, local collective mechanisms to solve local 
collective problems (Wunsch 1990:27). 
Wunsch continues by arguing that, 
colonies created the worst possible situation as far as 
deve 1 oping broad empowerment through multiple institutionally 
based organizations. Sovereign authority [sic] was highly 
centralized in the hands of the governor or even in the 
metropole; effective governance was in the hands of a district 
officer who was highly paternalistic and operated in a 
personal istic and ad hoc manner because of distance from the 
capital; and logistical support was centralized, slow and 
unresponsive. Local residents were therefore neither involved in 
their formal governance (centralized in the capital or overseas) 
nor left alone to solve their own problems and to build on their 
existing institutional infrastructure (Wunsch 1990:27). 
Col oni a 1 rule 1 eft centralised structures of power to post-independence 
African leaders. Regional and local political organisations were stifled and 
those which did exist were not sufficiently developed to resist the 
centralisation of political power. Wunsch (1990) views colonialism, the 
international environment and domestic socio-economic conditions as the most 
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important contributory factors to centralised government in Africa (Wunsch 
1990:38). 
Selassie writes of the imitation of metropolitan const itut i ona l systems. 
Writing on the adoption of a constitution for the former Belgian Congo at 
independence, Selassie says that militant nationalist leaders of that country 
insisted on the introduction of Belgian Parliamentary government, 'because, 
it was argued, it was better to copy a system that "had been tested" than to 
face the hazards of experimentation'(l974:21). 
African elites, which are sometimes referred to as 'inheritance elites' 
together utilised centralised colonial structures to establish their 
authority: to govern, to tackle development problems and to forge national 
unity. Some of their rationale for the greater centralisation of power is 
discussed below. 'Inheritance elites' wanted similar political structures to 
those of the departing colonial governors. One of these structures was that 
of the centralised unitary state. 
Much of the justification for the adoption of centralised unitary forms, 
centres on the needs of the African state and its leaders at a particular 
historical point in time. Very little consideration seems to have been given 
as to the long term suitability of the centralised unitary state. 
4.6 NATIONALISM 
The nationalist movements in colonial Africa contributed towards the setting 
of the ideological climate for the eventual creation of centralised unitary 
states. Following World War II, nationalism became a driving force in much of 
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colonial Africa. Nationalism is defined in various ways, but may be considered 
to be an ideological movement which strives for the attainment and maintenance 
of autonomy, cohesion and individuality for a social group, some of whose 
members conceive it to be an actual or potential nation. The nationalist 
strives for emotional solidarity, sovereignty of the state and the rights of 
citizens to participate in decision making (Smith 1979:87). Nationalist 
movements permeated the politics of all former African colonies. The thrust 
of these movements was towards autonomy and sovereignty for their respective 
colonies and the attainment of power at the centre. It was a reaction against 
European domination (Kedourie 1970:1). Thoughts of constitutional 
decentralisation would have constituted a centrifugal force, which would have 
cl ashed with nat i ona 1 i st centri pet a 1 forces. Accardi ng to Mboya, a Kenyan 
nationalist leader, African nationalist movements gave no consideration to 
details of problems or issues, unlike British and European political parties 
would, through committees, research workers and discussion groups. Such 
discussions would have created opportunities for differences to be addressed 
within the respective movements (Kedourie 1970:480-481). Mboya is suggesting 
here that constitutional innovation was not possible due to the nature of the 
nationalist movement in the African colony. African national ism thus furthered 
the intellectual and ideological climate for the creation of the centralised 
unitary state. 
In the late colonial era, African nationalism then was directed towards 
independence from a specific colonial power and unity referred to that between 
those fighting the same immediate battle. Beliefs in continent wide unity, 
al so referred to as Pan-African ism, were entertained at the same time as 
commitments to regional unity (Wallerstein 1968:112-113). This theme is 
referred to again below. 
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4.7 AFRICAN SOCIALIST AND MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY 
Underpinning the nationalist movement, various strands of socialist and 
Marxist-Leninist ideology also contributed to the contextual environment in 
which the centralised unitary African state came into being. The idea of 
African Social ism in the 1950s and 1960s was used by African leaders to 
justify their authority and to mobilise their people. There is no one precise 
definition of African Socialism and the ideology itself is the product of 
diverse leaders. Friedland and Rosberg (1964:2) describe African Socialism as 
being neither a precise ideology nor a specific guide to action, but is 
nonetheless a set of dimensions to which Africans give specific content as 
they deal with their problems. Despite the lack of homogeneity in African 
Socialist ideology, Friedland and Rosberg identify three main themes embodied 
in the doctrine, namely: the problem of continental identity (which is 
discussed below); the crisis of economic development; and the dilemmas of 
control and class formation (1964:3-9). The authors also identify four basic 
trends which appear to be relevant to the analysis of African Socialism. The 
trends are: 
First, the idea of the social obligation to work; 
secondly, the conversion of labour unions from consumptionist to 
productionist associations; 
thirdly, an orientation toward a classless society or a society 
with minimal stratification patterns; 
fourthly, a tendency towards developing a society that can be 
characterised as '"focal institutional"'(l964:3-4). 
The fourth trend is of particular importance in this study. Focal 
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institutional societies are monist in nature and are dominated by a single 
institution which becomes the focal point upon which all others depend. These 
societies, as discussed in chapter 3, can be described as 'concrete monist'. 
Friedland and Rosberg (1964) advance several reasons for the construction of 
'focal institutional' societies. One of them as pointed out above, is that 
African leaders have frequently expressed a desire for unity and have 
expressed hostility to tribalism in particular or to use Geertz's (1963) 
terminology - primordial attachments. To minimise tribalistic attachments, a 
single central focal institution is considered desirable. Friedland and 
Rosberg further say that the formation of 'focal institutional' societies also 
have historical roots. Africans they say, who come from traditional societies 
are accustomed to a considerable extent to the idea that society should be 
centred upon a single complex. Further, they maintain that the colonial period 
was marked by a tendency for a central government to emerge as an important 
and dominating element in the lives of Africans. Central governments 
represented a major source of monolithic power which was conveniently utilised 
and strengthened by African leadership elites (1964:29-30). The single party 
state was seen as an important instrument in achieving a 'focal institutional' 
society. 
As far as the theme, crisis of economic development is concerned, Sigmund 
(1963:12) argues that despite the particular socialist strand to which a 
leader might belong, there was a common commitment to a new form of 
development that would allow planning and control of the economy from the 
centre. 
The centralised unitary state can be seen as a necessary corollary to the 
process referred to above. 
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4.8 AFRICAN UNITY AND PAH-AFRICANISM 
4.8.1 African leaders 
In the 1960s, a number of prominent African leaders expressed themselves in 
written texts and in speeches on the need for African unity and Pan-
Africanism, that is unity and union (as defined in chapter 2) between existing 
states. However, there are differences in approach between them. Nkrumah for 
example, tended to be the most radical of all and advocated an immediate 
continental political union, whereas Kaunda was more of a gradualist in his 
approach and was accommodative of regional political unions as phases in the 
creation of continental political union. The Pan-Africanist movement 
represented a centri pet a 1 force, in that the idea was to create 1 arger 
political associations. It also established an intellectual climate in which 
African states became independent. While this movement was dominant, 
decentralisation was unlikely to receive much support or attention: 
centripetal forces tended to neutralise centrifugal ones. 
4.8.2 Azikiwe 
In an address to the Committee of African Organisations, delivered in London 
in August 1961 by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, Governor-General of Nigeria, he spoke of 
the idea of an 'African Leviatha~, echoing Hobbes' notion of a commonwealth 
(Hobbes 1962:177) referred to in chapter 3 above. Azikiwe was referring to the 
need for the continent to unite on a continental or regional basis to achieve 
certain political objectives (Legum 1962:274). He advanced his argument by 
saying that, when such a Leviathan had become a reality, it would be necessary 
for the nature of its form of government to be revealed: 
135 
The three main forms are known to students of government; 
unitary, federal and confederate [sic]. If it is to be union 
[sic], then it will be highly centralised with some devolution of 
its internal sovereignty to its local government units. If it is 
to be federal, then it will be necessary to decide whether the 
internal sovereignty of the federal government shall be 
explicitly defined, whilst allocating to it the exclusive 
exercise of internal sovereignty, but reserving residuary powers 
to its co-ordinate units as is the case in Nigeria .... If it is 
to be a confederate form of government, then both the external 
and internal sovereignties of the individual members of the 
confederation shall remain intact ... (Legum 1962:275). 
Azikiwe's is one example of a number of pleas for greater associations of 
African states. 
4.8.3 Nkrumah 
Kwame Nkrumah, former president of Ghana, was a leading proponent of Pan-
Africanism or political union between the states of Africa. Writing in 1960 
(Emerson 1965), he felt that there were two threats to the continent of 
Africa: nuclear tests in the Sahara by the French Government and the Apartheid 
policy of the Government of the Union of South Africa. In order to combat 
these threats, Ghana should surrender its sovereignty to a higher authority. 
African unity demanded the sacrifice of all personal, tribal and regional 
objectives and considerations. 
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Nkrumah in another of his writings, Africa Must Unite, published in 1963, 
further spelled out the need for the political and economic unification of the 
African continent. In terms of his thinking there were three objectives for 
the political and economic unification of Africa. First, according to Nkrumah, 
there should be over-all economic planning on a continent wide basis. That 
would increase the industrial and economic power of Africa. He reasoned that 
so long as Africa remained balkanised, regionally and territorially, the 
continent would be at the 'mercy of colonialism and imperialism' {Mutiso 
1975:344-345). Secondly, Nkrumah advocated the establishment of a unified 
military and defense strategy: 
I do not see much virtue or wisdom in our separate efforts to 
build up or maintain vast military forces for self-defense which, 
in any case, would be ineffective in any major attack upon our 
separate states (Mutiso 1975:345). 
Thirdly, Nkrumah believed that, stemming from the previous two objectives for 
Pan-Africanism, it would be necessary for African states to adopt a unified 
foreign policy and diplomacy to give them political direction in their joint 
efforts for the protection and economic deve 1 opment of the continent. He 
recommended that: 
The desirability of a common foreign policy which will enable us 
to speak with one voice in the councils of the world, is so 
obvious, vital, and imperative that comment is hardly necessary 
(Mutiso 1975:345). 
Nkrumah believed that a constitutional structure could be devised which would 
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secure the above objectives, 'and yet preserve to some extent the sovereignty 
of each state within a Union of African States' (Mutiso 1975:345). A 
continental union, Nkrumah stressed, was 
an inescapable desideratum if we are determined to move forward 
to a realization of our hopes and plans for creating a modern 
society which will give our peoples the opportunity to enjoy a 
full and satisfying life (Mutiso 1975:346). 
4.8.4 Nkrumah and the Congo crisis 
The Congo crisis is an illustration of a specific instance where a deliberate 
pol icy choice was made between an internal federation and a centralised 
unitary state. Kwame Nkrumah, the most influential Pan-Africanist at the time, 
was directly involved in this choice. The facts of the Congo crisis are 
briefly as follows. In 1960 the Congo became independent from Belgium. Shortly 
after independence, three major secession movements emerged in Katanga, South 
Kasai and the Stanleyville area of Oriental Province. Besides the emergence 
of these movements a series of army mutinies broke out accompanied by civil 
disorder and a breakdown of local government. The Congo consisted of six 
provinces which eventually fragmented into twenty-two, not fused in any way 
to facilitate nation building. In a series of negotiations, variations of 
constitutional orders were proposed, from a weak confederal system at one 
extreme to a relatively centralised form at the other. Cyrille Adoula was at 
the time Prime Minister of the Congo, and it was in these negotiations that 
Nkrumah became involved. 
In one of numerous communications between Nkrumah and Adoula, Nkrumah advised: 
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In order to repair effectively and quickly the serious damage 
done to Africa as a result of imperialism and colonialism, 
emergent African states need strong unitary governments capable 
of exercising a central authority for the mo bi l i sat ion of the 
national effort and the co-ordination of reconstruction and 
progress (Axioms of Nkrumah 1967). 
What emerged was a federal type of constitution with strong centralist 
tendencies. The major power was vested in the President, and the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet were chosen by, and made responsible to, the President 
(Rivkin 1969:183). This is one example of the considerable influence that 
Nkrumah had on the politics of Africa in the early 1960s. 
4.8.5 Nyerere 
'African unity' (rather than Pan-Africanism) was a recurring theme in the 
1960s in the writings and speeches of Julius Nyerere, former President of 
Tanzania. Two of his key publications, amongst others, which touch on this 
theme are Freedom and Unity {1966) and Freedom and Socialism (1968). The theme 
of 'African unity' is stated in a 1961 speech in which he says that regional 
associations should precede unity of the whole continent (Nyerere 1965:136). 
Again in the same year, Nyerere stated that once the potential for conflict 
on the continent had been avoided through unity, could African states tackle 
pressing socio-economic problems (Nyerere 1965:153-154). 
Writing in 1965, Nyerere points out that the leaders of the thirty-six 
independent African states existing at the time, knew something of the 
practical difficulties which they faced in attempts to achieve economic 
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development in a divided world. Each of the African states was then so weak 
in relation to the outside world, and so dependent upon it, that hardly any 
decisions could be made without some consideration of the attitudes which the 
larger powers might consequently adopt (Nyerere 1966:335-336). 
Unity for Nyerere was all-important. It was, 
essential for the safety, the integrity, and the development of 
Africa .... Unity must prevent the political exploitation of our 
fears and the needs by those outside Africa; it must not be 
possible for the different parts of Africa to compete one against 
the other for economic favours in return for political 
concessions Unity must also ensure that Africa becomes one 
market, and that its people cease to be divided by customs posts 
and tariff wa 11 s a 1 ong a hundred frontiers. Africa's commerce 
must be facilitated by a single currency, and its productivity 
enhanced by the rationalization of administration in relation to 
economic factors. These things require that in relation to the 
outside world the separate national states of Africa must cease 
to exist. They must be replaced by Africa. National sovereignty 
must be surrendered by the nation states in favour of an All-
African Government (Nyerere 1966:338). 
Nyerere did not believe that the continent-wide state need be a unitary state; 
the new African state could be a federal one. The important characteristic of 
this state, according to Nyerere, was that: 
The stronger the Central Government the greater the potential of 
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Africa; for powers can be devolved in practice as necessary, but 
they are only with difficulty surrendered by a lesser authority 
to a greater one. It is also important to realize that, once the 
decision to unify has been taken, it is the smaller and poorer 
nation states which have most reason to support a strong centre; 
only in such case is it possible to equalize benefits and burdens 
over the whole continent (Nyerere 1966:344). 
For Africa to be united, according to Nyerere, sovereignty must reside in a 
single body which incorporated the existing sovereign states. Nyerere conceded 
that the new African state need not be a unitary state with a single all-
powerful government, it could be a federal state with a division of powers 
between the centre and the constituent parts. Nyerere believed that the 
stronger the central government, the greater Africa's potential would be to 
achieve political and economic strength (Nyerere 1966:344). His is one of the 
few attempts at explaining in detail future constitutional arrangements for 
a Pan-Africanist Africa. 
4.8.6 Kaunda 
Kenneth Kaunda, former President of Zambia, writing in his book, A Humanist 
in Africa, published in 1966(a), also supported the objective of African 
unity, but cautioned against rapid progress towards union. In support of his 
belief in African unity, Kaunda in fact quotes, from the Preamble to the 
Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (DAU), the following: 
inspired by a common determination to strengthen 
understanding and co-operation amongst our states in response to 
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the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in 
a large unity transcending ethnic and national differences .•. 
(Kaunda 1966:136(a)). 
In the same book Kaunda argued that there was more 'i nternati ona list thinking' 
in Africa than in any other continent of the world and also a desire to avoid 
'balkanisation'. Arguing against advice to shelve ambitions for wider unity 
until national states had been firmly established and solved their domestic 
problems, Kaunda advanced two justifications for early national unity. The one 
was a psychological justification, that the minds of the people were still 
ma 11 eab le early in the independence peri ad and would more readily accept 
sacrifices which wider links would demand, twenty-five years down the line. 
The second was economic. Unity he maintained was essential to exploit the 
economic resources of the continent (Kaunda 1966:113-llS(a)). 
In another of his books, Zambia. Independence and Beyond (1966:43)(b), he 
argued that Pan-Africanism could be a constructive force for the uniting of 
economic operations which in turn would lead to political unity. 
4.8.7 A counter argument to unitarism 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, writing in 1947 (Emerson 1965) and 1966, argues against 
unitarianism [sic] and for internal federalism [sic] in Nigeria. Awolowo is 
one of the few African writers and leaders who actually sets out the arguments 
for or against unitarism within a particular state, namely Nigeria. He 
postulated that unitary constitutions were suited to uni-lingual countries, 
and federal constitutions to multi-lingual countries. In his 1947 writings, 
Awolowo maintained that Nigeria was not a nation, it was merely a geographic 
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expression and there were vast differences in the potentialities of the groups 
within the territory. The incompatibilities between these groups militated 
against unification and the creation of a number of provinces within the 
territory. 
4.9 PAN-AFRICANIST RESOLUTIONS 
Over the years a number of Pan-Africanist Congress resolutions were passed. 
These too helped establish the climate of opinion for the centralisation of 
power within individual colonies and states. Some of these clauses will be 
referred to here. In December 1958, the All-African Peoples Conference held 
in Accra, Ghana adopted a number of resolutions, one of which was on 
'Frontiers, Boundaries and Federations'. Parts of this Resolution states the 
following: 
Whereas the unity of Africa will be vital to the independence of 
its component units and essential to the security and general 
well-being of African peoples; Whereas the existence of separate 
states in Africa is fraught with the dangers of exposure to 
imperialist intrigues and the resurgence of colonialism even 
after the attainment of independence, unless there is unity among 
them; Whereas linguistic, religious and cultural divisions and 
national sovereignty should be subordinated to the overriding 
demands of Pan-African Unity where convnon geographical and 
economic considerations and national interests suggest the 
grouping of certain States; Whereas amalgamation, federation or 
groupings should only take pl ace between 1 ndependent states 
governed by Africans; Be it resolved ... that the Conference; {a) 
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endorses the desire in various parts of Africa for regional 
grouping of States ... (Legum 1962: 229-230). 
A further reference to the need for African unity was made at the Second 
Conference of Independent African States held in Addis Ababa, in June 1960. 
The Resolution held that, 'co-operation and unity among African States are 
essential for the maintenance of the independence and sovereignty of Africa' 
(Legum 1962:152). 
In March 1961, The All-African Peoples Conference held in Cairo, Egypt adopted 
a Resolution of Nee-colonialism. It maintained: 
This conference denounces the following manifestations of nee-colonialism in 
Africa: 
(b) Regrouping of States, before or after independence, by an 
imperial Power in federations or communities linked to that 
imperial Power. 
(c) Balkanisation as a deliberate political fragmentation of 
States by creation of artificial entities, such as, for example, 
the case of Katanga, Mauritania, Buganda, etc. (Legum 1962:255). 
The Preamble to the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, adopted in 
May 1962, makes further reference to African unity and the need to: 
promote understanding and collaboration among our States in 
response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and 
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solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national 
differences (Mutiso 1975:394). 
The Preamble to the Charter also declared itself, 
determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard won 
independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of our States, and to resist neo-colonialism in all its forms ... 
{Mutiso 1975:394). 
Statements of this nature were centripetal forces (referred to in chapter 3) 
in the creation of centralised unitary states in Africa. A climate of opinion 
was created that individual colonies and states should become components of 
greater political entities. Decentralisation was unlikely to occur at the same 
time as states were considering or being encouraged to invest powers in 
greater political entities. 
4.10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has been concerned with some of the general literature dealing 
either directly or indirectly with the establishment of the centralised 
unitary state in Africa, and more particularly in former British colonies. 
Since the continent is vast, specific experiences in the process of 
establishing centralised unitary states must also differ widely. The authors 
writing on the African state are also influenced by their own theoretical 
perspectives. This probably explains why there are differing emphases in the 
literature and no single coherent explanation for the establishment of 
centralised unitary states in Africa. 
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Two of the great challenges in explaining the development of the centralised 
unitary state in Africa are: first the necessity to deconstruct words and 
concepts which are used in a great many senses in order to find common 
meaning; and secondly, the inability to pin-point the degree to which specific 
factors and individuals have influenced the development of the centralised 
unitary state in Africa. Inferences have to be made as to what is understood 
by various words and concepts like 'devolution' or 'unity'. Similarly, 
inferences have to be made as to how specific factors influenced a 
constitution-making process. For example, particularly in the case of the 
Congo, referred to above, it is clear that Nkrumah influenced the process, but 
it is unclear as to whether the final outcome was entirely as a result of 
this. Also, in other cases where unitary constitutions have been adopted, 
external forces have played a greater role than internal forces. More specific 
conclusions will be made in the case studies that follow in chapters 5, 6 
and 7. 
Different factors have influenced the adoption of centralised unitary 
constitutional models at different times in the historical evolution of the 
African state. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, ideas and 
approaches emanating from the European colonial powers, like the Durham 
report, influenced this process. The Westminster model was, by and large, 
exported to Africa with a degree of authochtony permitted. This model 
established precedents and became an important inheritance amongst African 
leaders. In the case of most African countries nearer the time of 
independence, practical conditions, socio-economic and ideological factors 
like the various brands of socialism, began to influence the constitution-
drafting process. The need, for example, for nation-building, national unity 
and economic development began to impact upon this process. 
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The new independence leaders in African countries had to contend with 
centrifugal forces such as ethnic and economic divisions within their state 
boundaries. The political cultures of the people of African states at the time 
of independence were fragmented and the task was to build a centripetal 
political culture which leaders viewed as being sound and desirable. This they 
believed could.be undertaken by integrating or assimilating diverse groups in 
a centralised unitary state. The process was, moreover, influenced by dominant 
leaders and ideologies, and perceptions of alternatives. Internal federation 
was seen as being divisive, in that it would perpetuate centrifugal forces and 
facilitate nee-colonialism. A distinction was not made between internal 
political or geographic federation and federation in which boundaries followed 
ethnic or religious divisions. The natural legal alternative to a unitary 
constitution was seen as a federation. 
Perhaps the most important factor contributing towards the creation of the 
centralised unitary state in Africa was the climate of opinion prevailing at 
the time: it was believed that the centralisation of power would lead to 
political and economic progress and prosperity. Pan-Africanist thinking was 
important in this regard. The thinking was that the larger the African 
political unit, the better. Political power should rather be allocated to 
higher authorities rather than l ewer authorities within the African state. The 
important deduction to be made from this thinking is that, internal 
decentralisation or devolution was unlikely to occur at the same time as the 
allocation of powers were being made to new centralised authorities. Very 
little thought seems to have given to whether the centralised unitary state 
could in the longer term subdue or accommodate centrifugal forces like ethnic 
groupings, and also whether it would provide the framework under which rapid 
economic development could take place. 
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Chapter 5 
BOTSWANA (BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Bechuanaland Protectorate became the independent Republic of Botswana on 
30 September 1966, in terms of the Botswana Independence Act, 1966 passed by 
the British Parliament. This Act provided for a centralised unitary 
constitution for the territory. 
As stated in chapter two above, both pol itical-leg~l criteria, and fiscal 
criteria are utilised in this thesis for the identification of a centralised 
unitary state. As far as the political-legal criteria are concerned, the 
central government or authority should be supreme and there should be an 
absence of subsidiary sovereign bodies. As far as the fiscal criteria are 
concerned, total government expenditure at the central level should exceed 
that at the regional and. local levels, and central government expenditure 
expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) should be 
substantial that is about 30 percent. 
In terms of the political criteria, the independence Constitution of Botswana 
does provide for a supreme central government or authority and does not 
provide for subsidiary sovereign bodies. Provision is, however, made in terms 
of ordinary legislation for the establishment of representative District, 
Traditional Authorities and Town Councils. 
In terms of fiscal criteria, in 1967 approximately 89,6 percent of total state 
expenditure was expended by the central government, the balance being expended 
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by Local Councils, District Councils and Tribal Administrations (IFSY, 1982; 
Botswana Annual Report 1967). 
In 1971, the earliest year for which statistics are available, the central 
government was responsible for the production of 29,5 percent of GDP, again 
indicating an important decision-making role for the central authority (IFSY, 
1982). 
Therefore, in terms of both political-legal and fiscal criteria, Botswana at 
the time of independence may be considered to be a centralised unitary state 
organised in terms of a written constitutional document as referred to in 
chapter 1. 
5.2 NOMENCLATURE 
Reference will be made to 'Bechuanaland' or the 'Protectorate' in this study, 
when referring specifically to the historical Bechuanaland Protectorate 
between the years 1885-1966, although some historical references make mention 
of the 'Territory'. The people are referred to as 'Batswana', while one person 
is referred to as a 'Motswana'. After 1966 the country is referred to as the 
'Republic of Botswana'. 
Ethnic sub-divisions in their historical context are referred to in this study 
as 'tribes'. The ethnic sub-divisions of Botswana will be referred to with 
their full prefix, as distinct from texts where the prefix 'Ba' is dropped in 
some cases. The eight principal ethnic sub-divisions are as follows: 
Bamangwato; Bangwaketse; Bakwena; Batawana; Bakgatla; Bamalete; Barolong and 
the Batlokwa. 
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5.3 SCOPE, SOURCES, CIRCUMSTANTIAL FACTORS, ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
5.3.1 Scope 
This chapter covers the period beginning in the early 1880s and ends with the 
advent of independence in 1966. The year 1885 is taken as the most significant 
year in that period, in that it was the year in which the territory that today 
forms the Republic of Botswana was granted Protectorate status by the British 
government. This event partly laid the foundation for the later creation of 
a centralised unitary state in a sovereign Botswana Republic. 
5.3.2 Sources 
A number of written sources are used in this chapter. They include historical 
and contemporary academic texts and official documents like Command Papers, 
Advisory Council Minutes, Legislative Council Official Reports, and various 
archival sources. The sources focus generally on political elites and their 
perspectives concerning a centralised administration or legislative council 
for the Protectorate. Oral and written material generated by these elites is 
al so used1• 
5.3.3 Circumstantial factors 
As explained in chapters 1 and 4, many factors contribute to the adoption of 
a particular constitutional form. The general ones which contributed to the 
1
• Sir Ketumile Quett Masire, present day President of Botswana, and 
deputy leader of the BOP under Sir Seretse Khama during the independence 
negotiations, was not accessible for an interview. He is one of the few 
remaining pre-independence leaders. 
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adoption of a centralised unitary constitution in the case of Botswana are as 
follows: 
the nature and application of British colonial policy and 
historical precedents; 
attempts over the years to have Bechuanaland administered by the 
British South Africa Company or incorporated into the Union of 
South Africa or Southern Rhodesia; 
the emergence of a modernising African political elite and a 
nationalist sentiment in the territory; 
the desire amongst African and European elites in the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate to improve administrative efficiency 
and responsiveness and participate in centralised decision 
making; 
the constitutional evolution of former African colonies and the 
desire amongst Batswana elites to emulate these developments. 
5.3.4 Assumptions 
Throughout the entire period of the Bechuanaland Protectorate's 
constitutional evolution, the issue of whether to adopt a 
centralised unitary constitution, or a federal constitution was 
never thoroughly debated. Throughout the history of the 
Bechuana 1 and Protectorate, from 1885 onwards, the trend was 
towards the centralisation of administrative control and 
political power, and repeated calls were made for the creation of 
a single legislative council. It is therefore assumed that a 
unitarist political culture developed amongst elites and 
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eventually become dominant in the Protectorate, leading to the 
eventual adoption of a centra 1 i sed unitary con st i tut ion. The 
corollary of the calls for the creation of a single legislative 
council is that such a council could only be accommodated by a 
unitary constitutional form. The two notions of a single 
legislative council and a unitary constitutional form are not 
synonymous with one another but are closely related. If a federal 
constitutional order had been called for, it is likely that calls 
would also have been made for the creation of additional 
legislative councils coinciding either with ethnic or geographic 
divisions in the Protectorate. 
5.3.5 Hypotheses 
The following four hypotheses are made: 
1. That the foundations for the centralised unitary state were laid 
early in the history of Botswana at the time of the establishment 
of Protectorate status, and that this process was promoted 
through successive Orders-in-Council and Proclamations issued by 
the High Commissioner, and through the establishment of African 
and White Advisory Councils, a Joint Advisory Council and a 
Legislative Assembly. 
2. That the adoption of a centralised unitary state was the result 
of views held by modernising elites that nation-building should 
be promoted in the territory. This view prevailed over the 
traditionalist views of the tribal authorities and the final 
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independence constitution was largely a reflection of the 
modernising elites in the Protectorate. 
3. That the various attempts over the years by the South African 
government and Southern Rhodesia to have the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate incorporated into their territories contributed to 
the adoption of a centralised unitary constitutional form in 
Botswana. When the autonomy and integrity of a territory is 
threatened, its people tend to consolidate and find ways and 
means of promoting and strengthening their autonomy. Centripetal 
forces tend to override centrifugal forces in these 
circumstances. 
4. That developments in other African countries like Ghana, Uganda, 
Kenya and Nyasaland, the successes of nationalist movements, and 
the creation of single legislative councils in those countries 
had an important demonstration effect on the elites in 
Bechuanaland. 
5.4 THEORETICAL SCHEME 
This chapter will follow Etzioni's four-stage conceptual scheme as modified 
in chapter 3 above. 
i) The pre-centralised stage (1885-1920) corresponds with the 
proclamation of Protectorate status over Bechuanaland in 1885 and 
the period preceding the formation of a Native Advisory Council 
in 1919, and a European Advisory Council in 1920. 
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ii} The centralisation stage (1921-1949} corresponds with the 
functioning of the Native Advisory Council (renamed African 
Advisory Council} and the European Advisory Council as focal 
points for African and European interests, respectively. The 
early growth of nationalist sentiment also reinforces this 
process, together with administrative changes in the 
Protectorate. 
iii) The take-off stage (1950-1960) corresponds with the formation of 
a Joint Advisory Council in 1950, the development of nationalist 
sentiment in other parts of Africa and the further growth of 
nationalist sentiment in the Protectorate. 
iv) The termination stage (1961-1966} corresponds with the adoption 
of a Legislative Council in 1961 and the process of negotiation, 
leading up to the adoption of a centralised unitary constitution 
in 1966 for an independent Botswana. 
5.5 FOUNDATIONS OF THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1885-1920 - THE PRE-
CENTRALISED STAGE 
5.5.1 The historical foundations of the centralised state 
The foundations of the centralised unitary state can be traced to the early 
conflicts between white and black in the region. Members of the London 
Missionary Society (LMS) began exploring and settling in what was to become 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate and present-day Botswana from the early part of 
the nineteenth century. 
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Two general factors resulted in the declaration of Bechuanaland as a 
Protectorate in 1885 and the initiation of the centralisation process. On the 
one hand, the Boers from the Transvaal attempted to acquire as much of the 
territory as possible for farming purposes, and on the other, German activity 
and the founding of a settlement at Angra Pequena, in the former South West 
Africa, aroused fears that the Germans might join hands with the Transvaal 
Boers, or Portuguese or other Germans in East Africa. Throughout this period 
of expansion, 'the road to the north' which led to what was eventually to 
become Southern Rhodesia, could be cut, thus placing the Cape Colony at an 
economic and strategic disadvantage in its trade relations with the north. 
Of the tribes living in the Protectorate at the time, there were three which 
were pol it i ca 11 y significant. They were the Bakwena, Bamangwato and the 
Bangwaketse, ruled respectively by Chiefs Setshele, Khama and Gaseitsiwe. 
There was also a Batswana tribal grouping outside the territory in the 
Transvaal, namely the Bakgatla who in 1871 fled from the Boers, settled in 
Bakwena territory and became a disruptive factor. The trekking of Boer 
families through the territory in 1873/1874 was also a disruptive factor. 
These events and conflicts between the tribes led in 1876 to the request of 
Chief Khama III for British protection against such incidents. For these 
reasons and as a result of the activities of the Reverend John Mackenzie of 
the LMS, who waged a vigorous campaign advocating that the Tswana should be 
protected from foreign intervention, the territory was declared a British 
Protectorate in January 1885 (Sillery 1965:39 et seq.). 
Bechuanaland became a Protectorate in terms of Proclamation No.l dated 30th 
September 1885, an event which initiated the process of consolidating a 
centralised authority for the Protectorate which was at the time of 
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independence embodied in a constitutional document. 
The Proclamation stated: 
in the interests of peace, order and good government it has been 
found necessary that Her Majesty's Sovereignty should be 
proclaimed over such portion of the said Protectorate .•• and 
shall be taken to be British Territory under the name of British 
Bechuanaland (C.8707:2). 
Shortly before this Proclamation was issued, a Report with proposals for the 
future administration of the Territory was produced by G. Baden-Powell, a 
Colonial Civil Servant, for Sir Charles Warren, Special Commissioner for 
Bechuanaland. It formed part of a Dispatch sent to the Secretary of State. 
In his Report, Baden-Powell expressed his belief that the main object of 
administration in the Protectorate would be 
the maintenance of the Queen's peace against both external 
aggression and internal disturbance, with a view to the welfare 
and progress of a 11 inhabitants of the country, whether of 
European or native race ... (C.4588:59). 
With regard to a future administrative structure, Baden-Powell wrote, 
it appears to me that a uniform administration and fiscal system 
may be inaugurated which, at all events in the near future, would 
be self supporting. But such a system must be sufficiently 
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elastic to cover the widely-differing present needs of the 
various districts of Bechuanaland (C.4588:69). 
Baden-Powell, according to his Report, foresaw that, in what was to become the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, the chiefs would retain jurisdiction over their 
respective tribes, but the colonial authorities would assume responsibility 
for matters concerning more particularly the European population. This early 
Report formed the basis of the future administrative system for the 
Protectorate. 
An Order-in-Council was issued on 9 May 1891, granting the High Commissioner 
'all powers and jurisdiction' over the territory (C.8707:1). In terms of this 
Order-in-Council, the High Commissioner was empowered to appoint either Deputy 
Commissioners, Resident Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners, or Judges, 
Magistrates, or other officers, and could, from time to time by Proclamation, 
provide for the administration of justice, the raising of revenue, and 
generally for peace, order and good government (C.8707:1-2). 
The High Commissioner was, however, required to, 
respect any native laws or customs by which the civil relations 
of any native Chiefs, tribes or populations under Her Majesty's 
protection are now regulated, except so far as the same may be 
incompatible with the due exercise of Her Majesty's power and 
jurisdiction (C.8707:2). 
In terms of this Order-in-Council, the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner 
should, as far as possible, be confined to the European population. The powers 
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of the High Commissioner were thus better defined than previously, and also 
broadened. A central administrator could thus delegate powers to a number of 
subordinates, but retract the same powers. 
It should again be noted at this point that since early colonial rule, the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate has been inhabited by eight principal tribes of 
which the Bamangwato was the largest, making up one-third of the total 
population of the territory. Besides the main tribes mentioned above, there 
are a number of alien Africans resident in the Protectorate, as well as a 
small white population. From the early part of the nineteenth century, the 
main tribal groupings enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, as no centralised 
tribal authority for the Protectorate existed. The territory was thus highly 
fragmented in its early stages of development. 
Picard describes this early relationship between the colonial administration 
and the 'tribes' as having two dimensions, namely that of external protection 
and that of parallel rule, also referred to as 'indirect rule'. The European 
administration would exist to regulate the affairs of traders, missionaries 
and other Europeans, whereas the Magistrate (appointed in terms of the 1891 
Order-in-Council) would mediate between the chiefs and the outside world 
(1984:11). However, Picard and Stevens note that this administrative practice 
was broken almost from the moment of its implementation, in that British 
officials intervened on a number of occasions in issues affecting the social, 
political and economic life of the Tswana, in order to entrench and increase 
British authority over the Protectorate (Picard 1984:11; Stevens 1967:125). 
These breaches of administrative practice laid the foundations for increasing 
control over the territory as a whole. 
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According to Gunderson, much of the subject matter of legislative 
proclamations, up until about 1910, concerned law and order issues, personnel 
matters, judicial administration, taxation, and the control of liquor, arms 
and livestock. Law and order activities and revenue activities disrupted 
internal social order, which in turn extended the need for greater colonial 
administrative activity, as well as the resources to finance it. This, he 
says, contributed towards the enhancement of a centralised authority at the 
expense of traditional authority (1971:143). 
5.6 THE PERIOD 1921-1950 - THE CENTRALISATION STAGE 
5.6.l Administrative reforms 
In a report presented in 1933 by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
to the British Parliament, Sir Alan Pim (author of the report) describes the 
organisation of the Bechuana tribes as being very different from that in the 
High Commission Territories of Basutoland and Swaziland. In the latter two 
territories, 'there is a national unity among the Natives, symbolized by a 
single Paramount Chief, who with his general and privy councils speaks and 
acts for the whole tribe' (Cmd.4368:9). In Bechuanal and, he continued, all the 
tribes are, 'entirely independent of one another, and there is no Paramount 
Chief or other symbol of national unity' (Cmd.4368:9). 
According to Hailey, the form of 'parallel rule' which was applied in 
Bechuanaland meant that the colonial authorities showed the maximum regard for 
the customary authority of the chiefs, but failed to take account of the 
unprogressive character of their rule. It meant too that they had to face the 
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consequences of a low standard of responsibility shown by some of the 
traditional leaders (1957:272). 
An Order-in-Council was issued in 1934 partly to address some of the problems 
mentioned by Pim and Hailey. The Reforms instituted under this Order-in-
Council had the effect of assigning to the 'Native Authorities' a defined 
position within the executive organisation of the Protectorate as well as 
preventing the misuse of power by the chiefs. As mentioned above, the original 
objective of British jurisdiction was to protect Bechuanaland from 
encroachment. However, by the 1930s, the British government began to view 
itself not only as a protecting power, but as an administration responsible 
for the improvement of standards of living amongst the African population as 
a whole. 
The 1934 Order-in-Council was later challenged in a Special Court of the 
Protectorate, by chiefs of the Bangwato and the Bangwaketse. These chiefs 
believed that their internal sovereignty was being infringed by this Order-in-
Counci l. In a decision handed down by the Court in Tshekedi Khama and Another 
v. The High Conunissioner, it was confirmed that the British government had 
'unfettered and unlimited power to legislate for the government and 
administration of justice among the tribes of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
... '(Stevens 1967: 132). 
The appointment of a commission headed by Sir Alan Pim, to investigate the 
'Financial and Economic Position of the Bechuanaland Protectorate', was 
further confirmation of the British government's view that it was responsible 
for the territory as a whole. The said appointment represented a move away 
from the understanding that the population was to be viewed as eight separate 
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and autonomous 'tribal' groupings, to a more holistic view of the population 
and the development of the territory. 
5.6.2 African nationalism as a centralising force 
Besides administrative reforms introduced in the lg3os which were of external 
origin, and which partly laid the foundations for a centralised system of 
government, the nat i ona 1 i st movement a 1 so played its part. However, the 
nationalist movement was never as strong as in other former African colonies. 
The nature of Bechuanaland society, as described by Pim above, is perhaps the 
most important factor explaining why the territory never boasted as strong a 
nationalist movement as did other African countries. Nevertheless, it did play 
a role in the centralisation process in the territory. 
Parsons argues that modern nationalism in the territory can be traced to at 
least the 1920s (Picard 1985:13}. In a limited way this movement contributed 
towards the creation of centralised po 1 it i cal institutions in Botswana. Parson 
[sic] defines the Bechuanaland type of nationalism as, 'the struggle of socio-
political groups to protect or extend their identity, autonomy, and 
independence'(l984:26}. Various manifestations of this type of nationalism 
will be referred to below. 
Parsons [sic] points to two branches of an intellectual nationalist movement. 
The first, which dates from the 1920s, he calls 'progressive chieftaincy' 
exemplified by Tshekedi Khama, Bathoen II and others (Picard 1985:13). The 
chiefs represented in this branch were educated men who 
held progressive ideas of economic development ..• and of 
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bureaucratizing their administrative machinery ..•. They also 
believed in their own kind of nationalism by presenting a more or 
less united front with the colonial authorities, appealing to the 
precedent of their 'fathers' who had gone in united delegation to 
the Colonial Office in London in 1895 (Picard 1985:13-14). 
The latter delegation refers to a visit by Chiefs Khama I, Bathoen I and 
Lentswe to the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, in London in 1895, to 
protest against the possible transfer of the administration of their 
territories to the British South Africa Company, which at the time 
administered Southern Rhodesia. The transfer of these territories never took 
place. 
Batswana chiefs also protested against the possible inclusion of the 
Protectorate in terms of the 1909 draft Act for the creation of the Union of 
South Africa. The chiefs were assured that the transfer of the territory would 
not take place in the immediate future, but that it would take place some day 
(Stevens 1967:126). 
This branch of African nationalism was al so manifested in the Advisory 
Councils in the 1940s and 1950s. Chief Tshekedi Khama and others expressed 
their opposition in this forum, to the possible incorporation of the 
Protectorate into the Union of South Africa. As one example and manifestation 
of this branch of African nationalism, in 1946 Chiefs Tshekedi Khama, Regent 
of the Bamangwato, and Bathoen II of the Bangwaketse, together with four other 
chiefs, submitted a Memorandum to the High Commissioner for transmission to 
the Secretary of State, to be placed before the Trusteeship Committee of the 
United Nations. In the Memorandum, the chiefs reminded the Resident 
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Commissioner that in the past they had never failed to record their protest 
against any suggestion for the inclusion of the Bechuanaland Protectorate into 
the Union of South Africa. The Memorandum continued that the chiefs were 
deeply concerned about what they referred to as 'our country' and its 
potential for industrial and agricultural development. They felt that for 
future development the Protectorate should have an unimpeded trade route 
through the former South West Africa to the Atlantic. At the time, the railway 
line running through the Protectorate was controlled by the former Rhodesian 
and South African Railways. Their appeal, therefore, was that South West 
Africa should not be made an integral part of South Africa, to facilitate a 
possible transport route to the Atlantic and to enable Hereros and other 
people, who had taken up refuge in the Bechuanaland Protectorate as a result 
of fear of the Union's 'Native Policy', to return to South West Africa. The 
South African mandate over the territory, they felt, should be revoked by the 
United Nations Trusteeship Committee and given to Britain or the United 
Nations Organisation (.!J.'.'_i_s_~~~~~~ves_'. ~-_K. -~atthews Collection. Ell-E3.81). V 
- . ------· ·- . --·-··-·---~----·------~-~-----
The second branch, Parsons saw as intellectual democratic national ism. It 
consisted of men like Simon Ratshosa (1883-1939) and Dr S.M. Molema (1891-
1965). These men differed little in terms of their background and education 
from the progressive chiefs, generally coming from aristocratic backgrounds 
with sound education but, because they were not in positions of power and 
influence within the traditional authority, they gravitated towards a form of 
bourgeois nationalism (Picard 1985:14). 
Writing between the years 1929-1931, Ratshosa for example, called for a united 
Bechuanaland Protectorate ruled with the consent and advice of the national 
intelligentsia as the representatives of the people. Parsons points out that, 
167 
although Ratshosa advocated the creation of a more centralised state, he 
actually wanted colonial administration to be stronger. To achieve this end 
Rathosa wanted a National Council established in which, 'a party of 
enlightened natives' would have a strong say, so that the 'unity and 
preservation of Bechuanaland Protectorate will ever increase'. He moreover 
called for the democratisation of local government and the checking of the 
powers of the chiefs (Parsons 1974:450-452). This branch of nationalism, 
Parsons maintains, can be linked i nte 11 ectua lly with that espoused by the 
Bechuanaland Democratic Party formed by Seretse Khama in 1962 (Picard 
1985:14). 
5.6.3 The Advisory Councils 
In 1919 the centralisation of the administration of the Protectorate was taken 
a step further with the creation of a Native Advisory Council, which in 1940 
became the African Advisory Council. Membership included representatives from 
each tribe, and the ruling chief from each had to be included. Chief Khama and 
the Bamangwato did not attend as full members until 1940. The function of the 
Council was to discuss with the Resident Commissioner all matters affecting 
African interests which members wished to put forward. This Council was the 
first administrative structure designed to co-ordinate solely tribal matters. 
The European Advisory Council was established in 1920 and consisted of six 
members elected by Europeans from the six areas into which the Protectorate 
was divided. The function of the Council, like that of the African Advisory 
Council, was to advise the Resident Commissioner on matters affecting 
Europeans in the Protectorate. 
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The two branches of African nationalism, which have contributed towards the 
creation of a centralised unitary state, have manifested themselves in 
statements made from time to time in the Advisory Councils. 
5.6.4 African Advisory Council 
The main thrust for the formation of a Legislative Council and a more 
centralised form of administration in the Protectorate, in which Africans 
might participate, came from the African Advisory Council. The formation of 
a Legislative Council for the Bechuanaland Protectorate was discussed 
periodically in the African Advisory Council from about 1944 onwards. 
An early example of this occurred in 1946, when a Councillor spoke out against 
the purely advisory nature of the Council. He held: 
At present we are interested onlookers and, if the present policy 
is not changed to that of which we shall be active partisans, it 
will not be long before we are disinterested onlookers. We are 
getting more and more dissatisfied with the policy of having 
everything thought out and done for us. The continuance of such 
a policy cannot perpetuate our status of 'children' and militates 
against our aspirations to become 'grown ups'[sic] (Minutes of 
the AAC, 26th Session, 1946:57). 
In 1949 an appeal was made by several members of the African Advisory Council; 
including Chief Bathoen II of the Bangwaketse, for a body which could 
consolidate the District Commissioners' Conference, the European Advisory 
Council and the African Advisory Council into a central organ of government. 
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The African Advisory Council, it was claimed, had lost the confidence of its 
members. Like the European Advisory Council (referred to below), it was 
claimed that delays were incurred by having to circulate matters through three 
Councils, and responses were then sometimes not forthcoming. 
In 1950 a resolution was passed in this Council stating that: 'We submit that 
it is now time that consideration is given to the formation of a Legislative 
Council for the Bechuanaland Protectorate' (Minutes of the AAC, 15-21 June 
1950:81). Despite the establishment of a Joint Advisory Council in 1950, the 
issue of the establishment of a Legislative Council for the territory was 
again debated in 19~2 in the African Advisory Council. The first speaker in 
this debate, Chief Bathoen II, maintained that requests put to the African 
Advisory Council over the years, '[were] not answered for a very long time and 
sometimes we are given promises which are never fulfilled' (Minutes of the 
AAC, 14-21 October, 1952:148). He further argued that members of the Council 
did not have sufficient opportunity or time to consider Government 
Proclamations before they were implemented. Finally, Chief Bathoen II felt 
that the Bechuanaland Protectorate was lagging behind other British colonies 
which already had Legislative Councils. 
Another member of the Bangwaketse, Counci 11 or M. L. Kgasa believed that a 
Legislative Council would resolve several issues. It would, 
fulfil the too often unpopular but reasonable dictum [sic] that 
'taxation of a people should be followed up by representation of 
the people in the framing of laws' ... a Legislative Council would 
dispel the deep seated belief of the average Motswana that all 
Europeans who come into the territory have come to take away the 
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land and our cattle. This belief leads to mistrust and a 
Legislative Council would in addition remove mistrust and bring 
about goodwill, co-operation, benevolence and unity in diversity 
(Minutes of the AAC, 14-21 October 1952:150). 
Counci 11 or Lethal e Mos i el el e of the Bakwena expressed his view that: 'A 
Legislative Council [will] afford the ordinary man to take a share in the 
framing of the laws which govern them' (Minutes of the AAC, 14-21 October 
1952:151). 
Councillor Tshekedi Khama claimed that of all the British Protectorates and 
Crown Colonies, only the three High Commission Territories were without a 
Legislative Council. He continued that: 
The unexplained delay in the creation of a Legislative Council 
... breeds a suspicion in the minds of many people ... that this 
delay has a deeper meaning than we realise. Some critics feel 
that the question continues to be shelved in order to placate the 
Government of the Union of South Africa ... we feel that a 
Legislative Council is in fact one of the protections necessary 
against any aggressive political measures which the neighbouring 
government may direct against us. It is only through a properly 
constituted Council that the true feelings of the people can be 
expressed ... demands will sooner or later be made by the Prime 
Minister of the Union of South Africa for the inclusion of the 
Protectorates into the Union of South Africa (Minutes of the AAC, 
14-21 October 1952:153). 
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5.6.5 European Advisory Council 
During the early years of the European Advisory Council, debate on 
constitutional issues tended to focus on access to land and the Protectorate's 
incorporation into the Union of South Africa. For example, at the sixth 
meeting of the European Advisory Council held in 1926, a resolution was passed 
stating in part that, 'it is the unanimous desire of the European residents 
in the Tuli, Gaborones and Lobatsi blocks that their settlement be 
incorporated in the Union of South Africa ... ' (Minutes of the EAC, 6th 
meeting, 1926:39). This attitude towards incorporation contributed towards the 
consolidation of the African opposition against incorporation. 
At a meeting of the Council in 1936 the focus began to shift and reservations 
were expressed mainly in response to practical realities, as to the status of 
the Council. These reservations were similar to those expressed in the African 
Advisory Council as referred to above. It was felt that the advice of members 
of the Council was seldom asked for, and then, seldom followed. The request 
then to the High Commissioner was to reconsider the status of the Council. At 
a meeting later that year, co-operation between the Protectorate and 
neighbouring states was discussed. A view was expressed that the African 
population should be consulted on this issue (Minutes of the EAC, 21st meeting 
1936). 
As time progressed, the opinions of the members of the European Advisory 
Council began to coincide more closely with African elitist opinion where 
constitutional advances for the Protectorate were concerned. It was in 1950 
that a motion was proposed in the European Advisory Council to establish a 
Joint Advisory Council, which would include the entire European Advisory 
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Council with the Resident Commissioner as President (Minutes of the EAC, 6-10 
March 1950). 
5.7 ESTABLISHMENT OF A LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 1950-196I - THE TAKE-OFF STAGE 
5.7.1 The nationalist movement 
The nationalist movement and the advent of a centralised administration were 
given further impetus by two main events in 1948. While studying in England, 
Seretse Khama, heir to the chieftaincy of the Bamangwato, married a white 
English woman. This event resulted in hostility from Seretse Khama's uncle and 
regent, Chief Tshekedi Khama, and caused division amongst tribesmen. In the 
same year, a new South African government began implementing its policy of 
strict racial segregation or what was referred to as apartheid. The marriage 
was vehemently denounced in South Africa and the South African government 
renewed its calls for the High Commission Territories (at the time 
Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland) to be placed under its jurisdiction. 
The British government responded by prohibiting Khama from entering 
Bechuanaland for a period of five years and barring him from assuming the 
chieftaincy of his tribe. It began also to move in the direction of self-
government and independence for the territory rather than incorporation. The 
establishment of the Joint Advisory Council in 1951 is an early indication of 
this shift in policy direction. 
Independence according to Parson [sic], became the accepted future direction 
in Bechuanaland for two reasons. First, there was a deep hostility in 
Bechuanaland towards incorporation into South Africa, and secondly, other 
173 
African nationalist 1 eaders pl aced pressure on Britain to prevent the 
extension of apartheid to the Protectorate (1984:30). This was a manifestation 
of the first branch of nationalism supporting increased colonial rule, as 
referred to above. 
In 1956 Seretse Khama was allowed to return to Bechuanaland on condition that 
neither he nor his family would be able to claim the chieftaincy. Khama 
assumed the vice-chairmanship of the Bamangwato Tribal Council and from that 
time on he took a leading role in domestic politics and became a member of 
both the African Advisory Council, the Joint Advisory Council and later the 
Legislative Council. As a member of the Legislative Council, he was 
instrumental in forming the Bechuanaland Democratic Party {BOP), the third 
political party to be established before independence. The first party to be 
formed was the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party, in 1959, followed by 
the Bechuanaland Peoples Party {BPP) in 1960, whose leaders Matante and Mpho 
were members of the South African Pan-Africanist Congress and the African 
Nati ona 1 Congress, respectively. Through these 1 eaders, the movements in 
question influenced Bechuanaland. The BPP attacked the institution of 
chieftainship and colonial ism and called for independence for the Protectorate 
and the exclusion of the white population from constitutional negotiations. 
The BOP was formed as a pragmatic alternative to the BPP and made a conscious 
attempt to appeal across tribal lines to traditionalist sentiment. Khama also 
defended the rights of the white population to participate in constitutional 
negotiations, but in 1963 rejected the demands of those living in the Tati 
District for independence. He stated that the fragmentation of the 
Protectorate would not be permitted. 
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Seretse Khama drew much of his strength from his membership of the Bamangwato 
tribe of which he was a member, and which comprised about thirty percent of 
the total population. Not being a chief, he was removed from the duties 
attached to this office, which allowed him to become the modernising leader 
of a broadly-based political party, supporting the territorial integrity of 
the Protectorate (Stevens 1967:144-148). Removed as he was from traditionalist 
matters, his acceptance of a unitary Bechuanaland was facilitated. 
Traditionalist elements tended, as pointed out below, to support alternative 
decentralised constitutional proposals. 
5.7.2 European Advisory Council 
The matter of political advancement for the territory was taken further in 
1953, in the European Advisory Council, when a motion was proposed by Mr L.S. 
Glover: 'That Council take stock of the present economic outlook in the 
Territory with a view to obtaining evidence of our ability to attain 
Legislative Council status' (Minutes of the EAC, 17-lg August 1953:28). 
The proposer of the mo ti on argued for Legislative Council status on two 
grounds. He felt that government was too remote from the people. The 
Protectorate was, in fact, governed from London 6 000 miles away, via the High 
Commissioner and Resident Commissioner from Mafeking outside the borders of 
the Protectorate. There was a lack of cohesion in the administrative 
structures for the Protectorate. Moreover, the High Cammi ssi oner for the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate was also High Commissioner to the Union of South 
Africa. The two roles of High Commissioner, he felt, were incompatible, in 
having to consider the interests of a 'poor dependency and wealthy dominion 
... ' (Minutes of the EAC, 17-19 August 1953:29). 
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The proposer of the motion further argued that problems that the Protectorate 
would sooner or later face must be resolved in a united front, by which he 
meant that Africans and Europeans should be at one when addressing issues 
relative to the Protectorate as a whole. Legislative Council status would 
afford this opportunity. However, he qualified his view by stating that the 
vote for this Council would, 'only go to the politically mature men who want 
to take their full share of citizenship, accepting the full obligations of 
taxation, morality and responsibility' (Minutes of the EAC, 17-19 August 
1953:31). 
5.7.3 African Advisory Council 
In 1958 the issue of establishing a Legislative Council for the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate was again debated intensively in the African Advisory Council. 
Speaking to a motion in this regard, proposed by the Bamangwato 
representatives, Mr Seretse Khama, who can be identified with the second 
branch of African nationalism referred to above, emphasised the need for co-
operation between the African people, the Europeans and the Administration. 
The purpose of a Legislative Council would then be to consider, 
matters which relate to the Territory as a whole .... I think our 
guiding principle should be the type of political institution 
which is appreciated throughout the world because it shows 
fairness and justice and shows co-operation between Government 
and the people (Minutes of the AAC, 20-23 May 1958:60-61). 
Mr Tshekedi Khama again spoke on the necessity of a Legislative Council for 
Bechuanaland in this debate, justifying the need for such a body for the 
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Protectorate by the progress already made in other African colonies towards 
obtaining Legislative Councils. Nevertheless, it was suggested by several 
speakers in the debate that the establishment of a Legislative Council would 
deprive the chiefs of their power bases. 
5.7.4 The formation of the Joint Advisory Council 
Although the Joint Advisory Council was formed in 1950, debate on the further 
constitutional development of the Protectorate only really commenced in that 
Council in 1958. At the seventh session of the Joint Advisory Council, held 
in April of that year, a resolution was passed stating that, 'in the opinion 
of this Council the time has come when a Legislative Council should be formed 
and empowered to assist in the Government of the Territory' (Minutes of the 
JAC, 14-15 April 1958:76). 
Mr Russell England, an elected member of the Council, speaking in support of 
the motion, felt that the granting of a Legislative Council to the territory, 
would bind it together 'in a common loyalty and desire' (Minutes of the JAC, 
14-15 April 1958:76-77). He continued that: 
We desire ... to develop our Territory in accordance with the 
true unfettered principles of the British Peoples. To assist in 
the achievement of this it is necessary that there should be a 
body of standing that feels itself bound to represent the wishes 
of the people to Government It is our firm belief that only 
by granting the peop 1 es of the Territory a reasonable 
participation in government and by giving the Territory its own 
Head of State, directly responsible to the Secretary of State, 
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that satisfactory human relationships can be maintained, and 
proper development take place (Minutes of the JAC, 14-15 April 
1958:76-77). 
Mr Tshekedi Khama, in responding to this motion, stated his belief that the 
people of the Protectorate had sufficient training in the European, African 
and Joint Advisory Councils to participate in a Legislative Council. He 
further maintained that there was a need to promote national unity which would 
bridge racial unities. There was already an atmosphere of racial harmony in 
the Protectorate which he felt could be improved and consolidated. 
Bechuanaland, he said, had a strong separate tribal element, and separate 
systems of land ownership and occupation. The people of Bechuanaland thus, 
have to face the issue as to what degree it is to be a federal or 
unitary state, one nation or two, and if as some of us wish, 
there is to be one nation, then 'there is need to fashion a 
common citizenship so as to create a bond between race and race 
and tribe and tribe' (Minutes of the JAC, 14-15 April 1958:80). 
Tshekedi Khama saw a federal system in the context of the Bechuanal and 
Protectorate as being divisive. He also remarked in response to this motion 
that the Protectorate, until that time, had been governed by numerous bits of 
legislation issued in the form of proclamations, which he felt might be 
relegated to wasted energy. A national political pol icy was necessary for 
Bechuanaland. Finally, he felt that a recognised political body composed of 
all the races in the territory could speak with a united voice as to its 
ultimate destiny, either as a part of the Union of South Africa, as a member 
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of the Central African Federation, or as an independent state (Minutes of the 
JAC, 14-15 April 1958:80-81). 
Chief Kebalepile Montshioa spoke in the same debate in favour of the 
establishment of a Legislative Council. His concern was with the racial 
composition of the new Council. He posed the question as to how many members 
there would be from the European side, and how many from the African side 
(Minutes of the JAC, 14-15 April 1958:81). With regard to the racial 
composition of a Council between Africans and whites, he felt that 'this sort 
of semi-official apartheid must be done away with' (Minutes of the JAC, 14-15 
April 1958:81). 
Mr J.G. Haskins also pleaded for a Legislative Council, as he felt that a 
'tremendous amount of repetitive work is taking place' (Minutes of the JAC, 
14-15 April 1958:83). He was referring to the three Councils, the African, 
European and Joint Advisory Council, having to consider similar issues. 
Another member, Mr W.H. Turnbull felt that Bechuanaland was 'growing up' and 
its destiny was more closely 1 inked with the Colonial Office than to the 
Commonwea 1th Re 1 at i ens Office. He maintained that the territory had, had sixty 
years of adolescence and was now ready for adulthood. This he expanded upon, 
seeing Bechuanaland as deserving a larger share in the management of its own 
affairs with a Governor, who would represent the British monarch, as head of 
the territory. He saw the destiny of Bechuanaland as neither with South Africa 
nor with the Central African Federation (Minutes of the JAC, 14-15 April 
1958:84). 
Dr S.M. Molema, identified above as a member of the second branch of African 
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national ism, drew a comparison between the level of development of the African 
in Bechuanaland and those in territories like Uganda, Tanganyika, Nigeria, 
Ghana and the Central African Federation, and their attainment of Legislative 
Councils. He posed the question as to why Bechuanaland could not have a proper 
Legislative Council, as the Joint Advisory Council had in effect already been 
legislating on many issues. He further raised the unification issue which 
could involve either the Central African Federation or South Africa, stating 
his belief that if the territory already had a Legislative Council and was 
destined to become part of a neighbouring territory, it would be able to play 
a greater role in that territory than it already fulfilled. 
Mr Seretse Khama, later a Prime Minister and President of the territory, 
compared the canst i tut i ona l evolution of Bechuana land with other African 
countries. He mentioned the need to de-emphasise race in the co.mposition of 
a Legislative Council. He continued 
we have got to consider ourselves a community ... we have got to 
have general legislation to cover the whole Territory, even 
though we can have special local legislation to satisfy those who 
wish to have that type of legislation .... the most important 
thing is that legislation .•. should be rather on the general 
side and it is only when we have a council of that nature that we 
can discriminate as to which legislation or order should apply to 
a specified area and which should be of general application 
(Minutes of the JAC, 14-15 April ·1958:88). 
At its 9th Session held in April 1959, the Resident Commissioner informed the 
Council that the Secretary of State would be happy to consider proposals for 
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the establishment of a Legislative Council for the Protectorate. The Resident 
Commissioner was requested to formulate and submit proposals to the High 
Commissioner, after consultation with the Joint Advisory Council and 
interested persons in the Protectorate. 
5.7.5 The Joint Advisory Council Constitutional Committee Report 
The Const itut i ona 1 Committee consisted of four African and four European 
unofficial (non-elected) members of the Joint Advisory Council, and four 
official Government members. Dr S.M. Molema and Mr Seretse Khama, who were 
associated with the second branch of African nationalism referred to above, 
were included as unofficial members. 
The introduction to the Committee's Report stated that the main concern was 
to formulate con st itut i ona 1 proposa 1 s which were, 'progressive yet not of such 
a nature as to be likely to prejudice or break down anything of value in the 
harmonious life of the Territory ... '(JAC, Constitutional Committee Report, 
8 October 1959:13). 
The Report explained that the problem of accommodating traditional political 
structures under a single legislative authority had exercised the minds of the 
Committee members. In this regard the Committee said that: 
The wishes of the small number of politically mature African 
inhabitants of the Territory should be balanced against the 
unexpressed and often inchoate views of the vast majority of the 
African inhabitants, whose entire mode and manner of 1 ife is 
related to and dependent upon the tribal structure. Any radical 
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changes which swept away familiar institutions without 
substituting anything both better and capable of being understood 
by them would be abhorrent to the majority of African peasants 
(JAC, Constitutional Committee Report, 8 October 1959:3). 
The Committee relied on principles gathered from the experience of other 
territories with more developed institutions. The Report mentioned that in one 
respect Bechuanaland was different from other territories, in that 
consideration was now being given to the establishment of a Legislative 
Council, rather than the improvement of a presently established Council as in 
other territories. The Council, moreover, should have a majority of elected 
representatives: it should be a representative Council. Only a representative 
Council would command the support of the general public. A further tendency 
in the Report was towards a common voters' ro 11 rather than communal 
representation. 
The Report said that communal representation might 'stereotype or harden 
racial divisions', whereas a common roll would encourage members to think in 
terms of the Territory as a whole (JAC, Constitutional Committee Report, 8 
October 1959:13). There was a strong nation-building view amongst the 
Committee members. However, the Committee believed that there was no prospect 
of a 'national outlook or consciousness cutting across racial divisions where 
any racial group in the Territory feels that its interests as a group are 
adequately represented or secured' (JAC, Const i tut i ona l Cammi ttee Report 8 
October 1959:14). 
To avoid the possibility of a smaller tribal grouping being excluded from 
having representation in the Legislative Council, it was proposed that the 
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African Advisory Council become an electoral college for the election of 
Africans to the Council. 
In summary then, the Committee tended towards a universally elected, 
centralised governing authority for the Protectorate, but was obliged to 
accommodate the deeply traditional element in Bechuana land. A centralised 
single authority was viewed as being in keeping with the constitutional 
development trends in other parts of Africa, that is the adoption of unitary 
constitutional forms. 
The Committee was empowered to consider proposals from interested persons. 
Only one memorandum which was relevant to the Constitutional Committee was 
received from a member of the public, Mr L.D. Raditladi. The memorandum was 
written on behalf of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party formed in 
1959. Mr Raditladi appealed for a democratic party system and a federation 
embracing the eight tribal admi ni st rat ions. His reasons for preferring a 
federal system to a unitary system were not well articulated. Nevertheless, 
he felt that a greater degree of participation by elected representatives of 
the tribal groupings in the central administration was necessary (Memorandum 
of Suggestions, 1959). The Federal Party did not survive very long after its 
formation nor did it enjoy a large membership base. Supporters of this party 
were also alienated by Raditladi's preference for tribal authorities (Tlou 
et.al.1995:178). The failure of this party would suggest a limited federalist 
sentiment in the territory at the time. 
Tl ou et al. maintain that the JAC was in fact cowed into accepting the 
constitutional recommendations en bloc which were modelled along the lines of 
a small British Caribbean dependency. The constitutional committee which had 
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in fact drafted the report, had been 'hi-jacked by its "official" 
members'(l995:180). 
5.8 THE INDEPENDENCE PHASE 1961-1966 - THE TERMINATION STAGE 
5.8.1 The 1961 Constitution 
The constitution drafted in terms of this Committee's recommendations came 
into effect in 1961 and provided for a single legislature consisting of 
thirty-one to thirty-five members, twenty-one of whom were elected. Ten 
Africans were elected indirectly through an African Council. Ten Europeans and 
one Asian were elected on a constituency basis. The Constitutional Committee 
believed that communal or racial representation would retain the confidence 
of inhabitants of the territory and ensure that all racial groups would be 
adequately represented. With the implementation of this constitution, the 
African Advisory Council, the European Advisory Council and the Joint Advisory 
Council were abolished. 
The establishment of a centralised unitary state with a popularly elected 
legislature was taken a step further with the drafting, in 1963, of a further 
set of constitutional proposals for advancing internal self-government in the 
Protectorate. In August 1963, the Resident Commissioner began consultations 
for a revision of the constitution. The only debate which came near to 
considering a decentralised form of government was that concerning the future 
position of the chiefs in the government. The Responsible Government 
constitution which was drafted provided for the executive arm of government 
to be drawn from an elected legislative chamber. The only recognition given 
to tribal interests was the establishment of a House of Chiefs whose function 
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it would be to examine certain bills before their introduction to the 
Legislative Assembly, and to make representations to the executive with regard 
to matters concerning the tribes and tribal organisations. 
One of the proposals put forward for the accommodation of the chiefs, one that 
could have resulted in a decentralised form of government, was a proposal to 
establish a federal system in which the tribal administrations would function 
as regional governments and be represented equally in an upper house of the 
legislature. This alternative was, however, rejected: regional governments 
were considered unsuitable for a country with a small and relatively 
homogeneous population and limited resources; the system would be expensive; 
could not be applied in certain areas; and would interfere with the growth of 
national unity and the development of an effective central government (Proctor 
1968:61-62). 
With regard to tribal institutions, the Resident Commissioner, in his opening 
address to the Legislative Council in August 1964, referred to the previous 
constitutional deliberations, and the role of traditional structures under the 
new Constitution. He referred, in particular, to the provision of essential 
local services which had in the past been the responsibility of traditional 
structures. He said that these structures should expand and meet the needs of 
the entire community, which could not be left to a somewhat narrowly based 
tribal administration which, by definition, was only concerned with one 
section of the community. Nevertheless, for many years the tribal 
administrations, headed by the chiefs, had loyally and valiantly sought to 
meet a number of local needs, especially in primary education; consequently 
it would be possible to build on the foundations which they had laid to evolve 
a fully representative, non-racial and responsible system of local government 
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which would retain the best features of the existing system {Legislative 
Council Official Report, 24-28 August 1964:3}. 
The new Constitution became effective on 30 January 1965. A general election 
was held on 1 March 1965. The BOP won twenty-eight of the thirty-one elected 
seats and its leader, Seretse Khama, was named Prime Minister. 
In the opening address to the new Legislative Assembly, Her Majesty's 
Commissioner, Sir Peter Fawcus, said that it was 
the aim of the Government to promote the gradua 1 but sure 
evolution of a fully unified state without, however, unduly 
forcing the pace at which tribal institutions are integrated in 
the national policy .. . (Legislative Assembly Official Report, 
23-26 March 1965:3}. 
Once again this highlights one of the tensions in contemporary society over 
constitutional advancement, that is the struggle between the modernising elite 
and the traditionalists. 
The Prime Minister, Seretse Khama, in a statement made in July 1965 referring 
to this issue, said that Bechuanaland was no less 'bedevilled' by differences 
of race, tribe, language and political opinion than other countries. The 
territory was moreover bedevilled by the search for power by irresponsible 
individuals and group interests which tended to fragment society. The goal 
therefore was to build a unified nation in the country (The Star, 12 July 
1965). The implication was that this could only be done through instituting 
a single central authority. 
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In a subsequent meeting of the Legislative Assembly, Prime Minister Khama 
presented a proposal for an independence constitution. He emphasised that the 
existing constitution would lead naturally to independence, and there was no 
need for most of the principles embodied in the constitution he put forward, 
to be re-considered. Jn subsequent debates in the Legislative Assembly, it was 
claimed by opposition members that the government did not have a mandate from 
the people to proceed in implementing an independence constitution. Another 
source of opposition to the proposed constitution came from the chiefs. 
In a confidential letter dated 30 December 1965, addressed to the Resident 
Commissioner, four chiefs listed their reservations about the proposed 
constitution. They maintained that in terms of the Jurisdiction Act 1890, each 
chief was as independent as could be in practice. In the 1963 constitutional 
talks, the major issues affecting the chiefs and the tribes had not been the 
subject of discussion. Issues like tribal boundaries, mineral rights, the 
independence constitution, what powers the tribes and chiefs would ultimately 
surrender to the central government and what powers they would retain as 
autonomous entities, 'that means the issue as to whether the final 
Constitution of Bechuana land should be Federal or Unitary was never discussed' 
(Confidential Memorandum, 5 February 1966). Their appeal was for consultation 
to take place with all whose interests were affected. They continued that the 
autonomy of the different tribal chiefdoms could be increased or diminished 
through consultation, and it was for the chiefs and tribes to decide whether 
they wanted a federal or unitary constitution. They maintained that the 1965 
election was about who was to be the leader of the Protectorate, and the 
greatest degree of support was in favour of Seretse Khama of the Bamangwato 
Tribe. 
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The chiefs called for a constitutional conference to be held to discuss issues 
like whether the final constitution should be federal or unitary and what 
powers and rights should be surrendered to a central government and what 
retained. They proposed that the decisions reached should then form the 
subject of a discussion between a Botswana constitutional delegation and the 
British government. 
Tlou, an authority on the history of Botswana maintains that the approach to 
constitution drafting in the territory was driven by the belief that the 
powers of the chiefs needed to be diminished, suggesting that the second 
branch, namely intellectual democratic nationalism ultimately prevailed 
(Personal interview. September 1993). Hence the opposition from the chiefs. 
5.8.2 Opposition to the Independence Constitution 
In February 1966, shortly before independence, another Confidential Memoranda 
was submitted to the Bechuanaland Independence Conference held in London, by 
the Bechuanaland Opposition, which had previously rejected the draft 
independence constitution. It gives a further insight into the factors 
contributing towards the adoption of a centralised unitary constitution at the 
time of independence, from the perspective of a group with a relatively small 
following in the territory. 
The Memorandum complained about a lack of consultation and that the 1961 
constitution was a fake document imposed upon the people of Bechuanaland 
without proper consultation. It voiced the opinion that the Protection terms 
reached in 1885 had been violated. Three reasons for this violation were 
listed: the handing over of British Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony in 1895; 
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the establishment in 1920 of a European Advisory Council; and the formation 
in 1950 of a Joint Advisory Council without the people of Bechuanaland being 
consulted. At the same time, the powers of the 'Principalities' were reduced, 
without consultations with the chiefs and the people. This Memorandum 
similarly argued that the people of Bechuanaland and the chiefs had not been 
consulted on the all-important issue regarding constitutional change and the 
attainment of independence (Confidential Memorandum, 5 February 1966). These 
alleged violations were simply dismissed by the Independence Conference, as 
the BOP was seen to be the legitimate representative of the views of the 
general population of the territory. 
At the Bechuanaland Independence Conference, held in London on 14 February 
1966, the broad provisions of the 1963 Constitution were adopted in the final 
Independence Constitution. On 30 September 1966 Botswana became a sovereign 
centralised constitutional unitary state. 
5.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The early colonisation process in the territory laid the foundations for the 
later centralised unitary state. The British government was requested by Khama 
III to protect the inhabitants of the territory against internecine conflict 
and invasions from across its borders. To fulfil the commitment to provide 
protection, administrative structures had to be created. Resources were 
limited and the tendency was to create sma 11 centralised administrative 
structures. This led to the presumption that the Bechuanaland Protectorate was 
one administrative entity, despite the recognition in successive Orders-in-
Council of its traditional and ethnic diversity and the doctrines of indirect 
and parallel rule. 
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The need for consultation with the local inhabitants of the Protectorate 
resulted in the creation of Advisory Councils for the African ethnic groups 
and the white group. The creation of separate councils followed the early 
British colonial doctrine of parallel rule, according to which African and 
white population groups were administered separately. As African and white 
interests coincided more closely, members of those councils began to question 
the impracticability of having para 11 el councils operating in the same 
territory. Moves were begun to create a joint council for the Protectorate, 
which eventually developed into a single Legislative Assembly and the 
Parliament of an independent state. A unitarist political culture developed 
through this process. This proves the first hypothesis made above. 
The dominance of two leaders in particular had a marked effect on the course 
of the Protectorate's constitutional evolution. Tshekedi Khama played a very 
important modernising role up until the time of his death in 1959. Thereafter, 
his nephew, Seretse Khama, played an equally modernising and unifying role, 
facilitated both by his membership of the Bamangwatho, and his non-involvement 
in tribal affairs. His brand of intellectual democratic nationalism ultimately 
prevailed. This proves the second hypothesis made. 
Besides the tendency towards increasing administrative and legislative 
centralisation, additional reinforcing factors which might be associated with 
the first brand of nationalism, also contributed to this process. Attempts at 
incorporation by neighbours, as well as the desire by members of the white 
population within the territory to be incorporated into neighbouring 
territories, led to opposing centrifugal and centripetal forces. The prospect 
of being incorporated into a neighbouring territory constituted a centrifugal 
force amongst some of the white population, which in turn resulted in a 
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countervailing centripeta 1 force amongst the African population of the 
Protectorate. Legal provisions in South African constitutional law for the 
incorporation of neighbouring territories were only dropped in 1961. The 
African population feared the implications of incorporation into a 
neighbouring white ruled territory, and responded by attempting to strengthen 
a single internal legislative structure. They had appealed as early as the 
1930s for a joint advisory council for the Protectorate. 
This appeal was buttressed by a modernising African elite, conscious of 
developments in other former colonial territories in Africa. Tshekedi and 
Seretse Khama were two strong personalities who took a lead in the process of 
administrative and political centralisation. This proves the third hypothesis 
made above. 
The growth of nat i ona 1 ism outside the Protectorate was al so an important 
factor in promoting administrative and legislative centralisation. Beyond the 
borders of the Protectorate, the growth of the nat i ona 1 i st movement was 
accompanied by the establishment of territorial legislative assemblies in most 
African countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Nyasaland. The advocacy of 
nation-building as part of the nationalist movement in Africa in general also 
had a demonstration effect on Bechuanaland elites, encouraging them to request 
the same for themselves. Since Bechuanaland became independent much later than 
most African countries, the recent trends were clearly visible to its elites. 
Those involved in the process, imbued with a unitarist culture and a sense of 
the course of events in other parts of Africa, were 1 ed to advocate a 
centra 1 i sed unitary form for the Bechuana 1 and Protectorate and later for 
Botswana. This proves the fourth hypothesis made. 
191 
5.10 SOURCES CONSULTED 
Abbreviations: 
AAC. African Advisory Council 
C.;Cd.;Cmd.;Cmnd. Command Papers of the British Government. 
EAC. European Advisory Council 
IFSY. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
JAC. Joint Advisory Council. 
Annual Report of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands for the year 1967. 
(no author). Gaborone: Government Printer. 
C.4588. Report on the Protectorate of Bechuanaland with Proposals for its 
Administration by G. Baden-Powell. 2 June 1885. 
C.8707. Bechuanaland Protectorate Order-in-Council, 9th May, 1891. 
Cmd.4368. Pim, Sir Alan. Financial and Economic Position of the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. Report of the Commission Appointed by the Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs. March 1933. 
Cmnd. 2378. Bechuanaland Constitutional Proposals. June 1964. Confidential 
Memorandum. Botswana National Archives and Records Services. 5 February 
1966. BNB 5314. 
Constitution of Botswana. Botswana Independence Act 1966. 
Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the year 1967-1968. Gaberones, 
Botswana: Government Printer. 
Gunderson, G. 1970. Nation Building and the Administrative State: The Case of 
Botswana. Ph.D. dissertation. Berkeley: University of California. 
Hailey, Lord. 1957. An African Survey Revised 1956. A Study of the Problems 
Arising in Africa South of the Sahara. London: Oxford University Press. 
IFSY, 1982. Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
192 
JAC, Constitutional Committee Report, 8 October 1959. 
Legislative Council Official Report, 24-28 August 1964. 
Legislative Assembly Official Report, 23-26 March 1965. 
Memorandum of Suggestions for the Proposed Constitution of the 8echuanaland 
Protectorate Legislative Council by the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
Federal Party. Botswana National Archives and Records Services 
S.548/11, 30 May 1959. 
Minutes of the AAC, 26th Session, 1946. 
Minutes of the AAC, 15-21 June 1950. 
Minutes of the AAC, 14-21 October 1952. 
Minutes of the AAC, 20-23 May 1958. 
Minutes of the EAC, 6th meeting 1926. 
Minutes of the EAC, 21st Meeting, 1936. 
Minutes of the EAC, 6-10 March 1950. 
Minutes of the EAC, 17-19 August 1953. 
Minutes of the JAC, 14-15 April 1958. 
Parson, J. 1984. Botswana. Liberal Democracy and the Labor Reserve in Southern 
Africa. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Parsons, Q.N. Shots for a Black Republic? Simon Ratshosa and Botswana 
Nationalism. African Affairs. vol. 73, no. 293, October 1974. 
Picard, L.A. 1985. The Evolution of Modern Botswana. London: Rex Collings. 
Proctor, J .. H. The House of Chiefs and the Political Development of Botswana. 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 6, no.I. 1968. 
Shaping the destiny of the nation. The Botswana Democratic Party 1962-1982. 
(no author. undated). Botswana Democratic Party: Gaborone. 
Sillery, A. 1965. Founding a Protectorate. History of Bechuanaland 1885-1895. 
London: Mouton & Co. 
193 
Stevens, R.P. 1967. Lesotho, Botswana, & Swaziland. The Former High Conunission 
Territories in Southern Africa. London: Pall Mall. 
The Star. 12 July 1965. Johannesburg. 
Tlou, T. Personal interview. Gaborone, September 1993. 
Tlou, T. Parsons, N. & Henderson, W. 1995. Seretse Khama 1921-80. South 
Africa: Macmillan. 
Unisa Archives. Z.K. Matthews Collection. E 11-E 3.81. 
Interviews were conducted with the following: 
Prof A. Low - Clare Hall, Cambridge. 
Dr P. Mawhood - Dept of Politics, University of Exeter. 
Prof L. Ngcongco - University of Botswana. 
Prof L.A. Picard - Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, 
University of Pittsburg. 
Prof T. Saunders - Vista University. 
Prof T. Tlou - Principal of the University of Botswana. 
Dr T. Tsie - Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University 
of Botswana. 
Chapter 6 
ZIMBABWE (RHODESIA) 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Zimbabwe became an independent Republic on 18 April 1980 and adopted a highly 
centralised unitary constitutional form. 
Two categories of criteria have been utilised for identifying a centralised 
unitary state in this thesis. As far as the political-legal criteria are 
concerned, Zimbabwe's 1980 constitution does not provide for 'subsidiary 
sovereign bodies' and is therefore unitary in terms of this criterion. 
In terms of the fiscal criteria for identifying a centralised unitary state: 
in the 1981 calendar year, the central government was responsible for 71,9 
percent of recurrent expenditure, and local government, the balance of 28,l 
percent. In 1981, central government expenditure as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) amounted to about 40 percent, indicating a substantial 
role for the government in the economy (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 
1986). Therefore in terms of both political-legal and fiscal criteria, 
Zimbabwe became a centralised unitary state at the time of independence. 
6.2 NOMENCLATURE 
Since the corrunencement of formal rule by the British South Africa Company 
(referred to as the 'Company' below) in 1889, the country has variously been 
referred to as, 'Southern Rhodesia' , 'Rhodesia' , 'Zimbabwe-Rhodesia' , and 
'Zimbabwe'. For the purposes of this thesis, the country will be referred to 
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by the official name which applied during the particular period under 
discussion: during the period 1964-1979, it will be referred to as 'Rhodesia'; 
and during the period 1979-1980, as 'Zimbabwe-Rhodesia'. 
Throughout Rhodesian history the concepts, 'amalgamation', 'union', 
'federation', 'dominion status' and 'self-government' have been used by the 
political elite to articulate their wishes for a strong central authority, 
either accruing from internal aggregations of power within the geographic 
boundaries of Southern Rhodesia, or through the membership of a larger 
political system including neighbouring territories. Seldom has the precise 
constitutional meaning of any of these concepts been spelled out. 
For the purposes of this study, 'amalgamation' and 'union' are taken to refer 
to the establishment of a centralised unitary state. 'Federation', 'dominion 
status' and 'self-government' are sometimes seen as interim stages before 
another const itut i ona 1 stage is reached, more particularly that of the 
establishment of a unitary state. For example, the achievement of self-
government or dominion status was seen by Southern Rhodesian elites as a 
necessary development before amalgamation could be achieved, whereas others 
saw the Central African Federation (CAF), established in 1953, as a 
preliminary stage to the establishment of a Central African unitary state. 
6.3. SCOPE, SOURCES, CIRCUMSTANTIAL FACTORS, AND HYPOTHESES 
6.3.1 Scope 
This chapter covers the period 1889 to 1980. It is hypothesised, as mentioned 
below, that the foundations for the centralised unitary constitution of 
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Zimbabwe were laid during the early period in the country's history, a period 
which left its mark on the later constitutions drafted for the country. Only 
the more significant constitutional debates and changes as embodied in new 
constitut i ona 1 documents will be analysed here. These include the British 
South Africa Company Charter of 1889, the Supplemental Charter of 1898, the 
1923 Constitution for Southern Rhodesia, the Rhodesia and Nyasa 1 and Federation 
Constitution, 1953, the Rhodesia Constitution of 1970 and the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe, 1980. 
6.3.2 Sources 
A number of sources, both written and oral, are referred to in this chapter. 
They include historical texts and official documents like British Government 
Command Papers, Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly Debates, official 
communications and personal interviews. Information used originates generally 
from important political elites involved in the political processes in 
Rhodesia, and it is assumed that they represent, in varying degrees, general 
public opinion at the time. 
6.3.3 Circumstantial factors 
The many ci rcumstant i a 1 factors which contribute towards the adoption of 
different constitutional forms in different circumstances have been mentioned 
in earlier chapters. It is often impossible to isolate specific factors 
impacting upon the adoption of constitutional forms because many of these are 
not explained or documented and, in fact, several may act in unison on the 
constitution-drafting process. They are often implicit in the views, actions 
and interests of individuals and political movements involved in this process. 
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Furthermore, different factors come into play at different times. 
An important consideration, in the case of Rhodesia, was what S.A. de Smith 
(1964:78), refers to as the 'climate of opinion' in which the older dominion 
constitutions were drafted. Many of these, such as the 1923 Constitution of 
Southern Rhodesia (though Rhodesia was never a dominion) were reconstructed 
Westminster unitary models. Very little debate was engaged in concerning the 
nature of these constitutions. In the case of Rhodesia, perhaps more debate 
than normal took place, because of the existence of a minority white power 
elite in that country up until independence. One of the tasks of this chapter 
will be to establish what the 'climate of opinion' was at the time of the 
drafting of the various Rhodesian constitutions, and to what degree 
'reconstructed Westminster unitary models' were simply adopted in Rhodesia. 
Another task will be to identify both the general arguments and the more 
specific ones which came into play at different times in Rhodesia's 
constitutional evolution, in framing and sustaining a centralised unitary 
constitution during the successive regime changes, up until the time of 
independence in April 1980. 
The general factors contributing towards the adoption and maintenance of a 
centralised unitary form of government in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe are as follows: 
the nature of British colonisation policy and historical 
precedents; 
black/white political interests, and socio-economic and cultural 
factors, such as a unitarist political culture, present in 
Rhodesia up until independence in 1980; 
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attempts at various times in Rhodesia's history to bring about a 
closer legal relationship between Rhodesia and its neighbouring 
territories either under confederal, unitary or federal 
constitutional forms and the realisation of these attempts; 
the imposition of sanctions against the territory and the desire 
by white Rhodesians to retain their privileged political and 
economic positions in the face of demands of black nationalist 
groupings; 
the military conflict preceding the Lancaster House Conference on 
Rhodesia in 1979, which led to independence in 1980. 
6.3.4 Hypotheses 
The following three hypotheses are made: 
1. That the nature of the early colonisation process and conquest, 
and the violent responses by the indigenous African population 
between 1893 to 1897, consolidated white power and contributed 
towards a unitarist political culture within the white community. 
Further, the mould was cast in Rhodesia for the centralised 
unitary system of government adopted at the time of independence, 
by events leading up to responsible government in 1923. This 
centralised form of government was reinforced over the years by 
a number of i nterna 1 and extern a 1 factors, which eventua 11 y 
resulted in Zimbabwe again adopting a centralised unitary 
constitution at independence in 1980; 
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2. That Rhodesia's uncertain political relationship with its 
neighbours has strengthened centralisation or centripetal forces 
within the country. At various stages the country's white rulers 
have contemplated and entered into closer constitutional and 
administrative relationships with neighbouring territories, 
either as a constituent element of a unitary state, or of a semi-
independent confederal or federal state. A closer relationship 
with a neighbouring territory may imply the creation of a new 
superior central authority and a diminution of the powers of an 
existing authority, by ceding powers to that new authority. An 
existing authority is at the same time unlikely to cede powers to 
a lower authority further weakening itself and diminishing its 
prestige; 
3. That the political nature and complexion of Rhodesian society, 
and in particular white society, had a major impact on the nature 
of the con st i tut i ans adopted over the years up until 
independence. White interests always dominated the constitution-
making process and consequently the constitutions produced over 
the decades mirrored these political realities. 
6.4 THEORETICAL SCHEME 
This chapter will follow Etzioni's four stage conceptual scheme as modified 
in chapter 3 above. 
i) The pre-centralised stage (1889-1898) corresponds with the 
imposition of Company rule, leading up to and including the 
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adoption of the Supplemental Charter of 1898. 
ii) The centralisation stage (1899-1923) corresponds with the period 
beginning in 1899, leading up to the adoption of the 1923 
Constitution. 
iii) The take-off stage (1924-1978) coresponds with the period 1924-
1978, the consolidation of white control and the adoption of 
successive centralised unitary constitutions. 
iv) The termination stage (1979-1980) corresponds with the 
negotiating process and the period 1979-1980, and the adoption of 
a centralised unitary constitution for an independent 
Zimbabwe. 
6.5 SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1889-1898 - THE PRE-CENTRALISED STAGE 
6.5.1 Historical and cultural factors 
In the 1860s, discoveries of gold in Mashona land (Southern Rhodesia) attracted 
the attention of Mr Cecil John Rhodes, a leading mining entrepreneur resident 
in Kimberley in the Cape Colony. In a letter dated 5 December 1888, the 
British High Commissioner at Cape Town reported to the British Colonial 
Secretary that the rush of concession hunters to Matabel el and (Southern 
Rhodesia) had produced a condition of affairs dangerous to the peace of the 
country (Franck 1960:11). In order to address these concerns, the British 
South Africa Company of Rhodes, petitioned the British government and was 
awarded a Royal Charter initially for twenty-five years, together with quasi-
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sovereign powers to administer the territory. In terms of the Southern 
Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 29 October 1889, which granted the Charter to the 
Company, it was authorised and empowered, subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of State to acquire, 'powers necessary for the purposes of 
government and the preservation of public order in or for protection of 
territories, lands, or property ... '(C.8773 para.3). 
The powers of the Company were, however, restricted in so far as diverse 
existing and new concessions and agreements were concerned. Agreements which 
had already been made with certain chiefs and tribes inhabiting the region had 
to be honoured. Any new agreements or alterations to existing concessions and 
agreements had also to be approved by the Secretary of State (C.8773 para.2, 
3, and 4). 
In terms of paragraph 10 of the Charter, the Company was given wide powers to 
preserve peace and order in such ways and manners (sic) as it 
shall consider necessary, and may with that object make 
ordinances (to be approved by our Secretary of State) and may 
establish and maintain a police force (C.8773). 
This provision, in fact, gave the Company wide powers to subdue the 'native' 
rebellions which occurred between 1893 and 1897. Thus the Company enjoyed 
restricted authority over the indigenous population, but extensive authority 
to govern and administer the territory in all other respects. The only formal 
concession made to decentralisation was the capacity given to members of the 
Company to constitute and regulate Committees or Local Boards of Management 
(C.8773:25:x). Company rule began with a small centralised administration 
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concerned mainly with white affairs. 
As more white settlers drifted into Mashonaland, the territory occupied by 
Chief Lobengula in the 1890s, the potential for conflict between these two 
groups grew. A series of brutal conflicts took place, beginning in 1893 and 
ending in 1896, between the white authorities and Chief Lobengula's Matabele 
military men. These encounters were initiated by the appropriation of 
Lobengul a' s cattle by the Company, the slaughtering of cattle owing to a 
rinderpest outbreak, and enforced labour practices. By September 1897, the 
Matabele had been disarmed by the Company, and had ceased to be a factor of 
military importance (Gann 1965:133). It is estimated that nearly ten percent 
of the white population, that is 400 individuals, and 8 000 of the African 
population, became casualties of this conflict. Nevertheless, European self-
confi dence remained unbroken, and none doubted that col oni sat ion must continue 
(Gann 1965:140). 
What is important about these conflicts is the impact that they had on the 
white psyche and on the future form of government in the country. There are 
a number of pointers in the literature referred to below, as to how and why, 
in the wake of these conflicts, the future form of government evolved as it 
did. 
6.5.2 The administration of the territory 
In November 1897, Lord Alfred Milner, High Commissioner in South Africa, 
visited Rhodesia. He described the Rhodesia of the time as 'in a pretty 
handsome mess administratively' (Headlam 1931:131). However, at this time a 
new concern over the treatment of Africans began to develop as a result of the 
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brutalities suffered during the conflicts, not only amongst the leadership 
hierarchy in the Company, but also in Britain itself (Ranger 1967:322). The 
self-confidence, which had carried whites through before 1896, particularly 
with regard to their methods of African administration, evaporated when a new 
fear of further uprisings developed. A new realisation dawned that, in future 
planning, the attitude of the Africans would have to be taken into account 
(Ranger 1967:328). 
The effects of the earlier uprisings, according to Ranger, were not simple nor 
did they all point in the same direction. In many ways they strengthened the 
African position in Southern Rhodesia, while at the same time strengthening 
the position of the white settlers (1967:328}. One of the effects of the 
uprisings was the acceleration of white settler advances and a growing 
bitterness against the Company's failure to protect the settler community from 
further attacks. According to Ranger, the settlers who had lost property in 
the uprisings were determined to 'extract payment in constitutional terms' 
(1967:331). 
In November 1896, the Rhodesia Herald commented as follows: 
It is a deplorable fact that the white inhabitants of the country 
who have shed their blood and risked their lives in fighting the 
battles of the Chartered Company ... are placed politically 
speaking on a level with the blood-thirsty Matabele and the 
cowardly, treacherous Mashona, their deadly enemies. We have 
hitherto had no voice in the affairs of the country and we 
venture to state that the interests of the Company have suffered 
severely as a consequence ... (Ranger 1967:331). 
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Commenting further on this period, Ranger says that racial prejudice and 
discrimination were more deeply seated in Southern Rhodesia in the early years 
of its existence than in the older colonies of South Africa. He attributes 
this fact to the experience of the rebellions and the folk memory of these 
events which every Rhodesian inherited (Ranger 1967:343). 
Rogers and Frantz, in a comprehensive study of the attitudes and behaviour of 
the white population published in 1962, have the following to say: 
European immigrants into Southern Rhodesia established their 
dominance over the indigenous population through a superior 
technology, military conquest, and more comprehensive means for 
regulating political relations. Many had come from a society 
characterized by a rather rigid system of social classes, in 
which an Englishman traditionally knew to whom and on what 
occasions to show deference. The African societies have their own 
systems for showing respect and politeness to individuals of 
superior status. The cultural backgrounds of the Africans and 
Europeans combined to support the new system in which dominant or 
superior status was assumed by Europeans ... (Rogers and Frantz 
1962:208-209). 
The above perception, I submit, filtered through to successive constitutional 
revisions up to and including the 1979 internal settlement constitution for 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 
In response to settler discontent at the end of the nineteenth century, Rhodes 
promised a semi-elective system of government preparatory to final formal 
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self-government (Ranger 1967:332). This form of government was proposed 
because it was believed by the Company that, in the circumstances, it was the 
smallest price it could pay to satisfy the settlers and that it offered to the 
British public the appearance of having introduced significant reform (Ranger 
1967:335). 
To give content to the above-mentioned promise by Rhodes, a further Southern 
Rhodesia Order-in-Council, dated 20 October 1898, was published, which 
elaborated on the 1889 Charter, providing in the main for a Legislative 
Council consisting of the Administrator, the Resident Commissioner and nine 
other members, five of whom were to be appointed by the Company with the 
approval of the Secretary of State, and four to be elected (Southern Rhodesia 
Order-in-Council, 20th October, 1898). Elected members to the legislature 
would have no say in the Executive branch of government. It also provided for 
a system of 'Native Administration', an 'Electoral System', and a 
'Supplemental Charter'. 
This Order-in-Council was a more extensive document than the previous Order-
in-Council of 1889, and in particular outlined the future administration of 
the African population or what was referred to as 'Native Administration'. 
Provision was made for the appointment of a Secretary for Native Affairs and 
Native Commi ssi one rs amongst others. The duties of these and a 11 other 
officers were described in the Order. The powers of the Company over 'Native 
Administration' were restricted and in terms of, for example, section (80) of 
the Order, it was laid down that: 
No conditions, disabilities, or restrictions shall, without the 
previous consent of the Secretary of State, be imposed upon 
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natives by Ordinance which do not equally apply to persons of 
European descent, save in respect of the supply of arms, 
anvnunition, and liquor (C.8773:14). 
The above, referred to as the 'reserved clauses', were incorporated in the 
1923 Constitution. 
The latter provision, according to Rogers and Frantz, was to minimise civil 
disturbances and i rrespons i bl e behaviour against the Europeans, the government 
and fellow Africans (1962:245). The Order-in-Council of 1898 also placed a 
statutory obligation on the Company to provide sufficient land for African 
occupation (C.8773:section 81). 
Ranger comments that, 
from 1898 onwards Southern Rhodesia moved steadily towards 
settler supremacy; in 1903 they achieved parity in representation 
in the Legislative Council; in 1908 they attained a majority 
there; even at this early date no one questioned that Company 
rule would be followed by settler rule. The mixture of Company 
and settler power, was the form that white supremacy took in 
Rhodesia after 1898 (1967:336). 
The Order-in-Council of 1898, (C.8773) also provided for a complicated set of 
voter qualifications, including amongst others, citizenship, occupation, 
ownership, earnings and literacy qualifications. In terms of these 
qualifications, few Africans or Indians were likely to qualify for the vote 
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and, in fact, by 1922 never more than 1,5 percent of the electorate was made 
up from this group. 
From the year 1898 onwards, the form of government in Southern Rhodesia may 
be described as a dualistic or parallel administration, in that separate 
legislative, executive and administrative structures were created for the 
white and African population groups with overlapping control at the centre. 
Ultimate control was exercised by an internal hierarchy of white officials 
responsible to the High Commissioner and Secretary of State. 
In terms of this Order, the Imperial Government took over military and police 
control by placing it in the hands of the High Commissioner for South Africa. 
A Resident Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia, who was subordinate to the High 
Commissioner for South Africa was appointed and became an ex-officio member 
of the Executive Council and the newly created Legislative Council. The High 
Commissioner had to sanction all administrative appointments and approve all 
local .ordinances before these could be submitted to the Secretary of State. 
He had also to approve all military operations. 
6.5.3 African administration 
The Administration in the territory sought to preserve much of the traditional 
political structure of the African communities, but the 'Native Commissioners' 
replaced the chiefs and headmen as the principal holders of power. African 
administration in Southern Rhodesia was thus more 'direct', unlike in other 
parts of British colonial Africa at the time (Hailey 1979: 341). The Colony, 
according to Gann, drew heavily on the experience of 'direct rule' as applied 
in the Natal Colony (Gann 1965:148). A 'Native Department' dealt with African 
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affairs by means of its own hierarchy of European officials, headed by the 
Administrator of Southern Rhodesia. At the base of the administrative pyramid 
stood the native chiefs who had only limited legal powers. Chief Lobengula's 
monarchy had been destroyed during the earlier conflicts and there were no 
'native states', such as that of the Barotse north of the Zambezi (Gann 
1965:148}. 
As regards the philosophy behind the establishment of a separate 'Native 
Affairs Department', Palley (1966) refers to Sir Alfred Milner, High 
Commissioner for South Africa from 1897 to 1905, and his approach to the 
issue. Milner was an important actor in the framing of the 1898 Charter, and 
felt at the time that of all the administrative questions affecting Rhodesia, 
the most difficult, as well as the one with the most potential for conflict 
between local opinion, whether under the autocratic government of the Company 
or a representative system, and the views of the Imperial Government was the 
'native' question (Palley 1966:141). 
Pa 11 ey contends that Milner viewed the successful admi ni st rat ion of the 
'natives', even in the best of circumstances, as being dependent upon 'men' 
rather than regulations, but where administration was still in an embryonic 
stage, as it then was in Rhodesia, the character of the administrators was of 
yet greater importance. In a country so extensive, with districts remote and 
inaccessible, it was necessary to put large powers into the hands of the local 
officials responsible for the government of the natives. Milner believed that, 
the only form of government which the natives understood was persona 1 
government. 'They are accustomed to look to a chief' (Palley 1966:141}. 
Through Milner's influence and beliefs, the administration of the African 
population was 'direct' and the colonial authorities could exercise close 
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control over this population group through their own appointees. Since the 
administration was still in an embryonic stage of development, these 
appointees had a degree of 1 at itude to determine 'native admi ni strati on' 
policy for themselves. 
The pattern for the future administration of the African population group was 
also set by the early practice of the Company, and its need to prevent further 
rebellions and maintain law and order (Rogers and Frantz 1962:246). As far as 
the attitude of the white settler population towards the African group in the 
early days of settlement was concerned, Mutambirwa says, becau.se of their 
small numbers, the whites were united in their attitudes and behaviour towards 
the Africans. Their sense of insecurity, together with the fear of being 
swamped by the Africans, led the Europeans to develop and maintain policies 
intended to keep them at a distance educationally, socially, economically and 
politically. To give up or share privileges with the Africans it was thought 
would be detrimental to the interests of the white race (Mutambirwa 1974:14). 
In summary then, the general approach to the administration of the Colony was 
that of central administrative dominance and control by the white population 
with parallel administrations for the white and African population groups. 
Varying degrees of autonomy were given to officials presiding over the white 
and African administrations, but ultimate control was exercised by a white 
centralised administration. In general, according to Gann, in the earliest 
pioneering days, 'the administrative machine was small, highly personal in 
character, unspecialised and mostly amateur'(Gann 1965:145). 
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6.6 THE EVOLUTION OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1899-1923 - THE CENTRALISATION 
STAGE 
6.6.1 Internal administration and the climate of opinion 
In the years following the Supplemental Charter of 1898 there was a gradual 
shift of legislative power away from the company and into the hands of the 
European population (Franck 1960: 14). However, throughout the peri ad of 
Company rule, Southern Rhodesia continued in law to be administered as a 
'place outside Her Majesty's dominions', that is, as a private estate. There 
was much dissatisfaction with this status on the part of the local European 
population, commencing in the early part of the century. In 1914, after the 
expiration of the original Charter grant, when a supplementary Charter was 
issued extending the company tenure for a further ten years, the Legislative 
Council was authorised, when it so wished, to petition the Crown for the 
termination of Charter rule and for the establishment of a 'self-governing' 
colony (Franck 1960:15). 
One of the purposes of the introduction of legislative changes beginning in 
1894 was, according to Palley, to lay the foundations for future self-
government to enable Southern Rhodesia to ultimately enter a South African 
federation. On this assumption it was decided that Southern Rhodesia should, 
in her legislative and administrative policies, follow the general pattern set 
by the South African colonies (Palley 1966:132). 
Archibald Colquhoun, the first Administrator of Mashonaland, writing in 1906, 
comments on the form of government 1n existence at the time: 
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The legislative body, with its imitation debates, cumbersome and 
costly machinery, is an anomaly. The civil service of Rhodesia is 
extraordinarily expensive considering the functions it exercises, 
and even at this early stage of affairs it possesses a 
comparatively large and steadily increasing pension-list. Like 
everything else it was hastily organised on a model too elaborate 
for the needs of the country, with a resulting multiplicity of 
officers and abundance of red tape. The fact that all real 
initiative rests with the Board in London, and that all questions 
of any importance, especially those connected with expenditure, 
must be referred to them, renders this method of government 
peculiarly pointless (Colquhoun 1906:304). 
During the early years of the century, the settler community learned to 
organise itself into a cohesive political unit, and their voice was heard not 
only within the country, but in Whitehall as well (Mutambirwa 1974:67). The 
white settler community, moreover, faced little political opposition after the 
defeat of the 'native' rebellions in the 1890s. The African population lacked 
articulate leaders to present a united political viewpoint and the old 
traditional leadership was unable to stem the tide of European expansion 
(Mutambirwa 1974:73-74). 
The main object then of whites and Company rule, in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, was to produce partially Westernised Africans who would not 
challenge European supremacy (Mutambirwa 1974:84). This relationship was 
articulated by several individuals prominent in white politics at the time. 
For example, in 1907, Mr H.T. logden, Member of the legislative Council, 
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proposed, in a motion placed before that Council, that the Company be relieved 
of its administrative responsibilities, which should be placed in the hands 
of a government adequately representative of the people (Legco Debates, 
1907:21). He believed that this sentiment accurately expressed the settled 
opinion of the great bulk of the population of Rhodesia (Legco Debates, 
1907:21). Logden was referring, in fact, to the small white population of 
Southern Rhodesia. 
The relationship between the European settlers and the African population was 
further articulated in 1909 by Mr Charles Coghlan, a later leader of the 
Responsible Government Movement (RGM), participant in the framing of the 1923 
Constitution and first Premier of the Colony. Addressing a rally in March 
1909, he said, 
'they [the Europeans] did not want Rhodesia turned into a black-
man' s country. They wanted it to be a whiteman's country'. White 
supremacy was the goal and to maintain it and all the benefits it 
brought to the settler, political power should for all time be in 
the hands of Europeans (Mutambirwa 1974:198). 
Gray, writing in more general terms on the relationships between the white and 
black populations between 1918-1939 and the rival policies of segregation and 
trusteeship, maintained that 
the principal object of policy was to protect and develop a white 
man's country; the Government was seen as the guardian or trustee 
of European civilization, and European settlers and capital 
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provided the 'steel framework' of the superstructure (1960:31-
32). 
At this time of responsible government in 1923, Gray describes the colony as 
having evolved a way of life which he terms 'intolerably Rhodesian'. The white 
residents were proudly conscious of Rhodesia's new independent existence, of 
its peculiar experiences, and of its affection for British middle-class values 
(1960:12). 
In summary, the administrative structures were primitive, centralised and not 
particularly efficient. The Company dominated the administration in the first 
two decades of the century, and focused more particularly on 'balancing the 
books', rather than the general development of the territory. This latter 
approach gave rise to the Responsible Government Movement. The white 
population were generally insecure, fearful of African domination, and 
believed in the political supremacy of their population group. This formed the 
'climate of opinion' which influenced the constitution-drafting process 
beginning in the third decade of the century. 
6.6.2 Southern Rhodesia and its neighbours 
One of the earliest public discussions about Southern Rhodesia's relationship 
with its neighbours took place in March 1903. At the invitation of the High 
Commissioner for South Africa, Lord Selborne, representatives of the four 
South African colonies and Southern Rhodesia attended a convention in 
Bloemfontein, during which it was decided to admit the territories into a 
Customs Union (Legco Debates, 1903:149). 
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The Treasurer in the Legislative Council in Southern Rhodesia, Mr F.J. Newton, 
stated at the time: 
The Customs Union secured uniformity of tariff, which was one of 
the essential preliminaries to the federation of the South 
African state .... Adherence of Southern Rhodesia to the Customs 
Union would distinctly define and establish her position in South 
Africa ... as one of the states of the South African body politic 
(Legco Debates, 1903:154). 
Mr W.H. Haddon, speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Legislative 
Council in the same debate in 1903, said that if the 'Customs Convention was 
to be the be all and end all of the matter ... ', the elected members would 
not be in favour of it: he felt that the customs union was 'the first stepping 
stone towards the federation of South Africa' (Legco Debates, 1903:154). 
In 1907 Lord Selborne suggested that the Europeans of Southern Africa should 
'federate' to develop the area as far as Lake Tanganyika in a development 
comparable to that of the United States of America (Palley 1966;325). In 
response to a memorandum sent in this connection to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies by Lord Selborne, dated 26 July 1907, Mr W.H. Milton, the 
Administrator in Southern Rhodesia, advocated 'the review of the situation 
generally' (Cd.3564:100). Milton was referring to Southern Rhodesia's 
relationship with the South African colonies. Following this, a Southern 
Rhodesia delegation participated in the South African Convention of 1908-1909. 
Mr Charles Coghlan, whose contribution is discussed below, was one of the 
Southern Rhodesia delegates to the Convention. 
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From about 1909, suggestions were being made that Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia should amalgamate to form a 'great British community in the heart of 
Africa under its own government' {Palley 1966:325), as distinct from a federal 
union with South Africa. After the formation of the Union of South Africa, 
without the membership of Southern Rhodesia, the colony began to look at a 
possible relationship with territories to the north of it. In 1913 the Company 
put forward a scheme to amalgamate with Northern Rhodesia so as to economise 
on administrative expenses (Palley 1966:325). A similar amalgamation scheme 
was put to the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Council in 1917, in the form of 
a motion proposing that the Territories of Northern and Southern Rhodesia 
henceforth be administered as one Territory (Legco Debates, 1917:Col.309). 
Although the motion was carried overall, it was rejected by the elected 
members (who were in a minority), since it was felt that Southern Rhodesia 
would not gain responsible government if the 'Black North' was added to it 
(Palley 1966:325). 
6.6.3 Local perspectives on the role of government 
During the course of the debates concerning the forging of closer 
relationships between Southern Rhodesia and its neighbours, some insights were 
revealed as to the preferred form of government for the territory; the role 
that it should play; the rationale behind this choice; and the existence of 
a unitarist sentiment. For instance, Mr F.J. Newton, Treasurer in the Southern 
Rhodesia Legislative Council, who in 1923 became a Rhodesian delegate to 
London to negotiate a responsible government constitution for the territory, 
expressed an opinion on the role of government. His views, typical of white 
Rhodesian perspectives, eventually filtered through into the constitution-
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making process. In April 1917, during a debate on the desirability of 
administering the territories of Northern and Southern Rhodesia as one, Newton 
said that it seemed to him to be a fatuous idea to allow two countries to be 
separated by the one important river, namely the Zambezi. He said that they 
should think of the Zambezi as a great commercial asset to both territories 
(Legco Debates, 1917:Col.312). 
Newton listed several other functional areas in which amalgamation would be 
beneficial to both countries. The idea of having two separate Customs 
Departments 
to collect on the same tariff from two separate and para 11 el 
States seems to me to be verging on the absurd. As regards the 
police, the two forces are already worked under the Commandant 
General and the same staff .... a group of departments in which 
I think we should really obtain the greatest advantage by 
amalgamation [are] the Department of Agriculture (and Veterinary) 
and the Medi ca 1 Department. We shou 1 d have these departments 
under one control .... We should be able to deal comprehensively 
with all questions of disease .... Then consider the Native 
Department. We should have everything under one control ... the 
Nat1ve Department is our 'strong suit' ... there has not been the 
slightest trouble within our borders .... Then there is the 
question about the Judges ... Northern Rhodesia, one judge - bad. 
Southern Rhodesia, two judges - bad. United Rhodesia, three 
judges - good (Legco Debates, 1917:Cols.314-315). 
Newton concluded his address by saying: 'We are all concerned to get the best 
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form of government compatible with efficiency. What is good for one of us is 
good for all of us' (Legco Debates, 1917:Cols.315-316). Newton's belief 
therefore was in strengthening the Southern Rhodesia government under which 
the country was governed at the time, thereby acknowledging the existence of 
a unitarist sentiment. 
The other issue debated in the Legislative Council was that of responsible or 
self-government for Southern Rhodesia. Newton outlined what he saw as a 
desirable form of government for Southern Rhodesia: 
'Responsible or self-government, as it is understood in the 
British Empire, involves a representative assembly, and an 
administration responsible to, and dependent for its existence on 
the support of that assembly. Throughout the Empire this 
representative assembly is also the legislative assembly and the 
responsible ministers are members of that assembly .... as a 
necessary preliminary to self-government you must have a 
representative legislative assembly containing a number of 
gentlemen able to form and carry on the administration, and in 
addition you must have another set of gentlemen able to criticise 
the government and to undertake the administration when the first 
set cease to possess the confidence of the assembly .... Such an 
assembly cannot be made in a day, but it is to a gradua 1 
enlarging and strengthening of the legislative assembly that the 
Board 1 ooks as the necessary means of preparation for self-
government. In fact a representative assembly of a certain size 
and capacity is an indispensable preliminary to self-government, 
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and that we propose to build up' (Legco Debates, 1917:Cols.316-
317). 
In a further defence of this motion, Newton argued in favour of amalgamation 
by saying that, 
whatever helps to make us bigger and stronger; whatever adds to 
our importance or our capacity; whatever increases our interests, 
or whatever widens our outlook, or whatever reinforces us in that 
element we admittedly lack - the element of numbers; whatever 
does these things must help us on our path towards our much-
wished-for goal (Legco Debates, 1917:Col.321). 
For effective government, the need was for a legislative assembly of a minimum 
size and capacity. The development of the centre was important in this view. 
Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia would contribute towards this 
goal of a strong central government and the achievement of responsible 
government. 
6.6.4 Responsible government 
As the early years of the century advanced, Company rule came under increasing 
criticism for its reputed record in Rhodesia, particularly with regard to its 
lack of development of the territory. In the period under discussion a number 
of important influences and events contributed towards the adoption of the 
1923 centralised unitary constitution. 
From about 1914, when the first twenty-five year Charter was about to expire, 
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local white Rhodesians began to think in terms of responsible government for 
the territory. In terms of British colonial pol icy, responsible government was 
understood to mean the following: the acceptance by the Governor of the advice 
of his responsible Ministers; the presence of those Ministers in one or other 
house of the legislature; their dependence upon a parliamentary majority for 
their continuance in office; and the solidarity of the Cabinet under the Prime 
Minister (Roberts-Wray 1966:66). 
Besides amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia and responsible government, there 
was a further constitutional option for Southern Rhodesia - union with South 
Africa - an idea entertained in the first decade of the century. Two movements 
were formed to further the ideas of responsible government or union with South 
Africa. The Responsible Government Movement was formed in July 1917 and a 
Rhodesia Union Association was formed at the beginning of 1919, which 
supported union with South Africa. There was no African participation in 
either of these groups (Lee 1974:9). 
In June of 1919, Sir Charles Coghlan was elected President of the Responsible 
Government Association and, in the following year, candidates supporting the 
RGA won twelve out of the thirteen elected seats in the Legislative Council. 
The thirteenth seat was won by Mr R.A. Fletcher who favoured a scheme of 
Representative Government. Some 4663 votes, out of a total of 6765 cast, 
favoured responsible government. 
In May 1920, the newly elected Legislative Council passed a resolution 
requesting that 
the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council establish forthwith 
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in Southern Rhodesia the form of Government known as Responsible 
Government which this territory urgently requires for the proper 
development of its resources and the freedom and prosperity of 
its people (Legco Debates, 1920:Col.48}. 
To the communication of the content of this Resolution, Lord Milner, who was 
now Colonial Secretary, replied by saying that he was well disposed to giving 
effect to that desire; and that the details of the new constitution would be 
a matter which would require very careful consideration, and probably 
discussion with the elected members of the Legislative Assembly (Cmd.1273:16). 
Elected members responded by saying that there should be no reason why that 
consideration should not begin at once, and why the constitution should not 
be framed and submitted to them within the next few months (Cmd.1273:17). 
In 1921, Mr Winston S. Churchill assumed the office of Secretary of State for 
the Colonies and in response to this motion appointed a committee on 7 March 
1921, consisting of Lord Buxton, former High Commissioner in South Africa, as 
Chairman, and four other members to investigate the matter of responsible 
government. 
Two of the three terms of reference of the Committee were to determine when 
and with what limitations (if any) responsible government should be granted 
to Southern Rhodesia, and what procedure should be adopted with a view to 
working out the future constitution for the Colony (Cmd.1273: 1). The Committee 
reported on 12 April 1921, the report becoming known as the 'Buxton Report'. 
Two reports were published, the first concerning Southern Rhodesia and the 
second containing questions affecting Northern Rhodesia. On the first page of 
the First Report it was stated that no advantage was to be gained by asking 
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for oral evidence. The Report said that documents placed before it by the 
Colonial Office, the Memoranda of the British South Africa Company, and the 
Resolutions of the Elected Members (to the Legislative Council) appeared to 
be sufficient to enable it to consider and to arrive at a decision on the 
various questions referred to it (Cmd.1273:1). 
The First Report urged that the Report of the Committee should be published, 
and sent to the Elected Members for their consideration and that of the 
Southern Rhodesian public. If there appeared to be general agreement with the 
Report of the Committee in Southern Rhodesia, the Colonial Office would draft 
a Constitution on the lines of the Report (Cmd.1273:5-6). The Report made two 
suggestions: that the draft be sent out to Rhodesia for full criticism locally 
by the elected Members and the public or, before being sent, be considered in 
conference with the Colonial Office and a deputation of elected members. The 
Report continued that, in drafting a constitution suitable for Southern 
Rhodesia, a number of questions would necessarily arise, in which local 
knowledge would be of great importance. The Committee felt that in drafting 
a final constitution for the Colony, a conference with the Colonial Office and 
a deputation of elected members would have considerable advantage, both in 
saving time and the avoidance of misunderstanding (Cmd.1273:6). 
The Report held further that if there appeared to be general agreement in 
Southern Rhodesia with the Report of the Committee, 
the Colonial Office would draft a Constitution on the lines of 
the Report . . . . It appears to us that, whatever may be the 
procedure, it would be better that, in the first instance, the 
constitution should be drafted by the Colonial Office rather than 
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in Rhodesia. The Colonial Office possess facilities and 
opportunities for drafting which are not available in Rhodesia. 
It should be made clear that the draft constitution was only a 
draft, and was open to the freest criticism (Cmd.1273:6). 
The First Buxton Report gives few clues as to why a centralised unitary 
constitution was eventually adopted in 1923. Because of the smallness of the 
white population, it was suggested, Southern Rhodesia could only sustain a 
unicameral parliament comprising a Legislative Assembly of twenty-six to 
thirty members (Cmd.1273:8). The Legislative Assembly, as proposed in the 
Buxton Report, would have supreme legislative power in so far as the white 
population, estimated at 33 000, was concerned, but limitations or 
reservations were placed on its power with regard to the 'native' (African) 
population which numbered 770 000 (Cmd.1273:7). 
The First Buxton Report suggested that two limitations or reservations should 
be made when responsible government was granted to Southern Rhodesia; these 
being that: 
The natives are entitled to be secured in their existing 
position, and to be ensured against discriminating disability or 
restrictions ... [and] provision must be made for dealing with 
the disposal of the unalienated Land in Southern Rhodesia 
(Cmd.1273:8). 
The Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1898 gave the High Conunissioner and 
Secretary of State considerable powers of control over 'Native' administration 
as mentioned above. The Report suggested that this position be maintained and 
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advocated the eventual creation of Native Councils in the Native areas 
(Cmd.1273:9). This was the only mention of decentralisation of power in the 
First Report. 
6.6.5 The Legislative Council debate on the First Report 
In a motion placed before the Legislative Council in 1921, the elected members 
unanimously approved the recommendations of the First Buxton Report. In a 
Memorandum compiled by the elected members of the Legislative Council in 
response to the First Report, they indicated a desire to send a deputation, 
without waiting for the constitution to be actually drafted, to the Secretary 
of State, in response to the suggestion made above in the Report (Legco 
Debates, 192l:Cols.781-782}. 
In May 1921, in a debate in the Legislative Council, Sir Charles Coghlan moved 
the motion in support of the First Buxton Report. With regard to the creation 
of a Parliament, as referred to in the First Report, Coghlan said: 
What we want is a small, inexpensive Parliament, such a 
Parliament and such a Government, as is consistent with the 
efficient managing of our own affairs by ourselves (Legco 
Debates, 192l:Col.790). 
With regard to 'native administration', Coghlan referred in the same debate 
to the need to continue with the administrative structures created by the 
Company. He felt that no friction had arisen as a result of the 
differentiation in administration of the 'natives' from the white population. 
Legislation concerning the 'natives' was (as pointed out above), specially 
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reserved for the assent of the High Commissioner and His Majesty in Council, 
after having been passed through the Legislative Council (Legco Debates, 1921: 
Col.791). 
Mrs Ethel Tawse Jollie, Member of the Legislative Council, speaking in the 
same debate, emphasised the need to remove the uncertainty about the future 
of Southern Rhodesia by sending a delegation to the Colonial Office at the 
earliest possible moment so that a constitution might be drafted in the 
shortest possible time. The Natal Constitution of 1893, in her opinion and in 
the opinion of the Report, had to be the precedent for granting responsible 
government to Southern Rhodesia but, as in nearly a 11 African colonies, 
constitutions in slightly different forms had to be adopted in order to fit 
with local conditions (Legco Debates, 1921: Col. 803). She was, moreover, 
supportive of a single chamber legislature, 'because of its comparative 
simplicity and because of the economy which it effected' (Legco Debates, 1921: 
Col.804). 
6.6.6 The delegation to the Colonial Secretary 
In accordance with one of the alternatives for drafting a constitution as 
expressed in the Report, a delegation led by Sir Charles Coghlan, leader of 
the Responsible Government Association in Southern Rhodesia, departed for 
London. The delegation included W.M. Leggate, John McCleary and Sir Francis 
J. Newton, three strong supporters of res pons i bl e government, and R.A. 
Fletcher who supported a further period of representative government followed 
by responsible government. With the exception of Sir Francis Newton, all the 
delegates were elected members of the Legislative Council. Before meeting Mr 
Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the delegation met 
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with General Jan Smuts, the South African Prime Minister, to ascertain the 
terms for possible entry into the Union of South Africa. 
Preceding the meeting with Mr Winston Church i 11 , Coghlan 'spent a few 
strenuous days preparing a skeleton of the constitution .•. ' (Wallis lgSO:l81). 
Coghlan's perspectives on unitarism and federalism must therefore be analysed 
in greater depth and in the context of Southern Rhodesia's agitation for 
responsible government, since he played perhaps the most prominent role in 
this movement and in the delegation sent to London to negotiate a new 
Constitution for Southern Rhodesia. Coghlan, according to Hummel, emerged as 
a politician whose attitudes reflected some of the economic as well as 
emotional tensions affecting the course of events which lead up to 1923 
(1977:60). Under company rule, Coghlan stands out as the politician least 
committed to any sectional interest. 
Coghlan's early constitutional thinking begins to evolve during his membership 
of the non-voting Rhodesian delegation which attended the South African 
National Convention of 1908-1909 referred to above. During the Convention, 
Coghlan became an enthusiastic convert to the idea of Rhodesia's early entry 
into the Union (Hummel 1977:71). He, however, reluctantly accepted the unitary 
structure for the proposed South African state and felt that Cape Town as a 
legislative capital would be 'too removed and in an atmosphere neither genial 
nor sympathetic' (Hummel 1977:71). Later, during the Convention, Coghlan 
expressed his preference for a federal rather than a unitary South Africa. 
There were a number of factors which later emerged and which drove him to 
advocate a responsible centralised unitary form of government for Southern 
Rhodesia. It was believed that South African government leaders had made the 
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Company an offer, during prior negotiations with the South African Prime 
Minister, General Jan Smuts, to buy out its Rhodesian assets and to use 
Rhodesia as a dumping ground for poor whites. Further, it was believed that 
the Rand Lords and Transvaal Progressives wanted Rhodesia for its black labour 
and its speculative assets in land and minerals. Chiefly however, they wanted 
it because it was British and, as such, would serve their own political end 
of creating an exclusively British party dominating Union politics, which 
would undermine the high ideal held by General Louis Botha (Smuts' 
predecessor) of a centrist party that cut across the white language divide 
(Hummel 1977:71). 
The specific terms of admission of Southern Rhodesia into the Union of South 
Africa were spelled out in a Government Gazette Extraordinary dated 31 July 
1922. In October of 1922 a referendum was held in Southern Rhodesia on whether 
to enter the Union or accept responsible government. Some 8775 voters voted 
for responsible government and 5989 for incorporation into the Union. It is 
unlikely that any of the specific incorporation terms offered by General Smuts 
affected the nature of the responsible government constitution, as it had 
already been negotiated with Churchill. However, Smuts' conditions for 
incorporation into the Union, together with Coghlan's responses, yield a 
further insight into the latter's thinking on the constitutional form desired 
for Southern Rhodesia. 
Smuts suggested that the 'natives' (of Southern Rhodesia) should be governed 
and legislated for by the Governor General in Council, as would be the case 
with Basutoland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate were the administration of 
those territories to be taken over by the Union Government •.. (National 
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Archives of Zimbabwe. CO 8/1/1). Coghlan's response to this suggestion was 
quite clear: 
Rhodesia would rank as a black Protectorate and we should have 
two sets of legislative and administrative institutions 
concurrently dealing with the affairs of the territory. A more 
ridiculous and unworkable suggestion I have never heard of 
(National Archives of Zimbabwe. CO 8/1/1). 
In Smuts' fi na 1 proposa 1 s for uni on he conceded that, 'to prevent undue 
centralisation the general control of native affairs would be delegated to the 
administration of Rhodesia' (National Archives of Zimbabwe. CO 8/1/1). What 
emerges from this is Coghlan's belief in maximum control of Southern Rhodesia 
by a Southern Rhodesia legislature. 
6.6.7 The British government's perspective 
Speaking in a British House of Commons debate on the Buxton Report, Sir S. 
Hoare, a Member of Parliament, gave some insight into the variety of Crown 
Colony governments, and perhaps the past degree of flexibility on the part of 
British government in drafting colonial constitutions. He said: 
Crown colony government has grown up haphazard [sic]. Some of it 
is the result of what took place in the 17th and 18th centuries; 
some of it has grown up more recently, but much of it ... quite 
by chance, and the result is that even in the same part of the 
world you have one dependency governed in one way and another 
dependency in very much the same conditions of life, governed in 
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a different way (House of Commons Debates, 14 July 
192l:Col .1586}. 
Mr Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, with whom the 
Southern Rhodesian delegation was to negotiate later in 1921, said in the same 
debate: 
I agree with what has been said as to the extreme importance of 
not offering to dictate to this Colony (Southern Rhodesia) what 
course they should adopt, whether it should be in the direction 
of assuming responsible government, with all its obligations, or 
on the other hand in the direction of joining the Union 
Government of South Africa .... I think that we have acted wisely 
in proceeding by means of the Buxton Committee .... We are now in 
a position, with a free hand, to discuss the whole subject with 
the accredited representatives of Southern Rhodesia (House of 
Commons Debates, 14 July l92l:Col.1626}. 
Much of the discussion with Churchill, in London in September 1921, concerned 
the outstanding debts owed to the Company and how these would be met by a 
responsible government. In July 1919 a Special Commission was appointed by the 
British government, chaired by Lord Cave, with the purpose of reporting on the 
amount that would have been due to the Company had the administration been 
terminated on 31 March 1918, at the end of the second extension of the Company 
Charter. The Cave Commission, as it was known, made a determination which 
formed the basis of the negotiations between the Southern Rhodesia delegation 
and Churchill in London. After strong pleas to Churchill, few financial 
burdens were placed on the new Southern Rhodesian government. 
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The need for a small efficient government in Southern Rhodesia once again came 
to the fore during discussions with Churchill who, in a direct response to the 
request for responsible government, expressed his continuing concern about 
debts which a new government would inherit from the company: 
It is very difficult for the Colonial Office to give a deaf ear 
to the repeated requests. But I have felt considerable misgivings 
about your capacity to bear the necessary financial burdens 
concerned with it. The misgivings have not diminished as time has· 
gone on (National Archives of Zimbabwe. LE 3/1/2). 
Sir Charles Coghlan replied by saying: 
We are quite able to bear the burden of Responsible Government if 
we are burdened with nothing more than we ought to carry. Our 
budgets here balanced for the last fourteen years as compared 
with the South African Union with its deficit of 600 000 Pounds 
(National Archives of Zimbabwe. LE 3/I/2). 
In a Dispatch to the High Commissioner for South Africa from the Colonial 
Secretary, Mr Winston S. Churchill, dated 22 December 1921, Draft Letters 
Patent providing for the constitution of responsible government in the Colony 
of Southern Rhodesia were included. According to Churchill, 'these drafts are 
in the form in which I have determined them after hearing the views of the 
Delegation of Elected members, and of the British South Africa Company' 
(Cmd.1273, Dispatch to the High Commissioner). Following each of the sixty-
four clauses in the draft, reference is made to the origin of the clauses 
which were sourced from one of the following: the Natal Constitution Act, 
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1893; the Transvaal Constitution Letters Patent, 1921; the Malta Constitution 
Letters Patent, 1921; the Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1898; and the 
First Report of Lord Buxton's Committee. There were also new inclusions. 
The 1923 Constitution, then was an amalgam of several constitutions and 
provided for a uni-cameral supreme legislature which could become a bi-cameral 
legislature at a future date. This provision was based upon the Natal and 
Transvaal Constitutions. The Report of the Durham Commission, as outlined in 
chapter 4, is likely to have had an influence on the 1923 Constitution. 
No provision was made in the Constitution for regional or local government, 
however, separate provision was made for 'native administration' based upon 
the Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1898 (C.8773}. The dualistic 
approach, referred to above in connection with the 1898 Order-in-Council, 
continued to b• pursued. 
ln so far as 'native administration' was concerned, the new Constitution was 
designed to preserve the essential features of the existing system which had 
worked so satisfactorily in the past (Cmd.1273, Dispatch to the High 
Commissioner}. A further provision was made in the Constitution for the 
possible future establishment of Native Councils in the Reserves along the 
lines of the Union of South Africa Act 23 of 1920. This was the only 
concession to a decentralisation of power in the Southern Rhodesia 
Constitution. 
These provisions provided for the creation of a 'Native Department', the 
permanent head of which was to be appointed by the Governor-in-Council, that 
is the Governor acting by and with the advice of the Executive Council, and 
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with the approval of the High Commissioner. Provision was also made for 
subordinate officers and for the Governor-in-Council, 
subject to the approval of the High Commissioner ..• to establish 
by Proclamation in any Native Reserve or Reserves such Council or 
Councils of indigenous natives representative of the local chiefs 
and other native residents as may seem to him expedient, for the 
discussion from time to time of any matters ... of direct 
interest or concern to the native population generally or to any 
portion thereof ... (Southern Rhodesia Constitution, Section 
47(1)). 
The Governor-in-Council was further empowered 
to make regulations conferring on any such Council such powers of 
management in connection with local matters affecting the 
indigenous natives as can in his opinion be safely and 
satisfactorily undertaken by them (Southern Rhodesia 
Constitution, Section 47(2)). 
It was urged by Churchill in his Dispatch to the High Commissioner for South 
Africa, dated 22 December 1921, that the people of Southern Rhodesia should 
also consider entry into the Union of South Africa, once these terms had been 
ascertained. They should then express their opinion by means of a referendum. 
This was followed by moves in 1922 to have Southern Rhodesia incorporated into 
the Union of South Africa, and by the offer of terms for incorporation from 
General Smuts. In the referendum held amongst whites in Southern Rhodesia on 
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27 October 1922, referred to previously, to choose incorporation into the 
Union of South Africa or responsible government, those in favour of 
responsible government gained a majority of 2 785 votes (Davies 1965:35). 
Consequently, Southern Rhodesia attained responsible government under a new 
constitution, which came into effect on 1 October 1923. 
6.6.8 The nature of the 1923 Constitution 
In summary then, the 1923 Southern Rhodesia Constitution provided for a highly 
centralised vertically integrated unitary form of government for the white 
population, but a dualistic or para 11 el, partially decentra 1 i sed form of 
government for the African population, with joint responsibilities for White 
and African affairs at the higher administrative levels. The availability of 
manpower and the costs involved in running a government were important 
considerations in devising a responsible government constitution, as was 
British constitutional tradition. 
The sequence of events from the commencement of Company rule in 1889 to 
responsible government in 1923 did not constitute conventional decolonisation 
exercise, whereby the citizens of a British colony progressed from the gaining 
of the franchise to self-rule. Significant in this process and quite different 
were the demands of the white population group themselves, whose 
dissatisfaction with the existing conditions and the rule of the Company were 
not simply the outcome of 'British' instincts, but the result of internal 
conflicts over economic conditions (Hummel, quoting Lee 1977:59). 
The 1923 Constitution was, in fact, a compromise dictated by the attitudes of 
the white po 1 it i ca 1 e 1 ite, the Company and the British government. It 
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incorporated many of the traditions and principles that had been established, 
beginning in 13g3 but provided for a small degree of autochthony. 
As mentioned above, the European settlers had various economic interests in 
the territory. They settled originally in the territory in pursuit of these 
interests. In order to succeed, it was ne.cessary for them to develop extensive 
political institutions to maintain their dominance, civil order and internal 
peace. To achieve these objectives, the European immigrants, 'needed a stable, 
adaptable, efficient, and responsible government' (Rogers and Frantz, 
1962:245). They partly achieved this through their centralised unitary form 
of responsible government established in 1923. 
6.7 THE PERIOD 1924-1979 - THE TAKE-OFF STAGE 
During the period 1924-1979, there were three main factors which influenced 
the continued existence and consolidation of the centralised unitary state in 
Southern Rhodesia, which was based upon the principles of the 1923 
Constitution. They were Southern Rhodesia's relations with its neighbours; the 
increasing scope of government; and the nature of the white political culture. 
6.7.1 Rhodesia and its neighbours 
From the early settlement of Southern Rhodesia by Europeans until the era of 
federation (1953-1963), the relationship of the territory with its neighbours 
had been a recurring topic of debate and dispute. The public justifications 
for closer relationships with neighbouring territories revolved around both 
political and economic arguments. Some of the arguments put forward by 
Rhodesians to justify closer union will be referred to below, to underscore 
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the existence of a unitarist political culture within that territory, 
particularly amongst the white population group. 
There was also considerable evidence, from motions and statements made by the 
elite in the Legislative Assembly since the turn of the century, to support 
the existence of a unitarist political culture in the country. Some of this 
evidence and the debate it occasioned, come under discussion below. 
In 1925, after Southern Rhodesia had attained responsible government, 
amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia again became an issue. The copper 
resources of this territory made amalgamation an attractive proposition to 
Southern Rhodesia. Enquiries were made by the Southern Rhodesia High 
Commissioner in London, the erstwhile Treasurer under Company rule and 
delegate to London, Sir Francis J. Newton, about the prospects for 
amalgamation. 
The issue of amalgamation between Northern and Southern Rhodesia was also 
raised in 1926 and 1927 by Sir Charles Coghlan, then Premier of Southern 
Rhodesia. These overtures were turned down by the Colonial Office which had 
plans for a wider East African Federation. Instead a proposal was made by the 
Colonial Office to carve up Northern Rhodesia and possibly allocate the middle 
portion to Southern Rhodesia. Nothing came of this proposal. The issue of 
amalgamation, union and federation again emerged in 1929 in the Legislative 
Assembly, although there had been continuing contacts and negotiations with 
the British Government on this issue since the achievement of responsible 
government in 1923. 
Sir Charles Coghlan was succeeded by Mr H.U. Moffat as Premier who served in 
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this capacity from 1927 to 1933. It was during this time that the Southern 
Rhodesia Cabinet resolved to propose a conference between representatives of 
Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia to discuss amalgamation. The British 
government refused to permit this conference, pending the visit of the Hilton 
Young Commission to examine the issue. 
In 1929 the Hilton Young Commission rejected any further proposals for 
additional territory to be added to Southern Rhodesia until it had 
demonstrated its ability to settle the 'native problem' {Palley 1966:327). 
This Commission was followed in 1930 by the Passfield Memorandum, which 
affirmed the United Kingdom's responsibility as trustee for the African people 
in Northern Rhodesia as elsewhere. Lord Passfield informed the Southern 
Rhodesian government that amalgamation was out of the question, but felt that 
'co-operation between the territories should, however, be increased' {Palley 
1966:328). 
Speaking in 1929 in the Legislative Assembly, the Premier, Mr H.U. Moffat 
mentioned several reasons why the territories of Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia should unite. The principal reason was, according to him, 
the absolute similarity of aims and the sentiments of the two 
countries .... There are many other reasons; the reason that we 
adjoin each other over a long border separated only by the 
Zambezi River .... The countries are the same in their physical 
characteristics .... They produce exactly the same products ... 
and above all, both countries have the great problem to solve -
the native question ... nothing can stop it ... (SRLAD, 10 May 
1929:Col.612}. 
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In 1930 a motion was proposed in the Legislative Assembly by Captain H. 
Bertin, urging the government to take more active steps to achieve the 
amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia (SRLAD, 2 April 1930:Col.515). 
Various speakers in this debate mentioned a number of areas of possible co-
operation between the South and the North (Southern and Northern Rhodesia) 
which would emphasise 'the community of interests that bind us together' 
(SRLAD, 2 April 1930:Col.517). These areas of co-operation included, amongst 
others, wireless broadcasting, schooling, transport, and a common legal 
system. In terms of this school of thought, economic links would be the 
prelude to political union. 
Mr R.D. Gilchrist, speaking to the above motion maintained that: 
All of us realise right down from Kenya to Table Bay that the 
great problem looking ahead of the European of this continent is 
the native problem, and the need for consolidation of all 
European interests is obvious and urgent •... it is necessary to 
consolidate our European interests and face this great question 
with a common front (SRLAD, 2 April 1930:Col.530). 
With regard to the 'native question', Mr Gilchrist felt that Southern Rhodesia 
should do all it could to work in unison with the government of Northern 
Rhodesia (SRLAD, 2 April 1930:Col.534). In the same debate, Mr R.A. Fletcher, 
advanced a further reason for amalgamation. He said that if the two 
territories could amalgamate, they would be in an infinitely stronger position 
as a unit in the sub-continent to carry on negotiations with their neighbours 
(SRLAD, 2April 1930:Col.536). 
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On 31 May 1933, Captain Bertin again proposed a motion in support of 
amalgamation. Besides the reasons advanced in his previous motion, he added 
the following: 
We have to remember that we are a comparatively small community; 
50 000 Europeans amongst a million natives. If we [are] going to 
maintain our position in the world we have to make ourselves a 
bigger unit or go into a bigger unit .... There is greater 
advantage in any country that is one unit having a diversity of 
products - in agricultural, mining and precious metals .... The 
more you have of them the less you are 1 i kely to be hit by 
depression in one or the other (SRLAD, 31 May 1933:Cols.2214-
2215). 
Later in the debate, Captain Bertin referred to institutional arrangements, 
and said that Rhodesia could then have a bigger parliament and would also be 
justified in having a second chamber or senate. As far as administrative 
arrangements were concerned, he held, 
one Governor can easily carry on the business for Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia . . . . One Governor is quite sufficient; one 
Parliament is quite sufficient; one Civil Service is quite 
sufficient. You would have one Postmaster General, one director 
of Education, and so on. The great trouble in this territory and 
in most of South Africa is the overhead charges are too much for 
the business that is done (SRLAD, 31 May 1933:Cols.2216-2217). 
Mr Godfrey Huggins, Member of the Legislative Assembly, expanded on the 
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constitutional advantages of amalgamating with Northern Rhodesia by saying 
that with a higher constitutional status, Southern Rhodesia would probably be 
the leader in an amalgamated state or federation. He felt that it was the duty 
of Southern Rhodesia to rescue fellow white kinsmen in neighbouring states 
from British government policy. He perceived this policy to be the elevation 
of black citizens into leadership positions, whether they represented the 
population or not. He concluded by saying that, 'we do not want to have a 
British Black Dominion as our nearest neighbour' (SRLAD, 31 May lg33:Cols. 
2219-2220). 
Discussions continued between Northern and Southern Rhodesia members elected 
to the respective legislatures and, in July lg34, the new Southern Rhodesia 
Prime Minister, Mr Godfrey Huggins, proposed a scheme to the Colonial Office 
for incorporation of the Copperbelt into Southern Rhodesia. This proposal was 
rejected by the Colonial Office. 
As a consequence of continuing pressure for amalgamation and further 
discussions between Northern and Southern Rhodesia parliamentarians, Sir 
Herbert Stanley, the Southern Rhodesia Governor, submitted a memorandum to the 
Colonial Office in 1935, which strongly advocated, 'a central African Union 
of Northern and Southern Rhodesia as a counterpoise to the Afrikaner Union of 
South Africa' (Palley 1966:329). The result was the convening of annual 
Governors' Conferences between the territories, and the creation of a common 
Court of Appeals in 1939. 
Yet another amalgamation motion was introduced on 1 April 1936 in the 
Legislative Assembly. It was carried after a division, and in 1937 Captain 
Bertin again introduced a motion in support of amalgamation. Many of the 
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reasons put forward were similar to those advanced previously. Captain Bertin 
expanded upon his vision for the institutions of government by saying that, 
'amalgamation would give us a sounder Parliamentary machine ..•. We should 
then be able to afford a larger opposition .•. we should be able to afford a 
Second Chamber' (SRLAD, 27 October 1937:Col.2246). 
As a result of this insistence the Bledisloe Commission was appointed. It 
reported in 1939 on the desirability and feasibility of closer co-operation 
or association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasa land. The 
Commission reported that there was a need for close and continuous co-
ordination of effort in many spheres of activity but rejected federation 
because, 'Governments enjoying such different measures of responsibility and 
in such different stages of social and political development would not in our 
opinion achieve success' (Cmd.5949:para.474). 
With regard to amalgamation as an alternative to federation, the Report said 
that this was an option to be kept in view. The major obstacle to 
amalgamation, according to the Report, was the different policies of the three 
administrations (that is Southern, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) in dealing 
with their 'native populations.' In the case of Southern Rhodesia, it had 
progressed the furtherest in the provision of certain social and development 
services, but in other respects it was restrictive in that it excluded 
Africans from certain forms of skilled employment and certain posts in the 
central government service. 
The Report continued: 
One cannot, however, overlook the fact that under any scheme of 
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amalgamation the Government of the combined Territory must rest 
mainly in the hands of those who at present direct the policy of 
Southern Rhodesia, and it is therefore necessary to envisage a 
situation where that pol icy might be extended in greater or 
lesser degree over the territories now known as Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland (Cmd.5949:para.480). 
According to the Report, in Southern and Northern Rhodesia the general idea 
of the European population by whom amalgamation was advocated, was that the 
1923 Southern Rhodesia Constitution would apply to the combined territory 
(Cmd.5949:para.484). Nothing came of this proposal. 
On 5 May 1943, the debate concerning Rhodesia's relationship with its 
neighbours took a different course. Mr P.B. Fletcher moved a motion in the 
Legislative Assembly that isolationism could do nothing but retard the 
progress of the Colony. He felt that the amalgamationists and federalists had 
been defeated in their endeavours by parties external to Rhodesia. He 
proposed: 'We can best serve the interests of Southern Rhodesia by vigorously 
pursuing a bold policy of planned Pan-African development'(SRLAD, 5 May 1943: 
Col.333). Mr Fletcher suggested that a start be made to establish a Pan-
Africanist conference with the Union of South Africa, at which co-operation 
would be sought in the fields of economics and defence. His motion was 
carried. 
On 23 June 1948, Mr A.R.W. Stumbles proposed a motion in support of Dominion 
status for the territory. He appealed for the removal of the reservations from 
the 1923 Constitution, limiting the government's jurisdiction over African 
affairs. This would have given Southern Rhodesia Dominion status. He supported 
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his motion by saying that: 
What we need in Africa is a Central African Dominion for 
strengthening and carrying out the defense of the Empire, and as 
a hub of democracy .... You must have that central focal point 
with full authority round which other states might revolve 
(SRLAD, 23 June 1948:Col.1351). 
Dominion status, he continued, could be followed by amalgamation or a 
federation of African states (SRLAD, 23 June 1948:Col.1351). The motion was 
carried. By 1948 the idea of federation in British Central Africa was again 
being put forward. After a number of representations to the British 
government, at the suggestion of the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister, a newly 
elected Conservative government approved in November 1950 the holding of a 
conference of officials from the three Central African Governments, that is 
Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the question of federation. 
This Conference, which took place in London in March 1951, recommended a 
federal relationship between the territories. The Conference comprised 
representatives from the United Kingdom, the three territorial governments and 
the Central African Council, the latter having been established in 1945 to 
promote the co-ordination of policy and action between the three territories. 
The Conference comprised only white representatives. According to the 
Conference Report, African opinion in the two northern territories and certain 
sections of Southern Rhodesia expressed its opposition to any form of 
amalgamation, as well as to any form of closer association. The majority of 
Europeans in Southern Rhodesia favoured a form of closer association of the 
three territories which entailed the establishment of a strong central 
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government. In Northern Rhodesia it was thought that the bulk of European 
opinion in the territory would be likely to support some form of closer 
association. In Nyasaland, European opinion, according to the Report, was less 
definite but had on some occasions expressed itself in favour of closer 
association (Cmd.8233:Chapt.2). 
The Report felt that, although there were still differences in pol icy 
concerning African advancement - and here it took issue with the Bledisloe 
Report referred to above - these differences could no longer be considered as 
a valid argument against closer association (Cmd.8233:Chapt.2). 
Again in 1951 a motion was proposed in the Southern Rhodesia Legislative 
Assembly, requesting the government to make clear the steps it proposed to 
take with regard to the future constitutional status of Southern Rhodesia 
(SRLAD, 14 November 195l:Col.3323). 
A Draft Federal Scheme was prepared in a Conference held in London in April-
May 1952 by representatives from the territories, the United Kingdom 
government, and the Central African Council. The only African representatives 
were J.N. Nkomo and J.Z. Shavanhu from Southern Rhodesia. On 23 June 1952 a 
motion was proposed in the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly in support 
of a federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasa land. 
Although the motion and arguments were in support of a federation, they are 
suggestive of a desire amongst the white population at the time for the 
ultimate creation of a strong centralised authority for the region. 
Some of the points made by Sir Godfrey Huggins, the then Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia, will be referred to as being broadly representative of the 
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elite supporting federation or a closer union between the three territories 
concerned. In supporting a motion in the Legislative Assembly in favour of 
federation, Sir Godfrey said: 
We are trying to enlarge and fortify a unit of the Empire which 
is at present small, thinly populated, industrially of small 
importance and of relatively insignificant importance in the 
world, into a country which is well populated, highly developed 
and with its immense natural resources employed to the benefit 
of mankind in general (SRLAD, 23 June 1952:Col.2621}. 
'Adequate development' he claimed, 'can be achieved only by a reasonably sized 
country to-day'(SRLAD, 23 June 1952:Col.2624}. Later in the debate he said 
that another important ideal which influenced their wish to see some form of 
union of the territories in Central Africa was the 'importance of creating a 
strong British bloc ... as a much needed stabilising influence'(SRLAD, 23 June 
1952:Col.2625}. Further in the debate he inferred that the racial policy of 
'partnership' as applied in Southern Rhodesia at the time, which he believed 
resulted in good relations between black and white, could set a pattern for 
Africa (SRLAD, 23 June 1952:Col.2625}. 
Huggins said that he and others believed that amalgamation resulting in a 
unitary state would be the best solution for the sake of simplicity and 
efficiency, but realised that it was not practicable in the circumstances, 
1 arge ly because of differences in the admini strati on of the three territories. 
Huggins thus saw federation as a preliminary step towards a possible unitary 
state. In reiterating his preference for a unitary state, while having to opt 
for a federal one, he told his audience: 
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Remember also that any Federal Constitution must contain checks 
and balances which are not necessary in, or appropriate to a 
unitary State. These are, after all, a fair price to pay for the 
increased political and economic strength which the territory 
will gain ... (SRLAD, 2 June 1g52:Col.2633). 
Finally, there was a degree of ethnic solidarity in his support for federation 
in that he believed it could be in the interests of all races 'whereby the 
standards of white civilisation are maintained and those of the backward races 
gradually raised towards our standard' (SRLAD, 23 June 1952:Col.2651). He was 
implying that if it were not for federation with the North, 
30 000 or more Europeans settled in Northern Rhodesia would become the 
subjects of black nationalist forces. 
The largely white electorate of Southern Rhodesia approved of federation by 
25 570 to 14 729 in a referendum held in April 1953. The federation came into 
being on 14 July 1953. The Southern Rhodesia Legislature surrendered somewhat 
more power to the Federal legislature than did the Northern Territories, since 
two i terns relating generally to Southern Rhodesia, non-African agriculture and 
agricultural research were made exclusively Federal, while the Northern 
Governments retained these powers (Palley 1966:346). The Federal Government's 
powers were specified in great detail and this tier of government could act 
in a wide field except in the area of 'Native Affairs'. The Federal Government 
was thus highly centralised {Palley 1966:346). 
6.7.2 The issue of control 
The motivation for or against unitary government at the time of federation was 
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the issue of control. If the white group in, for example, Southern Rhodesia 
stood to play a dominant role, as they were likely to in a unitary central 
African state, then they would support the idea of a unitary state. 
Considering the electoral system in operation at the time, the black 
population perceived that they would be dominated by Southern Rhodesian 
whites, and therefore rejected a unitary state. The desire and possibilities 
for control determined the attitude towards a unitary or federal political 
order. 
From the end of federation in 1963, the search for constitutional links with 
neighbouring territories ended, and between this time and independence in 
1980, limited consideration, and that only periodically, was given to the 
decentralisation of power within the existing Rhodesian state. 
6.7.3 Unitarist sentiment during the federal era 
A unitarist sentiment prevailed during the federal period. Despite Northern 
and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland being governed under a federal 
constitution, and having ceded certain territorial powers to a federal 
legislature, the future evolution of the federation was still debated. A 
belief persisted in establishing an even stronger central authority. In terms 
of a specific clause, the Federal Constitution was to be reviewed not less 
than seven and not more than nine years from the date of its coming into 
force. In response to a question posed in 1955 as to the future of the 
federation when it came up for review, a non-random sample of federal and 
territorial legislators supported a future unitary system of government for 
the three territories. The attitudes of both white and black legislators were 
determined by the question of political control. Since whites had majority 
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representation in the existing legislatures, they were likely to be in a 
strong position to control a single legislature in a unitary state. 
One white federal Member of Parliament felt that 'one central government 
administering all its affairs was not only desirable but also essential for 
the advancement of all its inhabitants' (The Next Step - Federation's 
Future:66). In opposition to this viewpoint, a black M.P. stated that: 
Evolution into a unitary state would diminish substantially the 
effective control of the British Colonial Office which at this 
stage and for some time to come would serve to protect the 
interests of the African people in most of the Federal state {The 
Next Step - Federation's Future:68). 
Another black M.P., representing the indigenous population of Northern 
Rhodesia, said that his people ' [had] no intentions of falling under the 
direct rule of British Settlers'. He felt that they had more faith in the 
policy of Colonial Indirect Rule as applied in Northern Rhodesia at the time 
(The Next Step - Federation's Future:68). 
However, a contrary view was expressed by a white Northern Rhodesian M.P. 
against a system of government (a unitary system), 
which would most certainly be dominated by Southern Rhodesians 
.... Would Southern Rhodesians take kindly to a unitary system of 
government controlled and dominated by Northern Rhodesians? (The 
Next Step - Federation's Future:74). 
247 
A further view expressed by a white Northern Rhodesian legislator in support 
of a unitary form of government, was that a federal government would be 
expensive to operate and, it would be preferable to formulate policy for 
African administration locally rather than by the Colonial Office in London 
(The Next Step - Federation's Future:74). 
In a later view of the federal era, Sir Garfield Todd1, former Prime Minister 
of Southern Rhodesia between the years 1953-1958, felt that the federation 
should evolve as quickly as possible to a unitary state. He believed that the 
total land area of the federation was sma 11 compared with that of, for 
example, the USA or Australia, as was the population, comparatively speaking. 
Todd also believed that unitary government was economical and efficient. For 
these reasons he felt that a central government was what was' required for the 
territory and he was prepared to surrender the position of Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia to achieve this goal. He further believed that whites, at 
the time, felt that since they controlled the government of Southern Rhodesia, 
they would also control a federal government (Personal interview followed by 
written communication with Sir Garfield Todd, dated 20 February 1994). 
In view of the fact that the Southern Rhodesia electoral system was weighted 
in favour of the white population, and produced a largely white legislature, 
it was believed that this situation would carry through into a centralised 
government for the three territories. 
6.7.4 An assessment of Rhodesia's constitutional development 
1
• A number of personal interviews were conducted on the constitutional 
evolution of Zimbabwe. Only some of the individuals interviewed are referred 
to directly in this chapter. Mr R.G. Mugabe, current President of Zimbabwe, 
was not accessible for an interview. A complete list of these individuals 
follows the list of sources consulted. 
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The trend in Southern Rhodesia's constitutional development from the first 
decade of the century to the advent of federation in 1953 was towards seeking 
closer constitutional links with neighbouring territories. These initiatives 
were discontinued from the time of the dissolution of the federation in 1963, 
and Southern Rhodesia then began to consider internal constitutional issues. 
The initiative for seeking closer constitutional links with neighbouring 
territories always came from the predominantly white legislature in Southern 
Rhodesia which, over the decades persisted in its requests. 
There have been three broad motives for closer links with neighbouring 
territories: the desire for increasing control by the white population to 
address problems of insecurity; the desire to promote British values and the 
fear of African domination; and finally, the belief that a larger political 
system would result in increasing economic prosperity. 
While the quest was for closer constitutional links with neighbouring 
territories, the tendency has been for power to continue to be centralised in 
a single central authority, in this case the Southern Rhodesia government. 
This tendency was reinforced by other factors referred to below. 
6.8 CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES 1965-1979 
With the failure of the Central African Federation in 1963, white Rhodesians 
began to look inwards for constitutional solutions to secure their privileged 
position within their society. During this period, Rhodesia adopted three new 
constitutions: a 1965 constitution providing for the legal realities of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) state, which in broad terms did 
not deviate much from the earlier centralised unitary 1961 constitution; a 
249 
Republican constitution implemented in 1969; and a constitution in 1979 
resulting from an internal political settlement. 
The 1969 constitution was framed, after the most in-depth analysis in the 
history of Rhodesia, from constitutional alternatives available to the 
country. This was the only occasion on which members of the public both black 
and white became involved in the detail of constitution drafting. The factors 
contributing towards the adoption of a centralised unitary constitution will 
once more be analysed in depth. 
6.8.l Report of the Constitutional Commission 1968 (The Whaley Commission) 
With the failure of the Tiger and Fearless talks held between the Rhodesian 
and the British governments, in 1965 and 1966 respectively, to resolve the 
legal impasse between the two countries following the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence by Rhodesia, the idea of a Republic in Rhodesia gained 
momentum. 
A five member commission, under the chairmanship of Mr W.R. Whaley, was 
appointed by the Rhodesian government, to report on a suitable constitution 
for a Rhodesian Republic. 
The terms of reference of the Whaley Commission appointed in March 1967 were 
to advise the Government of Rhodesia on the constitutional framework which was 
best suited to the sovereign independent status of Rhodesia and was calculated 
to protect and guarantee the rights and freedoms of all persons and 
communities in Rhodesia. The Commission was also given the task of ensuring 
the harmonious development of Rhodesia's plural society, recognising the 
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different types of land tenure systems in the country, and attending to the 
problems of economic development {Report of the Constitutional Commission 
1968:1). 
The report of the Whaley Commission was {as has been mentioned above) the 
product of the most thorough of a number of attempts at devising a new 
constitution for Rhodesia. Unlike other constitution-drafting exercises, in 
particular the procedure leading to the formulation of the 1923 Constitution, 
this one included evidence gathered not only from el it es, but a 1 so from 
ordinary members of the public. Some 657 memoranda were received from 
i ndi vi duals, authors representing groups, and l oca 1 and nat iona 1 
organisations. The recommendations were gleaned from many points of view. 
As far as a future system of government was concerned, the Cammi ss ion 
recommended 
the continuance of a unitary government [state] in Rhodesia as 
being the system which is most suitable for this country and one 
which is most likely to foster the spirit amongst all Rhodesians 
of belonging to a single, united nation {Report of the 
Constitutional Commission 1968:27). 
The Cammi ss ion believed that there were three a lternat iv es for Rhodesia: 
partition, federation and a unitary state. The Commission rejected partition 
on the grounds that it was not a practical proposition and that it would not 
receive any substantial measure of support from the main races or ethnic 
groups in the country (Report of the Constitutional Commission 1968:21). 
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The Commission said that many of the arguments in favour of retaining a 
unitary system in Rhodesia were arguments against a federal system of 
government. Unlike past discussions on the constitutional future of Rhodesia, 
internal federation for Rhodesia was now being considered an option. Some 
Commission witnesses argued for racial and non-racial federal solutions and 
differing divisions of power between the federal and the state authorities. 
The Commission rejected an internal federal system on several grounds. It felt 
that a rigid federal constitution would be unsuitable for Rhodesia at its 
particular stage of development. A unitary constitution, the Commission felt, 
would be more flexible and would allow for constitutional change to follow the 
progress of the country (Report of the Constitutional Coirunission 1968:24). 
In rejecting federation for Rhodesia, the Commission felt that history had 
shown that a clear line of demarcation of powers between the various bodies 
of a federation was very difficult, if not impossible to achieve. It was 
equally difficult to make a fair distribution of powers between the 
constituents of a federation (Report of the Constitutional Commission 
1968:24). 
Other criticisms of federation were that they all originated through the 
coming together of sovereign independent states. This would not be the case 
in Rhodesia. Further, if federation was to be imposed on Rhodesia, the 
separate territorial states would have to be created by 'balkanisation' and 
built up mainly by the effort and at the financial cost of the European state 
and with great disruption of the services that were available to the people 
of Rhodesia as a whole. Federalism, the Commission said, brought with it a 
more costly form of constitution and government (Report of the Constitutional 
Coirunission 1968:25). 
252 
The Commission also remarked that federations elsewhere in Africa had not 
worked and racial federations could be platforms for conflict between one 
state and another. Moreover, the Report mentioned the possibility of secession 
by one state or another. 
Some of the arguments put forward in favour of a unitary system were as 
follows, 
a unitary system is a stronger form of government [constitutional 
form] than the federal system because power is combined in one 
authoritative body ... Rhodesia already possesses a strong 
unitary [constitutional] form and it would be foolish to exchange 
this for a weaker system ... the unitary form has been the 
pattern followed by Rhodesia in the past. It is understood by the 
people and there is no justification for abandoning it in favour 
of a federal system which would be a radical departure from what 
we have been accustomed to .. . (Report of the Const i tu ti ona l 
Commission 1968:26). 
In a written memorandum submitted to the Commission by a Law Officer, some of 
these points are re-emphasised. The evidence given to the Commission by this 
Law Officer emphasised the familiarity of the substantial white minority with 
the existing parliamentary form of government. The Law Officer also argued 
that if another form of government [constitutional form] were adopted, like 
the American Presidential system with its checks and balances, it would mean 
that: 
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Europeans and if they are to be allowed to share political power, 
other races also, will require education in the manipulation of 
unfamiliar machinery ..• change from the Westminster kind of 
constitution employed in Rhodesia entails a break in political 
continuity, with unforeseeable consequences (Whaley private 
papers, Memorandum dated 12 October 1967). 
The Memorandum continued: 
In federal as opposed to unitary states, African experience has 
also suggested that the clash between parties from different 
regions will lead to the collapse of parliamentary democracy •... 
[M]embers of the commission will doubtless be familiar with the 
stresses and strains which led to the dissolution of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the fate of federal 
Nigeria has illustrated centrifugal forces set up by the tension 
between autocratic Muslim Emirates to the north, Yorubas under 
less authoritarian rulers in the south west, and sophisticated 
Ibos associated in clans in the south east (Whaley private 
papers, Memorandum dated 12 October 1967). 
Further arguments were presented in favour of a unitary constitution, 
including the promotion of a common loyalty to the nation, unimpaired by 
allegiance to provincial, cantonal or other geographical divisions of the 
country (Report of the Constitutional Commission 1968:26). The Report also 
referred to the geographical extent, population density and financial 
resources of the country which it considered to be relatively small, therefore 
making it appropriate that overall control should be placed in the hands of 
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a single government unit. The Report referred to a tendency towards over-
central isation of powers in a unitary state. It felt that this trend could be 
reversed through decentralisation while overall control was still retained in 
the hands of a central authority. The Report continued: 
A strong central government is necessary to guide and control in 
a uniform manner. Rhodesia cannot afford to have various 
autonomous bodies pulling in different directions ... most 
functions of government contain some elements which, for the good 
of all, should be administered centrally and uniformly (Report of 
the Constitutional Commission 1968:26-27). 
The Report does acknowledge that occasions arise when decisions by lower tiers 
of government should be overridden in the national interest. In terms of the 
recommend at i ans of the Report, Rhodesia continued with a unitary 
constitutional form, as a Republic from 1969. 
The Whaley Commission undertook its investigations in a 'climate of opinion' 
different from that which prevailed when previous con st i tut ions had been 
drafted. By 1969 both Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) had 
gained independence as sovereign independent states under African leadership. 
The issue of amalgamation or federation was no longer being considered. Hence 
the consideration by Rhodesians of internal forms of decentralisation - more 
particularly internal federal options. However, unitarist sentiment and the 
practical realities in the country ultimately prevailed. Moreover, the 
Commission undertook its investigations when sanctions were being imposed on 
Rhodesia, which (as mentioned below) necessitated a greater role for central 
government. 
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6.9 THE INCREASING SCOPE OF THE SOUTHERN RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT 
Leys (1959), Murray (1970) and Herbst (1990) detail how the unitary 
constitution and the increasingly centralised state were utilised by certain 
interests, and particularly white ones up until 1980. The need for the 
increasingly centralised state was reinforced over the decades by Rhodesia's 
uncertain relationship with its neighbours. 
Leys maintains that the structure of government, as compared with that in 
1923, 
still reflects the political life of the European population 
alone .•. the relationship between the European community and the 
government is exceptionally close. This is expressed in several 
ways; one of the most striking is the official intermeshing of 
the formal organs of government with unofficial interest 
organizations in such a way that the distinction between the 
'official' and 'unofficial' sectors of public life is sometimes 
particularly difficult to draw (1959:37). 
Leys points out that from its earliest days, the government of Southern 
Rhodesia had been modelled in the image of a developed West European state, 
in all its ramification. But the structure had rested only on the financial 
and human resources of a small white community in a relatively poor and 
undeveloped country (1959:57). Moreover, the white population he characterised 
as being remarkable for its political solidarity, since there was an absence 
of ethnic and linguistic barriers (1959:88). It was predominantly British in 
origin and small, relative to the African population. In 1953, the European 
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population numbered 158 000, against an African population of 2 130 000. A 
corollary of this political solidarity and minority status amongst the white 
population was the maintenance of a centralised unitary state. 
In the years immediately after the attainment of self-rule in 1923, the whites 
began to construct, according to Herbst (1990), a highly interventionist state 
to further their interests. The main motivation for strengthening the colonial 
state was the insecurity of the settlers in the face of a hostile environment. 
The colonists had to look towards the state early on for protection against 
economic competition from Africans, and they used the state to place the 
Africans in a permanently disadvantaged position (Herbst 1990:18). 
Herbst illustrates this point by referring, for example, to the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1934, which explicitly excluded Africans from the 
definition of 'employee'. Further, in the 1930s, the government systematically 
strengthened the labour reserve system by preventing Africans from moving into 
prospecting and mining and from competing on even terms in beef production, 
as well as erecting barriers that excluded blacks from the domestic maize 
market (Herbst 1990:18). Leys reinforces this view by claiming that, in the 
first forty years of this century, every avail ab 1 e art i fici a 1 means was 
employed to squeeze from the country a standard of life which would increase 
the European population and make it secure (Leys 1959:290). Murray adds to 
this by saying that before the depression the government limited its 
activities and trusted free enterprise and private organisation to achieve 
economic objectives. With the failure of the tobacco crop in 1928 and the 
world-wide depression of the early 1930s, government became involved in the 
economy over a wider field. It began to regulate and control agricultural 
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marketing and production, and gave direct assistance to prospecting and 
mining. 
The small economic base of Rhodesia's economy, according to Herbst, also meant 
that it was extremely vulnerable to changes in the world economy. The whites 
therefore used the state as a buffer against the threatening international 
environment (Herbst 1990:18-19). Herbst illustrates this point by referring 
to the period after the Great Depression when the white state began, 
to regulate contro 1 and eventually more systematically 
orchestrate economic policy. For this it needed to exercise power 
usable in a wide range of spheres. Interventionist legislation 
was thus set in motion and applied in the determination of prices 
(eg. over maize), quotas, balances in the tobacco market, 
subsidies (eg. to small-worker gold mines}, employment (through 
1 abour- intensive public works schemes) , 
administrative protections, and new taxes 
protected revenue sources (1990:19). 
tariffs and 
over previously 
In addition, the state established public enterprises which it considered 
vital to the colony's economy. By 1945 the state had established electrical 
power stations, a Cold Storage Cammi ssi on, the Rhodesian Iron and Steel 
Corporation foundries, and the Sugar Industry Board's Triangle estate. 
From the post World War II period onwards, the state intervened increasingly 
in the economy in order to secure the interests of the whites. In the 1950s, 
the government enacted comprehensive price controls over large parts of the 
economy (Herbst 1990:22}. White farmers were the beneficiaries of these 
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measures, in that the system set the prices for many of their crops and 
guaranteed the purchase of these. By the 1950s the white population was 
clearly developing a system best described as 'Socialism-for-the 
whites' ... the state sought to provide an economic life for 
whites which was basically shock-free with a near guarantee of an 
extraordinarily high standard of living (Herbst 1990:22). 
Through this process of consolidating white power, government in turn became 
more powerful. It had the legal power by the 1950s both at the territorial and 
federal levels, to act over a far wider field than it had in 1923. Further, 
government had increased its administrative capacity by, for example, building 
up executive departments, the introduction of a standing army, and the 
development of lines of communication with the public through, for example, 
broadcasting channels. The government, moreover, increased its ability to 
offer inducements in that it could offer patronage in setting up government 
boards and commissions. 
By the 1950s, the government developed a greater cohesion than it had before 
World War II, partly as a result of its increased capacity and the weak 
position of representative associations. In addition, according to Murray, the 
genera 1 economic situation required closer co-ordination in government. It was 
necessary to determine how a wide range of scarce resources were to be 
allocated, and to plan, to a limited degree, the economic development of the 
colony (1970:349). 
Because of these developments, the implications for European politics were 
that a greater premium was placed on control over the government. The need for 
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such control was accentuated in the 1950s and early 1960s by the aim of 
African political movements to wrest that control from the Europeans (Murray 
1970:359}. The corollary to this process was that a strong central government 
was necessary and the idea of decentralised political structures could simply 
not seriously be entertained. 
The scope of the state was further extended during the UDI years 1965-1980. 
Economic sanctions were imposed against Rhodesia by the international 
community, which necessitated the use of 'dictatorial powers' (Herbst 1990:26} 
to further the state's financial and political interests. The necessity of 
conducting a brutal civil war from the early 1970s against black nationalist 
guerrillas further extended the scope and reach of the state, not only the 
economy but the lives of the white population, and a significant portion of 
the black population, had to be co-ordinated by the state [government] (Herbst 
1990:26}. Thus, during the period 1965 to 1980, governmental structures 
assumed additional functions. Centripetal forces supported the centralised 
unitary state. Economic and military issues dominated Rhodesian society during 
that time. 
Economic sanctions were imposed by Britain in a staggered fashion over a 
number of years rather than immediately and comprehensively. This resulted in 
many white Rhodesians, including those who had not supported UDI or the 
governing Rhodesian Front party, committing themselves to using, 'every ounce 
of resourcefulness, courage and cunning they had in order to outwit Britain 
in the economic war' (Flower 1987:62). The government, according to Flower 
(1987), showed considerable skill in managing the economy and fighting 
sanctions. In this it received great assistance from both the Civil Service 
and parastatals, such as the Grain Marketing Board and the Cold Storage 
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Commission. It also established new parastatals specifically allocated the 
task of evading sanctions by planning the diversification of commerce and 
industry (Flower 1987:71-72). The fighting of sanctions, according to Mr Ian 
Smith, former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, 'received the support from all' 
(Personal interview with Mr Ian Smith, September 1993). Flower comments that, 
'Rhodesia had won the economic war long before 1972 through high endeavour, 
resourcefulness, and great pride in national achievement'(1987:77). 
Gann and Henriksen (1981) describe post-UDI Rhodesia as a 'Counter insurgency 
State' distinguished by 'a unity of effort between military and civilian 
branches in the political and military spheres, respectively' (Gann and 
Henriksen 1981:72). During the counter-insurgency war which began in about 
1972, the Prime Minister, Mr Ian Smith, chaired what was referred to as the 
Defence Council. Final responsibility for the war effort thus became located 
in a centralised Defence Council. 'The responsibility for the conduct of the 
war rested on the Prime Minister. One did not have the delegation to ministers 
as in normal times' (Personal interview with Mr Ian Smith, September 1993). 
The emergency measures necessary in war situations further centralised power, 
as decisions had to be taken quickly by a single authority. 
The ZANU(PF) government which took over power in 1980 inherited a strong 
centralised unitary state which coincided with its political interest in 
removing total white control within the state and its belief in a centrally 
planned economy. 
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6.10 THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE (LANCASTER HOUSE CONSTITUTION) - THE 
TERMINATION STAGE 
Upon the adoption of the Zimbabwe Constitution 1980, the country achieved the 
status of an internationally recognised sovereign independent state. What is 
important here is that although new circumstantial factors prevailed as 
compared with those operating during previous con st i tut ion-drafting exercises, 
the centralised unitary constitution adopted was similar to those implemented 
at the time of responsible government in 1923, and subsequently. 
Zimbabwe's independence constitution was negotiated at Lancaster House in 
London between September and December 1979. A new set of factors constituted 
the climate of opinion under which the Lancaster House Constitution was 
drafted. These included a longer constitutional inheritance; the war; black-
white relations; sanctions; and the attitude of the British government. 
6.10.1 Lancaster House - the run-up to the formal proceedings 
Two elections in 1979 provided an opportunity for resolving the Rhodesian 
constitutional dispute with Britain and bringing to an end the civil war in 
Rhodesia. Bishop A.T. Muzorewa was elected Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
in April 1979 in terms of a new internally negotiated constitution, and Mrs 
Margaret Thatcher, leader of the Conservative Party in Britain, was elected 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in June of that year {Stedman 1991:166-
167). 
There were several issues at stake at the time. The Muzorewa government 
desperately needed the 1 i ft i ng of sanctions and the granting of 
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internationally recognised independence; the Conservative government wished 
to dispose of the Rhodesian issue so that it could concentrate its energies 
on other more pressing matters; and the Patriotic Front, consisting of Mr 
Robert Mugabe's ZANU and Mr Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU movements, believed, given the 
chance, that they could win an election in the country against the internal 
parties. 
The British recognised that neither side would ever reach an agreement if left 
to its own devices. The British, according to Stedman, would therefore have 
to decide in advance what the most polarising issues in the conflict were, and 
then present to the participants what they believed to be the only acceptable 
solution in order to elicit agreement from them (Stedman 1991:159). 
In August of 1979, a Commonwealth Conference took place in Lusaka, Zambia. 
This Conference was preceded by an intense round of diplomatic activity on the 
part of the British government to test the degree of acceptability of the 1979 
internal Zimbabwe-Rhodesia settlement amongst African leaders. In response to 
this activity, it was decided to form a working group of Commonwealth members, 
to formulate a set of principles which would provide the basis for a broadly 
acceptable Rhodesian settlement (Davidow 1984:31). The concern reflected in 
the set of principles focused on the control of the traditional central 
authority, namely the government situated in Salisbury. These principles 
referred to the need for 'independence' and 'majority rule', to 'appropriate 
safeguards for minorities' and 'the Government'(Davidow 1984:32). 
The three parties to the Rhodesian dispute, namely, the British, the Salisbury 
delegation, and the Patriotic Front delegations, met at Lancaster House on 10 
September 1979. According to Davidow, because the parties were so far apart 
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on most issues, the British decided that traditional negotiating patterns of 
establishing opening positions and trading concessions toward an acceptable 
midpoint would not work. Instead, Lord Carrington, the British Foreign 
Secretary who assumed res pons i bi l ity for the negotiations, would take the 
initiative, offer at each stage an outline plan, amend it as much as he 
believed practicable on the basis of the responses of the other delegations, 
and then present a final detailed proposal to which he would, if necessary, 
demand a response (1984:38). Some of the British principles were set out in 
an opening address by Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary. He drew 
the attention of those present, to the principles espoused at the earlier 
Lusaka Commonwealth Conference, which, if accepted, would result in Rhodesia's 
gaining British and Commonwealth international acceptance and independence. 
Lord Carrington also indicated that the British Government had accepted its 
constitutional responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on the 
basis of justice and democracy, by putting forward constitutional principles 
which had formed the basis for other independence constitutions in Africa and 
elsewhere (C.7802:3-6). Precedent thus played an important role in this 
process. 
Further elaborating on these principles, Lord Carrington stated 
the principle of majority rule must be maintained and guaranteed 
•.. there should be immediate improvement in the political status 
of the African population ... we must ensure that, regardless of 
race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of 
minority by majority; and what is agreed must be shown to be 
acceptable to the people of Rhodesia (Cmnd.7802:6). 
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Mr Joshua Nkomo, acting on behalf of the Patriotic Front allies, outlined 
their constitutional principles. Amongst those stated were: that Zimbabwe 
should be a sovereign republic in which the sovereign nation pursues its own 
destiny, totally unshackled by any fetters or constraints; a sovereign 
Zimbabwean Republic should, acting through its own freely chosen 
representatives in parliament, be free and fully vested with the power to 
exercise complete dominion over its resources from time to time and as the 
need arose; Zimbabwe's chosen representatives should be free to reorganise 
their social, political and economic institutions and structures and be free 
to shape their own destiny as a nation, without having to pander to any 
racial, ethnic, religious, social or other interests or differences 
(Cmnd.7802:9-12}. 
Bishop Muzorewa, leader of the internal delegation said in his address: 
We sincerely trust that you will not insist on us making changes 
to our constitution, which is already working very well, merely 
for the sake of appeasing other countries who do not appreciate 
the position in Zimbabwe Rhodesia (Cmnd.7802:15}. 
The 1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Constitution provided for a centralised unitary 
system of government. Similarly the 1980 Independence Constitution, agreed to 
at Lancaster House on 21December1979, provided for a parliament which would 
have full legislative powers for Zimbabwe, meaning that it operated under a 
unitary constitution (Cmnd.7802:27). 
The 1980 Constitution of Zimbabwe was therefore a compromise document drafted 
to placate the British government, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia delegation, the 
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Patriotic Front, and the international community. It retained and built on the 
centralised unitary tradition that had evolved in Rhodesia from the time of 
Company rule, and well as the British tradition of devising, in general (there 
were exceptions like that of Nigeria), centralised unitary constitutions for 
its former colonies. 
The negotiations were, in effect, a struggle for power at the centre, and the 
struggle for power between white rulers and black nationalist groupings; and 
from 1979 a multiracial administration considered to be illegal by the 
international community, and black nationalist forces. Former Prime Minister, 
Ian Smith, described the negotiation process as 'a question of how many whites 
and how many blacks would have a say in centra 1 government' (Personal 
Interview with Mr Ian Smith, October 1992). 
The focus in the negotiating process was therefore on the central authority 
in Zimbabwe. A sense of urgency was built into the negotiating process through 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's need for the 1 i ft i ng of sanctions and i nternat i ona 1 
recognition, and the British government's international reputation and the 
domestic divisiveness of the issue. The simplest and most certain path to 
resolving the dispute was through the adoption of a conventional Westminster 
centralised unitary constitution for Zimbabwe. 
In early 1980, ZANU(PF) published its Election Manifesto which gives some 
insight into its thinking which prevailed at the preceding Lancaster House 
negotiations. The Party was formed in 1963. ZANU(PF) described its policy in 
various ways as, fighting for the 1 i berat ion of Zimbabwe and the establishment 
of a nationalist, socialist Pan-Africanist republic. The implications of this 
pol icy was the confirmation of the need for a centralised unitary state. 
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ZANU(PF) moreover pledged itself to 'promote national consciousness and the 
unity of all our people', the 'complete unification of the African continent' 
and 'the sense of national belonging .•. should submerge and destroy tribal, 
regionalistic and racial animosity' (ZANU(PF) 1980 Election Manifesto). ZANU 
(PF) policy was therefore very much in keeping with African socialist doctrine 
as described in chapter 4. The emphasis was on centralisation to achieve 
political, social and economic goals. 
6.11 CONCLUSION 
The centralised unitary constitutions adopted by successive regimes in 
Rhodesia were the products of a complex interplay of historical precedents and 
c i rcumstant i a 1 factors. They were, moreover, the product of a drive for 
domination of the political decision-making processes by political elites. If 
white political elites perceived that they would be able to achieve their aims 
in a centralised unitary state, then they were prepared to support such a 
constitutional form. Similarly, when political circumstances and franchise 
qualifications changed, and black political groupings were able to dominate 
the state, they too accepted a unitary constitutional order to achieve their 
aims. 
Until the end of federation in 1963, the centripetal forces behind the 
incorporation of Rhodesia into greater political unions, as well as simple 
practical realities, put a brake on any form of decentralisation. However, 
with the subsidence of these moves, decentralisation again became a 
possibility, while centripetal forces remained strong within the territory, 
resulting in the 1965, 1969, 1979 and 1980 centralised unitary constitutions. 
The Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Act, 1961, passed by the British 
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Parliament, simply provided for the amendment of the 1923 Constitution by 
Order-in-Council: the basic form remained. 
Habit and precedent became vital factors in shaping Rhodesia's constitutional 
development, which followed the basic unitary form of earlier constitutions. 
As far as the distribution of administrative power was concerned, it was 
simply assumed that it should reside in the capital city, Harare (formerly 
Salisbury), which had first been settled in 1890. 
In the 1979 negotiations, which led to the adoption of the Zimbabwe 
Constitution, the negotiating parties were performing under pressure: the 
Muzorewa government wanted sanctions lifted and the war ended; the Patriotic 
Front wished to govern Zimbabwe; and the British government to dispense with 
the Rhodesian issue. There was, therefore, little room for innovative thinking 
on constitutional issues. The focus was on controlling the inherited 
centralised unitary state. The early colonial constitutional legacy, built 
upon white insecurity and fear, left its mark on the constitutional form up 
until independence in 1980. 
Palley, in her definitive study, The Constitutional History and law of 
Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965, adopts a similar hypothesis to the first one 
referred to above. She claims that, by the end of 1898, the future structure 
of government had been laid down. The major institutions, instruments of 
administration, and legislative policies, most of which have endured until the 
present day, were already in place (1966:155). During the early settlement 
period, economic factors including the profitability of the BSAC ensured that 
the administration of the colony remained small and centralised. This proves 
the first hypothesis referred to above. 
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Greater societal centripetal forces have contributed towards the maintenance 
of a centralised unitary constitution and have minimised any centrifugal 
forces, which may have contributed towards a decentralised constitutional 
dispensation during the history of the country up until independence. Strong 
political and economic arguments have been advanced in favour of a closer 
relationship with neighbouring states and this has meant, by implication, the 
creation and strengthening of centralised authorities through the 
strengthening of centripetal forces. This proves the second hypothesis 
referred to above. 
The existence of a belief in the need for a strong centralised authority 
amongst local political elites in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is important in 
determining the country's centralised unitary con st itut i ona l form. As a 
corollary to this, the need for a strong centralised government was 
underpinned by the development, over the decades, of a unitarist political 
culture. Further, the desire for a centralised unitary state was supported by 
the ZANU(PF) party ideological make up which advocated a socialist political 
and economic order for the country. This combined with the continued existence 
of a unitarist political culture particularly amongst the white population 
group up until 1980, served also to reinforce the unitary state. This proves 
the third hypothesis referred to above. 
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Chapter 7 
NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA) 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Namibia/South West Africa became a sovereign, independent, centralised, 
unitary state on 21 March 1990. 
The Preamble to the Namibian Constitution, states that: ' ... we the people of 
Namibia - ... have resolved to constitute the Republic of Namibia as a 
sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary State ... ', and Article 1 (1) 
that: 'The Republic of Namibia is hereby established as a sovereign, secular, 
democratic and unitary state founded upon the principles of democracy, the 
rule of law and justice for all' (Van Wyk et al.1991:164-165). Although these 
two clauses claim that the country is a unitary state, one needs to look at 
other provisions of the constitution for evidence that this is, in fact, the 
case. 
Two categories of criteria as set out in chapter 2 above, have been utilised 
for identifying a centralised unitary state. In terms of the first criteria, 
the po 1itica1-1ega1 criteria, the body of the Namibian Constitution does 
provide for a supreme central government, primarily in terms of Article 44, 
and it does not provide for subsidiary sovereign bodies. However, since this 
criterion for the existence of a centralised unitary state is not as clear-cut 
in the Namibian Constitution as in the constitutions of Botswana and Zimbabwe, 
a closer analysis of this provision needs to be made. 
In terms of Article 102 of the Namibian Constitution, provision is made for 
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'Structures of Regional and Local Government'. This Article enables an 
ordinary Act of Parl lament to provide for the division of Namibia into 
regional and local units, and the delineation of the boundaries of those 
regions. No provision is made in the Constitution prescribing a minimum or 
maximum number of regions. 
In terms of Article 108 of the Namibian Constitution, Regional Councils are 
empowered to elect members to the National Council. A National Council is 
established in terms of Article 68 of the Constitution and is intended to 
function essentially as a second chamber of the National Assembly. The only 
original power that the Regional Councils have in terms of Article 108 (a) of 
the Constitution is to elect members to the National Council. This power can 
only be repealed or amended through a special amending procedure as provided 
for in terms of Article 132 of the Constitution. This Article stipulates that 
the repeal and/or amendment of the Constitution shall be passed by a two-
thirds majority of the members of the National Assembly, and a two-thirds 
majority of the members of the National Council. 
The functioning of the regions in so far as the election of members to the 
Nat ion a 1 Council is concerned is therefore somewhat tenuous, in that the 
operation of this procedure is partly dependent upon the provisions of an 
ordinary Act of Parliament, which can be amended or repealed by ordinary 
legislation. The remainder of the powers that the Regional Councils may 
exercise are either delegated by the President or assigned by an Act of 
Parliament. It is maintained therefore that, although the Regional Councils 
do possess a single original power in terms of Article 108 (a) of the 
Constitution, the execution thereof is subject to an ordinary Act of 
Parliament and is limited solely to the election of members of the National 
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Council. This Article is therefore not a substantial concession to the 
sovereignty of subsidiary authorities. In terms of these criteria, it is 
maintained that the general orientation of the Namibian Constitution provides 
for a centralised unitary system of government. 
In terms of the two fiscal criteria, approximately 89 percent of government 
expenditure was expended by the central government as compared with regional 
and local authorities in the 1992-1993 financial year. In the same financial 
year, total current and capital expenditure at the central government level 
amounted to 44,6 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In terms of both 
these criteria, the Namibian state can be considered to be centralised 
(Namibia Public Expenditure Review, 1994). 
This chapter attempts to describe and explain the reasons for the 
establishment of a centralised unitary state at the time of Namibia's 
independence, as opposed to a decentralised unitary state, federation or 
partitioning of the territory. 
7.2 NOMENCLATURE 
The territory since its first settlement by Europeans, has been referred to 
as 'South West Africa', 'South West Africa/Namibia', and 'Namibia'. In the 
last few decades, and particularly since 1968, when the United Nations 
General Assembly renamed the territory as 'Namibia', it has been referred to 
mostly by the international community as 'Namibia'. When the territory was 
referred to as 'South West Africa' or 'South West Africa/Namibia', it was 
mostly by the South African authorities, and political parties internal to the 
territory. The terms will be used interchangeably, depending upon the source 
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being quoted and the period under discussion. 
7.3 ASSUMPTIONS 
In the various discussions on the territory, direct references to a unitary 
Namibia seldom specify what is meant by the term as a constitutional form. The 
use of this term for the purposes of this thesis is taken to refer to the 
constitutional form as outlined in chapter 2 above. References are also made 
to a 'united Namibia', the 'unity of Namibia', or 'Namibia as a national 
unit'. When referring to these three terms, the assumption is that they refer 
to 'unity', 'unification' and a unitary state, as defined in chapter 2. It is 
also assumed that these notions include the twelve Penguin Islands and the 
enclave of Walvis Bay in the territory. The Penguin Islands and Walvis Bay 
became part of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope prior to Union, and part 
of the Union of South Africa and the Republic of South Africa in 1910 and 
1961, respectively. 
The South African government's racial policy as applied in the territory has 
been referred to in various ways. Beginning with the Odendaal Commission 
Report of 1964 (referred to below), this pol icy has been referred to by 
various labels including, 'Apartheid', 'ethnic fragmentation', the 'Bantustan' 
or 'homelands policy', 'separate development' or as a 'gee-political' 
solution. Accordingly this policy will be referred to below by a variety of 
different terms, depending upon the source, but a 11 these wi 11 be taken to 
refer to the South African government's pol icy as applied to the black 
population of the territory. 
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7.4 PURPOSE, SCOPE, SOURCES, CIRCUMSTANTIAL FACTORS, AND HYPOTHESES 
7.4.1 Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and explain the origins of the 
centralised unitary state as embodied in the Articles of the Namibian 
Constitution referred to above. The period beginning in the 1880s with early 
European settlement will be taken as the starting point, and the period ending 
with the adoption of the Independence Constitution in the Constituent Assembly 
in 1990, as the concluding point. 
7.4.2 Sources 
A number of sources will be utilised, including academic texts, United Nations 
Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, official reports, 
documents from research institutes and party political documents, and 
interviews1• 
7.4.3 Circumstantial factors 
The origins of the centralised unitary nature of Namibia's 1990 Independence 
Constitution can be traced to both external and internal factors. The external 
origins can be found in the nature of the original form of German rule, in 
subsequent South African rule, and in United Nations resolutions and policy 
positions taken, for example, by the Western Powers, the Namibia Institute and 
1
• A number of interviews were conducted on the constitutional evolution 
of the territory. Only some of them are referred to in the chapter itself. A 
full list of interviews conducted is included following the list of sources 
consulted. 
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external political movements. The internal origins can be found in the 
policies of the political parties which produced manifestos, and in some cases 
participated in various constitution-making structures, like the Turnhalle 
Constitutional Conference, the Multi-Party Conference, the Constituent 
Assembly which formulated the final Constitution, and the physical nature of 
the territory. 
Namibia is a vast territory covering 824 269 sq km, or nearly 3 percent of the 
total land mass of the continent, and its population comprises 0,2 percent of 
the population of Africa. Up to 30 percent of Namibia's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is derived from mining operations. Namibia in 1991 had a GDP per capita 
of about $1400, as compared with $2600 for South Africa. It is therefore a 
relatively poor country (Handbook of the Nations 1994). 
The ultimate political destiny of the territory has been a matter of intense 
controversy, beginning in the second decade of the twentieth century with its 
occupation by South African forces. The destiny of the territory became an 
international issue in 1920, with the awarding of a League of Nations Mandate 
to the South African government to administer it for an unspecified period of 
time. The destiny of the territory became a more prominent international issue 
from the late 1940s, as a result of the South African government's desire to 
incorporate it into the Union of South Africa. 
The territory retained its prominence in the international community as a 
result of the imposition by the South African government of the policy of 
separate development. This resulted in a counter response from the 
international community and internal and external South West African political 
parties. The rise of African supported political parties in the territory from 
280 
about the mid-1950s coincided with the rise of African nationalism in most of 
Africa and thus added to the controversy over the future destiny of the 
territory. 
Although independence was achieved almost thirty years after most former 
colonies in Africa, that is in 1990, black supported political movements took 
their cues, like the need for nation-building, and the general acceptance of 
the appropriateness of a unitary state, from other independent states on the 
continent. 
7.4.4 Hypotheses 
The following five hypotheses are made: 
1. That the centralised unitary state had its genesis in the era of 
German colonial rule. 
2. That the centralised unitary state was reinforced by South 
African rule and proposals for incorporation right up until the 
1980s. 
3. That the adoption of a centralised unitary constitution for 
Namibia was partly a reaction against the imposition of Separate 
Development policy in the territory. 
4. That the adoption of a centralised unitary constitution was also 
largely a product of Swapo' s ideological orientation .as a 
dominant liberation movement with a strong support base 
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amongst the Owambo group, which was the largest ethnic group in 
the territory. 
5. That the final constitution was the outcome of a trial of 
strength between the international community and SWAPO, and the 
internal parties supported by the South African government, with 
the international community and SWAPO being the stronger and 
ultimately succeeding in establishing a centralised unitary 
state, with minor compromises being offered to accommodate 
internal parties in order to facilitate a nation-building 
process. 
7.5 THEORETICAL SCHEME 
This chapter follows Etzioni 's four-stage conceptual scheme as modified in 
chapter 3 above. 
i) The pre-centralised stage (1884-1894) corresponds with the early 
settlement of the territory and the establishment of German rule. 
ii) The centralisation stage (1895-1945) corresponds with the 
consolidation of German rule, followed by South African military 
rule under the League of Nations Mandate and early attempts at 
incorporation. 
iii) The take-off stage (1946-1966) corresponds with the South African 
government's proposal to incorporate the territory, the 
assumption of power by the National Party in South Africa, closer 
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administrative control by the South African government, and 
United Nations Resolutions and the international community 
support for various efforts to create an independent unitary 
state. 
iv) The termination stage (1967-1990) corresponds with the acceptance 
of a centralised unitary state brokered by the international 
community, and the adoption of a constitution in 1990 by an 
elected Constituent Assembly, for an independent Namibia. 
7.6 SOUTH WEST AFRICA 1884-1894 - THE PRE-CENTRALISED STAGE 
The foundations for centralised rule were laid partly during the period of 
German colonial rule in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In the mid-
nineteenth century the territory, of what was to become South West Africa, was 
settled by various indigenous groupings and through an influx of missionaries, 
in particular members of the Rhenish Mission. This Mission performed a number 
of important political roles, including intervention in inter-tribal 
rivalries. In this way it became associated with later German colonial rule. 
Early missionary activity was also accompanied by the establishment of trade 
links between the Cape and the territory from about the end of the eighteenth 
century. As a result of threats to trade routes from local rivalries, and the 
need for the preservation of these links and existing missionary activities, 
it became apparent that a third force was necessary to achieve this latter 
objective. British and Cape interests in trade nevertheless waned in the 
1880s, and this paved the way for German colonial rule. 
As a result of these circumstances, and in particular conflict between the 
Nama and the Herera between the years 1870-1890, the Rhenish Missionaries 
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requested protection from the British government at the Cape, as well as the 
German government. The British government responded by taking possession of 
Walvis Bay in 1878, and in 1882, a German merchant named Luderitz took the 
initiative and established a commercial post at Angra Pequena. In 1884 the 
German Chancellor, Bismarck, in turn declared all the land occupied by 
Luderi tz to be under the protection of Germany. At the Berlin Conference 
(1884-1885), the coastline between the Orange River in the south, and the 
Kunene River in the north was recognised as a German interest (Bley 1971; Du 
Pisani 1986). These events were to have fundamental implications for the later 
political and economic development of the territory. 
The greater part of South West Africa became a German Colony in 1893, and the 
settlers ensured that Berl in enforced a pol icy of economic and political 
protection of the indigenous inhabitants of the territory. 'Schutzvertrage' 
or protection treaties were imposed on the various population groups, a policy 
which, while it ensured political and economic control over these groups, was 
also intended to protect them from one another. These protection treaties 
fragmented the leadership of the indigenous population and undermined its 
political autonomy (Du Pisani 1986:25). This marked the beginning of control 
by a central authority. 
Theodor Leutwein was appointed Governor of the territory in 1898 by the German 
authorities, and was given the brief of preserving and strengthening the 
military relationship between the German forces and the indigenous population. 
European expansion was not restricted in terms of this brief, and little 
regard was had for the desire of traditional leaders to preserve their 
identities. Leutwein, in the process, attempted to have himself recognised as 
a representative of a legitimate government, and as a consequence the black 
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inhabitants fell under a normal state system bound by a constitution and 
statutes. Leutwein also embarked upon the building of a comprehensive and 
efficient bureaucratic framework and, moreover, held the belief that the 
economic exploitation of the territory could only be undertaken in a planned 
and centralised manner (Bley 1971). Further, according to Bley, 
the colony was, from a climatic point of view, suitable for more 
dispersed settlement than in the tropics, and this again 
presupposed some central state authority to protect and promote 
the interests of individual settlers (1971:7). 
For Leutwein, there was an immediate and close connection between economic 
efficiency and centralised state control (Bley 1971:7). 
However, German administration was not imposed to the same degree throughout 
the territory. It was implemented more successfully in the central and 
southern parts, as these areas, referred to as the 'Police Zone', were more 
readily accessible. With the exception of the Caprivi Strip, which had a 
limited form of administration from 1910 onwards, the other areas to the north 
of the Pol ice Zone remained relatively untouched. This was also because of the 
disruptive Herero and Nama rebellions (1902-1907), a lack of personnel, poor 
communications, a small European population, and inadequate transport 
facilities (Du Pisani 1986:23). 
Thus, during this early period of German rule, a form of centralised 
administration and control was seen as necessary for the pursuit of German 
interests in the central and southern parts of the territory. 
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7.7 FOUNDATIONS OF THE CENTRALISED UNITARY STATE 1895-1946 THE 
CENTRALISATION STAGE 
From about 1895 the administrative system of the territory began to take 
shape. Three administrative districts were created, with independent divisions 
within these districts. The organisation of the army followed a similar 
pattern with the establishment of an expanded centralised administration in 
Windhoek. In 1899 Advisory Councils were created for these districts, which 
were elected by the German population. Leutwein advocated the establishment 
of an administrative state modelled along German lines. Windhoek became the 
capital and centre of this state and exuded a sense of domination and control 
over the African population of the territory. 
By 1907, according to Bley (1971), the point had been reached at which every 
European exercised private police functions over the African population. The 
settler population accepted that there was a legal basis for their 
authoritarian relationship with the indigenous population. Although there was, 
apparently in practice, a united front between the government and the European 
population, the settlers believed that it was their right, rather than that 
of the government or the Reichstag, to rule the African population. As time 
progressed, the settler population became an increasingly important political 
force in the territory; the distinction between 'native' and domestic policy 
was removed, both becoming the responsibility of the settlers. 
By about 1909, a programme of se 1 f-government had been devised for the 
territory. However, the relationship between the settlers, the South West 
African administration and Germany was at this time controversial and 
troubled. A strong sense of national awareness characterised the settler 
286 
population. Loyalties were divided between Germany and the territory, and in 
particular values concerning their personal and economic lives were 
transferred to the territory (Bley 1971). 
Bley writes of the psychological effects of military conquest, the influence 
of which impacted on centralised white control of the territory. He refers to 
the military conquest of the indigenous population and the accompanying 
growing tot a 1 i tari an tendency amongst the settler population towards the 
African population. Attempts were made by the settlers to divest Africans of 
their national characteristics and deny them any freedom (1971:202). 
In South West Africa he explains, 
one finds a racial, social, and bureaucratic predisposition to 
totalitarianism; all of them connected with the position of the 
Africans, who were, as objects of German rule, 'coloureds', 
'workers', and members of tribes that had been disbanded. Socio-
economic, military, and quasi-biological factors were thus 
mobilised as instruments of totalitarian rule (Bley 1971:224). 
This attitude affected the whole area of public, economic, social and even 
private life. 
At the end of German rule in South West Africa, 'state control reached a point 
at which every aspect of the Africans' life was subordinated to the Europeans' 
search for power and security ... '(Bley 1971:282). Absolute control over the 
South West African territory was thus exercised within a formal constitutional 
organisation, or what may be referred to as a centralised unitary state. This 
287 
was the inheritance of the South African military admi ni strati on which 
followed German colonial rule. 
7.7.l South African rule over the territory 
On 9 July 1915, German rule in South West Africa ended with the surrender of 
its armed forces to South African military forces. At the commencement of 
World War I in 1914, the South African government had been requested by Great 
Britain to undertake the task of defeating German forces in the territory. 
This was successfully accomplished by South African government troops. 
On 17 December 1920, after the conclusion of the War, the territory was 
entrusted by the League of Nations to the government of South Africa as a 'C' 
mandated territory. In terms of Article 2 of the Mandate, it was ruled that 
the South African government, 
shall have full power of administration and legislation over the 
territory ... [and] ... apply the laws of the Union of South 
Africa to the territory, subject to local modifications as 
circumstances may require. The Mandatory shall promote to the 
utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of 
the inhabitants of the territory subject to the present Mandate 
(Mandate for German South West Africa. Article 2. 17 December 
1920). 
In terms of Article 6, 
The mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations 
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an annual report indicating the measures taken to carry out 
the obligations [contained in the Mandate] •.. (Mandate for 
German South West Africa. Article 6. 17 December 1920). 
These two articles were important for the political dispute over the 
territory, which will be referred to below. The Mandate did not, however, 
co.nta in any st i pul at ion about the measure of self-government which the 
inhabitants should be allowed to exercise nor the specific form of rule. 
At the conclusion of the war, and in preparation for the return of civilian 
rule, a Commission was appointed by the South African government in 1920, 
chaired by N.J. de Wet, to advise on the future form of government to be 
instituted in the territory. The Commission recommended that the form of 
government existing at the time in the four Provinces of the Union of South 
Africa should be adopted for the territory. The population would then be given 
full representation in a Provincial Council and in the Union Parliament, and 
would be administered as a fifth Province of the Union. The Commission Report 
suggested that, since the white population did not number more than one-tenth 
of the population of the smallest Union Province, certain powers might not be 
delegated, until the adult male British subjects of European descent numbered 
at least 100 000 (Final Report of the Commission. 11th March 1921). 
The Union Government did not fully act upon these recommendations. Instead an 
Advisory Council was constituted by Proclamation, to advise an Administrator, 
who became the sole authority in the territory (Du Pisani 1986:53). The 
Administrator was under no obligation to follow the advice of the Advisory 
Council and administered the territory in all matters separate from the Union, 
except in so far as Customs, Railways and Harbours were concerned. A highly 
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centralised form of administration was continued. 
In December 1922, the Advisory Council passed a resolution requesting the 
Union Government to grant a form of self-government to the territory. This was 
achieved with the passing of the South West Africa Constitution Act, 1925. 
This Act made provision for the creation of a Legislative Assembly, an 
Executive Committee and an Advisory Council. The Legislative Assembly 
consisted of eighteen members, twelve of whom were elected, and six of whom 
were nominated by the Administrator. The Executive Committee consisted of five 
members, including the Administrator and four other persons chosen by the 
Legislative Assembly. The Advisory Council consisted of eight members, 
including the Administrator, the four members of the Executive Committee, 
three other persons appointed by the Administrator, and one person acquainted 
with the reasonable wants and wishes of the African inhabitants of the 
territory. 
Legislative competence in matters such as African affairs, defence, railways 
and posts and telegraphs was permanently withheld from the Assembly and held 
by the South African government. Many of the admi ni strati ve functions 
concerning the white sector of the South West African population thus remained 
highly centralised and localised, whereas those for the African population 
were decentralised. 
7.7.2 'Native Administration' 
For much of the period beginning with German rule, up until the Odendaal 
Commission Report of 1964, the approach to African rule followed the British 
Colonial policy of 'indirect' rule. Under German rule a 'native reserve' 
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policy was formulated, but before this policy had been implemented, the German 
authorities had ensured that the majority of the indigenous population were 
placed under the Schutzvertrage as mentioned above. This policy of creating 
separate reserves for the African population was continued when the South 
African government took control of the territory. A form of indirect, but 
limited, rule was extended throughout the territory and was exercised either 
through councils, where there were no chiefs, or chiefs themselves. 
The South African government continued to legislate and administer the African 
population separate from the white population. For example, in 1922 the Native 
Administration Proclamation no. 11/1922 (SWA) was adopted, which provided, 
inter alia, for the promulgation of regulations for the control and 
administration of 'Native reserves', as well as urban residential areas for 
'Natives'. This was supplemented by other proclamations and legislative 
enactments in the 1920s. The ultimate control of African affairs was delegated 
to the Administrator of South West Africa at this time. By 1939 seventeen 
reserves had been established. African admi ni st rat ion became the direct 
responsibility of the Administrator resident in the territory. A dualistic 
policy was thus applied to African and white settler administration. 
No major constitutional changes took place during the period 1925 to 1949, 
after the implementation of the South West Africa Constitution Act, 1925. 
During this period, constitutional changes were frustrated by a hotly 
contested debate that ensued in the territory. According to Du Pisani, during 
the period 1924-1945, the cleavage in South West African politics was along 
language lines, and the issue of incorporation or non-incorporation of the 
territory into the Union of South Africa was the main topic of debate. 
Generally, parties supported by the Afrikaans and English-speaking groups were 
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in favour of incorporation; parties supported by the German-speaking group 
were against incorporation (1986:88). 
Because of this cleavage in white South West African politics, the centralised 
nature of South West Africa's administration continued over this period of 
time. Important functions remained centralised in the South African 
government. It was only in the 1960s that a measure of decentralisation 
occurred, as a result of a more doctrinaire political policy being applied in 
the territory. 
7.8 INCREASING INVOLVEMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 1946-1965 - THE 
TAKE-OFF STAGE 
7.8.1 The international dimension 
The dissolution of the League of Nations and the creation of the United 
Nations changed the relationship between the territory and the international 
community. The United Nations Organisation (UNO) or United Nations (UN) came 
into existence on 24 October 1945, and the League of Nations was disbanded in 
April 1946. With the coming into being of the United Nations, the 
international dispute over the territory was precipitated, only ending with 
independence in 1990. 
The outline of this dispute will be briefly explained, since the United 
Nations, including its principal organ, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), and a number of committees, together with the international community 
as a group, became important role players in determining the form of an 
independence constitution for the territory. The other important role players 
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were South West African political parties both internal and external, and the 
South African government. 
This dispute itself generated many political and constitutional responses over 
time. These responses were embodied in United Nations General Assembly and 
Security Council Resolutions, and also in the policies of internal and 
external South West African/Namibian political parties, liberation movements, 
alliances, fronts and the South African government. Through these responses, 
the constitutional options for the territory began to emerge. 
Since the political destiny of South West Africa became an important 
international issue and involved many international role players, the final 
internal centralised unitary constitutional order was, to a degree, determined 
by the international community, together with movements like the South West 
African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), which operated largely from outside the 
territory. The international community, from the late 1970s, became quite 
specific in its demands for a legitimate unitary constitutional order in an 
independent state. An exposition of the background to, and actual involvement 
in the territory on the part of the United Nations is therefore necessary. 
At the time of the dissolution of the League of Nations in 1946, no special 
provision was made for its successor, the United Nations, to assume 
responsibility for territories which were under mandatory supervision. On the 
establishment of the United Nations in 1945, 
it was apparently accepted that all states which administered 
mandated territories would place their mandates under the new 
International Trusteeship system of the UN .•.. the procedure 
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was, in fact, followed by all countries, except South Africa ...• 
South Africa, in contrast, renewed her efforts to have South 
West Africa incorporated in the Union (Totemeyer 1977:18). 
As a response to the uncertainty surrounding the future of South West Africa, 
the General Assembly of the United Nations decided, in 1949, to request an 
Advisory Opinion from the ICJ on the legal status of the territory. Amongst 
others, two important questions were submitted to the ICJ: 
1) Does the Union of South Africa continue to have international 
obligations under the mandate for South West Africa, and, if so, 
what are these obligations? and, 
2) Has the Union the competence to modify the international 
status of the territory of South West Africa, or in the event of 
a negative reply, where does competence rest to determine and 
modify the international status of the territory? (Du Pisani 
1986:130). 
With regard to question (1), the Court stated that the creation of the United 
Nations in 1945 did, inter alia, not result in sovereignty over the territory 
being transferred to the Union of South Africa, but the Union was still 
obliged to provide for the well-being and development of the inhabitants; 
further, the Court stated that the Mandate did not lapse when the League of 
Nations ceased to exist in 1946. The Union of South Africa was still obliged, 
in terms of the Mandate, to submit an annual report (referred to above) on its 
administration of the territory to the United Nations, which it had ceased to 
do in 1949. 
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With regard to question (2), the Court stated that the Union of South Africa 
had no unilateral competence to modify the international status of South West 
Africa. Such determining and modifying competence resided with the Mandatory 
power, acting with the consent of the United Nations. It required the 
Mandatory power to place the territory under the Trusteeship system of the 
United Nations in terms of Article 77 of the Charter. However, the Union of 
South Africa, in terms of this opinion, was not legally obliged to place South 
West Africa under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. 
This pronouncement of the !CJ was merely an Advisory Opinion. It was accepted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 449 A(V) of 1950, 
after which an ad hoc committee was set up, to negotiate with the South 
African Government on the implementation of this Opinion (Du Pisani 1986:130-
131). This Opinion had major imp 1 i cations for South Africa, the territory, and 
its relationship with the world body, in that its status now became truly an 
international concern, continuing right up to independence in 1990. 
In 1960 a further series of resolutions was passed by the General Assembly at 
the initiative of the Trusteeship Committee. The Assembly resolved, amongst 
other issues, that the application of apartheid in South West Africa was to 
be deprecated, that the African population should be able to exercise free 
political rights, and that the United Nations Committee on South West Africa 
be invited to investigate the situation in the territory, and propose steps 
leading to self-government for the indigenous inhabitants (Survey of Race 
Relations in South Africa 1961:289). 
In December 1962, the !CJ handed down a judgement on an application filed by 
Ethiopia and Liberia. The Court found that South Africa was accountable to the 
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United Nations for her administration of the territory and, moreover, that the 
implementation of the apartheid policy violated Article 2 of the Mandate, 
which required that the mandatory power, 'promote to the utmost the material 
and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the territory 
... '(Mandate for German South West Africa, 1967). 
In July 1966, the ICJ handed down a further judgment in which it declined to 
pronounce upon the two issues dealt with in the 1962 judgment, but declared 
that the two applicants, Ethiopia and Liberia had no legal standing. The 
result of this judgment, according to Du Pisani (1986:141), was to strengthen 
the South African government's resolve to implement its policies of geo-
political partition or apartheid in the territory. 
The international dimension to the political evolution of the territory 
fuelled counter reactions from the South African government. At the time of 
the latter two ICJ pronouncements, the South African government increased its 
endeavours to implement its own political solutions in the territory. This 
latter judgment marked a turning point in the conflict over the destiny of the 
territory, which will be discussed below. 
7.8.2 Incorporation of the territory into the Union 
It had been the pol icy of successive South African governments, from about the 
second decade of the twentieth century, to incorporate neighbouring 
territories into the Union. An offer was made by General Jan Smuts, South 
African Prime Minister at the time, to incorporate Southern Rhodesia into the 
Union in 1923 (see chapter 6 above), and General J.B.M. Hertzog, his 
successor, al so made offers to incorporate the former High Commission 
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Territories into the Union (see chapter 5 above). From 1934 onwards the White 
Legislative Assembly for South West Africa also adopted resolutions, 
requesting that the territory be incorporated into the Union of South Africa. 
General Smuts' attempts, in the 1940s, at having South West Africa 
incorporated into the Union were a continuation of this policy. The National 
Party, which assumed power in South Africa in 1948, also favoured 
incorporation. 
In support of Smuts' desire to have the territory incorporated into the Union, 
a so-called referendum was held in 1947. The entire black and brown population 
was asked whether South West Africa should be incorporated into the Union or, 
alternatively, whether Trusteeship should continue under the supervision of 
the United Nations. An International Trusteeship system was established under 
Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter. 
According to Totemeyer, this was not a referendum in the true sense of the 
word, since the ethnic groups were consulted as a whole, and not as individual 
people. Petitions emphasising the desire for incorporation were signed by 
captains, chiefs and councillors on behalf of their members, without proper 
consultation. The 'referendum result' showed that a majority of the South West 
African population was in favour of incorporation into South Africa (1977:18). 
The effect of this 'referendum' was several-fold. Amongst the new black elite, 
especially among the new black leadership groups, an awareness of alternatives 
was created, which eventually contributed towards the growth of an African 
nationalist sentiment in the territory. 
The formation and evolution of the United Nations also aroused expectations 
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among the rising modernising elite of the territory, a sentiment which 
resulted in more black people fleeing to foreign countries, and associating 
with the United Nations Organization. Individuals who associated themselves 
with the United Nations acted as the champions of the black and brown people 
of South West Africa {Totemeyer 1977:19). These groups now had a say in the 
policy-making process at the United Nations, where previously only whites had 
an input, both within the territory and in the international organisations. 
In 1948 the National Party came to power in South Africa, and government 
policy with regard to South West Africa began to change. The way was paved for 
further constitutional developments, and the implementation of the separate 
development pol icy in the territory. According to Du Pisani, the National 
Party programme, including such aspects as republicanism, racial separation, 
white self-preservation and white supremacy, was extended to the territory 
{1986:121). The allocation of values, goods, status, power and services took 
place almost exclusively along ethnic lines, as a result of National Party 
policy being increasingly implemented in the territory (Du Pisani 1986:124). 
Radical changes were introduced in a legal sense by the passing of the South 
West Africa Affairs Amendment Act no. 23 of 1949, amended by Act no. 55 of 
1951, which gave the South African Parliament full responsibility for 'Native' 
affairs. Control over 'Native' affairs had previously been delegated to the 
Administrator of the territory. The administration and responsibility of the 
indigenous peoples of South West Africa was transferred to the Minister of 
Native Affairs of the Union of South Africa under the South West Africa Native 
Affairs Administration Act no. 56 of 1954. The former Act also provided for 
the election, with full membership rights, on behalf of South West Africa, of 
six white members to the House of Assembly and two white members to the Senate 
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of the Parliament of the Union of South Africa. Together with the above 
legislation, the Native Affairs Act no. 55 of 1959, and 'full and final 
legislative function of the administration and development of "Natives" in 
South West Africa was vested in the Government of South Africa'(Totemeyer 
1992:8). 
What is important about the closer legal and administrative integration of the 
territory into South Africa is that it further laid the basis for centralised 
administration and an eventual unitary state. The dominance of centripetal 
forces resulting in greater legal and administrative centralisation is 
unlikely to be accompanied by centrifugal forces resulting in decentralised 
administrative structures. Thus this process was an important early 
contributory factor in establishing a centralised unitary form of government 
in the territory. 
By the late 1950s, the South African government's policy of Apartheid was 
being applied vigorously in South Africa itself. To give substance to this 
policy in the territory, a Commission of Inquiry was appointed by the South 
African government, in September 1962, to find ways of 'further promoting' the 
we 1 fare of the i nhabi tan ts of South West Africa. It became known as the 
Odendaal Commission. 
The Commission argued that: 
It is the considered conviction of the Commission that the 
continued existence of a home area for each individual population 
group as the inalienable area of that indigenous group would be 
in the best interests of the various population groups, and that, 
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in accordance with their declared wish, these homelands should 
continue to exist as such and become increasingly independent 
(Report of the Commission, Chapter VII, para.293). 
The Odendaal Commission reported in 1964 and, following its recommendations, 
so-ca 11 ed homelands or Bantus tans were established in Namibia for the Owambos, 
Hereros, Damaras, Tswanas, Namas, Basters, Kavangos, Caprivians, Kaokolanders, 
and the San people. As a result of the 1966 judgment, a number of Legislative 
Councils and Community Authorities were established for the different ethnic 
groups, and their implementation was continued until 1977. 
In a Memorandum produced in 1968 by the South African Government, detailing 
future financial and administrative relations between the Republic and South 
West Africa, it was stated that a further twelve administrative functions 
would be taken over by the Republic, previously administered by the South West 
Africa Administration (Memorandum. Decisions by the Government on the 
Financial and Administrative Relations Between the Republic and South West 
Africa). 
Further functions were also transferred to the Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development from the South West Africa Administration, in 
a number of the homelands referred to above. The Memorandum re-emphasised 
that the territory formed an integral part of South Africa, and that the South 
African government might apply its laws to the territory. 
In order to give content to the policy of ethnic fragmentation as provided for 
in the Odendaa l Commission Report, and administrative centralisation as 
referred to in the Memorandum, the Native Nations in South West Africa Act, 
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no. 54 of 1968 was adopted by the South African Parliament. In an accompanying 
memorandum, it was stated that, 
the objective of self-determination for the various 
population groups will ..• not be promoted by the establishment 
of a single multi-racial central authority in which the whole 
population could potentially be represented, but in which some 
groups would in fact dominate others (Du Pisani 1986:185). 
This led to a kind of dualistic policy of legal control and administration. 
Final legislative control vested in the government of South Africa. A degree 
of administrative control was vested in the homeland administrations, but 
white administrative control remained centralised. Up until the early 1970s, 
the South African government did not accept a central authority for all groups 
in the territory. 
7.9 BUILD-UP TO THE 1990 INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION 1967-1990 - THE TERMINATION 
STAGE 
As referred to above, there were a number of role players both internal and 
external to the territory who participated in formulating Namibia's 
independence constitution. All these interacted in a very complex process 
during the period in question, the eventual result of which was a convergence 
of thinking across a broad spectrum of opinion in favour of a centralised 
unitary state. Limited concessions were made to regional administration. It 
was the international community who prescribed the minimum requirements for 
resolving the international dispute over the territory and having it 
recognised internationally as an independent state. Much of the detail was 
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negotiated by the different role players involved. 
7.9.1 Renewed attempts by the United Nations and the international community 
to resolve the dispute 
Periodically, beginning with the formation of the United Nations in 1946, 
either the General Assembly or Security Council or the lCJ pronounced upon 
South Africa's administration of the territory. From the latter part of the 
1970s, the international community, that is states which were members of the 
United Nations, but acting outside the United Nations, also became involved 
in attempting to resolve the dispute and establish an internationally 
recognised independence for the territory. 
7.9.2 The United Nations 
Numerous resolutions and reports were passed and accepted by United Nations 
organs from the 1 ate 1940s onwards, concerning the South West African 
question. Through these resolutions and reports the international community 
also became involved, as a result of overlapping membership, in determining 
the nature of the Namibian independence con st itut ion, either through the 
insistence upon specific detail or through the presumptions contained in these 
resolutions and reports. Independence and the constitutional form for an 
independent territory thus became an international issue. Only some of the 
more important United Nations resolutions taking definitive stands on issues 
or illustrating key principles will be referred to below. 
In October 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 
2145(XXI) terminating the Mandate for South West Africa. An ad hoc committee 
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was established to implement the Resolution, which gave rise to the later 
establishment of the United Nations Council for Namibia in 1967 (referred to 
below) to administer the territory until independence. It also cleared the way 
for Security Council involvement in the dispute over the territory. In 1969, 
the Security Council approved the General Assembly's termination of South 
Africa's right to administer the territory. 
In 1971 the World Court handed down an Advisory Opinion, which was adopted by 
the Security Council, declaring that South Africa's presence in the territory 
was illegal. According to Du Pisani, this Advisory Opinion gave renewed 
impetus to the accelerated implementation of ethnic fragmentation and the 
recommendations of the Odendaal Commission. This Opinion was approved by 
important internal black supported movements, which viewed South Africa's 
admin i strati ve control of the territory as i 11 ega l and oppressive. The 
Advisory Opinion led to increased i nternat ion al pressure to re so 1 ve the 
question of the status of the territory (1986:196). The personal intervention 
of the Secretary General of the United Nations in the dispute, and his later 
appointment of personal representatives to visit the territory, also resulted 
from this opinion. 
7.9.3 United Nations Representatives 
In February 1972, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 309, 
authorising the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr Kurt Waldheim, to 
enter into negotiations with all parties concerned as to the political future 
of Namibia. Dr Waldheim visited the territory and reported to the United 
Nations Security Council during its session on the situation from 28 November 
to 6 December 1972. 
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According to Dr Waldheim's Report, he had indicated to the South African 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, while on a visit to the territory, that any 
useful discussions on the future of Namibia would have to be based on self-
determination and independence for the people and the territory as a whole. 
The South African government's policy of self-determination and independence 
for the peoples of Namibia, he said, needed to be reconciled with the United 
Nation's understanding of these concepts. Dr Waldheim's visit initiated the 
first real discussion on whether a unitary, federal or a gee-ethnic or 
homelands constitutional solution was appropriate for the territory. 
Dr Waldheim had solicited the views of a number of organisations and 
individuals during his visit. Referring to non-white groupings, he indicated 
that they supported the establishment of a unitary and popularly e 1 ected 
government in the territory. These views were essentially similar to those of 
SWAPO at the time, and were opposed to the creation of separate ethnic 
homelands. 
Those opposing the unitary state justified their views by stating that African 
tribal groups formed essentially different ethnic, cultural and linguistic 
groupings which had always lived separately, and that they should be allowed 
to retain their separate identity. Semi-autonomous entities could unify under 
a federal system of government. 
Members of the White Executive Committee of South West Africa emphasised the 
1 ack of unity and the differences between African ethnic groups, and felt that 
in a unitary state these divisions would lead to conflict as the Owambos (an 
ethnic group which resided largely in the north of the territory and comprised 
about fifty percent of the population) outnumbered a 11 other non-white groups. 
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The same, they feared, would happen under a federal system of government 
(United Nations Security Council. S/10738, 17 July 1972). 
Following this visit, Dr Waldheim appointed Dr Alfred Escher as his personal 
representative to realise the goals of self-determination and independence for 
Namibia. In his Report to Waldheim, Escher stated 
the majority of the non-white population of Namibia 
supported the establishment of a united, independent 
Namibia •..• On the other hand, certain sections of the 
non-whites and the majority of the white population 
supported the homelands policy and supported continued rule 
by South Africa (United Nations Security Council, S/10832. 
15 November 1972). 
In the conclusion to his report, Escher referred to the interpretation of the 
South African government's policy of self-determination and independence with 
regard to Namibia. The South African government's view was that more 
administrative and political experience should be gained through a policy of 
self-determination, before independence could be considered. However, the 
South African government did, according to Dr Escher, 'agree to certain 
measures involving the "territory as a whole"'(United Nations Security 
Council, S/10832. 15 November 1972), which Dr Escher felt would be in line 
with the United Nations aim of retaining the unity of Namibia. This was the 
South African government's first tentative concession towards an eventua 1 
unitary constitution for the territory. It was suggested that if this 
concession was not made, the talks would come to a halt. Gradually, over the 
years, the eventual unitary form of government took shape and became more 
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entrenched in United Nations resolutions. 
The Escher report was followed by Resolution 323 (1972), which affirmed that 
the principle of national unity and territorial integrity could not be subject 
to any conditions, and noted that the overwhelming majority of the opinions 
consulted by the Representative of the Secretary-General were in favour of the 
immediate abolition of the homelands system of government. 
In a further memorandum from the White Executive Committee of South West 
Africa, directed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations in October 1972, a case was made against a unitary state for 
the territory. It was argued that freedom in a unitary state could only lead 
to domination of one or more groups by another. As an alternative, it 
advocated an ethnic homelands policy. It was argued that the homelands policy 
was a perpetuation of traditional arrangements (Uni sa Archives. Niehaus 
Collection. Memorandum, 25 October 1972). 
In a memorandum compiled by Chief Munjuku II of the Mbanderu tribe, a case was 
made out against the creation of homelands in the territory. He stated that: 
Bantustans are an isolation [sic] to the entire territory of 
S.W.A. and also to the Western Civilisation [sic] as the 
homelands have no source of income to the indigenous population 
. . . . There are no minerals, industries, sufficient transport 
facilities .... The Five Year Development Plan of the Govt [sic], 
has failed in all spheres (Unisa Archives. Niehaus Collection. 
73.3. Memorandum 18 October 1972). 
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Despite the South African government's assurances, in 1973 it passed the 
Deve 1 opment of Self-Government for Native Nat ions in South West Africa 
Amendment Act, which made further provision for the development of the 
homelands policy. SWAPO and SWANU rejected the Amendment Act on the grounds 
that South Africa's presence in the territory was illegal and that it was 
devised to divide and rule the indigenous population. 
7.10 INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS 
7.10.1 Advisory Council 
In 1973, a Prime Minister's Advisory Council for South West Africa was 
constituted as a new diplomatic and political initiative by the South African 
government to resolve the Namibian dispute. It arose out of assurances given 
to Dr Escher during his earlier visit to the territory. The Advisory Council 
was constituted on an ethnic basis but excluded political movements 1 ike SWAPO 
and SWANU. It was the predecessor to the Turnha 11 e Conference, which was 
constituted in Windhoek in 1975. The constitution of the Advisory Council was 
the first organised attempt by the South African government at drafting a 
constitution for the territory, together with members of different ethnic 
groups. 
7.10.2 The Turnhalle Conference 
During the early 1970s, pressures were brought to bear on the South African 
government by Western powers, and in the form of an armed struggle waged by 
SWAPO, to settle the South West African dispute. The South African 
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government's response to these pressures was to establish initially an 
Advisory Council, and then to organise what became known as the Turnhalle 
Conference in the capital, Windhoek. The delegations to this Conference 
comprised 156 white, black and brown people, chosen on an ethnic basis, and 
consisting mainly of traditional leaders. SWAPO was not present at the 
proceedings. 
The Conference adopted a Declaration of Intent which said nothing about the 
final form of government desired for the territory, neither unitary, federal 
nor confedera l con st i tu ti ona l opt ions were excluded in the Deel arat ion of 
Intent. 
The Turnhalle Constitutional Conference delegations deliberated for just over 
eighteen months, from l September 1975 to 18 March 1977, and adopted by 
consensus a plan for an Interim Government and a three-tier constitutional 
system providing for eleven ethnic administrations at the second tier, which 
would establish the framework for an independence constitution. Independence 
was scheduled for 31 December lg78. The Turnhalle draft constitution was, 
however, never implemented for fear of economic sanctions being imposed by the 
international community. 
The Turnhalle Conference initiated a great many reactions, both from internal 
and externally based political parties and movements during and after the 
Conference, and a 1 so from the i nternat i ona l community. A number of new 
re solutions and i nit i at i ves were consequently taken by the i nternati on al 
community. In the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization, for 
example, the Turnhalle was perceived as comprising delegates who were 
carefully hand-picked to carry out the South African government's wishes 
308 
(Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1977. I). 
A number of statements were issued by parties, which did or did not 
participate in the Turnhalle Conference, setting out their constitutional 
visions for the territory. In a statement issued on 18 August 1976, the 
Turnha 11 e Conference referred to the 'interdependence of the different 
population groups and a firm desire to maintain SWA as a unity' (Africa 
Contemporary Record. 1976-77). This was evidence of a very slight shift in 
thinking towards the acceptance of a single authority for the territory. 
A further indication of a growing belief in a strong central authority for the 
territory came from the Damara delegation to the Turnha 11 e Conference. It 
spelled out its objections to a federal constitutional form by stating that 
the territory required a strong centralised form of government, because the 
population relative to the geographic extent of the territory was small, and 
manpower should be utilised to its best advantage. In all federations, there 
is a tendency towards greater centralisation to facilitate planning. However, 
the delegation stated that certain federal characteristics could be utilised 
in a future constitution for South West Africa (Unisa Archives. Niehaus 
Collection. Document undated). 
In response to the Interim Constitution drafted by the Turnhalle Conference, 
Mr Brian O'Linn, leader of the Federal Party which later became a constituent 
part of the Namibia National Front, described the eleven ethnic 
administrations as provided for at the second tier as 
an overdose and overemphasis on ethnicity .... It is nevertheless 
... totally unacceptable and impracticable •.•• In the present 
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circumstances and climate, a federation can only be a solution if 
the second tier of government has a clear geographic content ••• 
that is jurisdiction or authority within a specific identifiable 
area. Such a form of federation matched with a strong central 
government is still the ideal solution for SWA (Official opening 
address to the first Federal Party Congress by Adv. B. O'Linn). 
In December 1978 an election was held, in terms of this constitution, for a 
Constituent Assembly. This election was ethnically based and political 
movements like SWAPO and the NNF did not participate. In terms of Security 
Council Resolution 439(1978), dated 13 November 1978, the South African 
government was urged to cancel this election. This Constituent Assembly became 
a National Assembly and was recognised by the South African government as 
being the authority entitled to make laws for the territory. From 11 to 13 
November 1980, ethnic elections were held for second-tier authorities in the 
territory. According to Du Pisani (1986:449), these two elections were 
designed to enhance the position of the internal political parties. The spin-
off of this process was that it drew the lines between the internal parties, 
SWAPO and the i nternat ion al community, and encouraged further rounds of 
diplomatic activity intent upon resolving the dispute and devising a 
constitutional solution acceptable to the international community. 
7.11 FURTHER INITIATIVES BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The Turnhalle Conference was not regarded as a legitimate constitutional 
exercise by the i nternat i ona l community. Consequently, it led again to a great 
deal of international diplomatic activity. A preferred unitary constitutional 
order was embodied in a number of resolutions by the United Nations denouncing 
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internal ethnic constitutional solutions. Only some of the resolutions passed 
are referred to below. 
First, United Nations Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976 was passed, 
which expressed grave concern about South Africa's efforts to destroy the 
national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia and demanded that it put 
an end to its policy of fragmenting the territory. The Resolution declared 
that free elections should be held for the whole of Namibia as one political 
entity under United Nations supervision and control. The Resolution further 
demanded that all politically repressive laws and practices be abolished, and 
particularly bantustans and home lands (United Nations Security Council, 
S/RES/385). This resolution formed one of the later foundations upon which the 
Independence Constitution was constructed. 
Secondly, Security Council Resolution 435 was passed on 29 September 1978. 
Recalling Resolution 385 and reaffirming the United Nations responsibility 
over Namibia, it provided for the establishment of a United Nations Transition 
Assistance Group (UNTAG) to ensure the early independence of Namibia through 
free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United 
Nations (United Nations Security Council Resolution 435). Resolution 435 
formed another section of the foundation upon which the Independence 
Constitution was constructed. 
Another resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1978, prescribing a 
future con st i tut i ona l order for the territory, affirmed that the Namibian 
people should be able to attain self-determination, freedom and genuine 
independence within a 'united' Namibia (United Nations General Assembly, 
A/Res/S-9/2. 4 May 1978). Yet another adopted at the 31th Session of the 
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General Assembly held in 1982, denounced 'all fraudulent constitutional and 
political schemes of South Africa' (Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 
1982). 
In 1982, the President of the General Assembly stated that the achievement of 
self-determination, freedom and independence in a united Namibia, together 
with the liquidation of colonialism and racism, was a matter of great urgency 
for the organisation (Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1982). During 
the same General Assembly session, representatives from Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, the United States and other countries, stated 
that Resolution 435 was the only basis for the independence of Namibia (Annual 
Review of United Nations Affairs, 1982). 
7.11.1 The Western Contact Group 
By 1976 it was becoming clear that the Turnhalle constitutional conference was 
not regarded as a legitimate political exercise, and the Five Western powers, 
which included the United States, France, Great Britain, Canada and West 
Germany, increased their diplomatic efforts to reach an internationally 
acceptable solution to the Namibian issue. The South African government 
objected to Resolution 385 adopted in January 1976, which called for free 
elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, and in 1977 
proceeded with a referendum amongst the white population to determine the 
acceptability of an Interim Turnhalle Constitution. This Constitution was 
overwhelmingly endorsed by the white population group in the referendum. In 
1977 the Western contact, consisting of the United States of America, Canada, 
France, Great Britain and West Germany, launched a diplomatic initiative. 
After intensive negotiations between South Africa, the so-called 'Frontline 
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States' of Zambia, Angola and Botswana, SWAPO - as an external political 
movement - and internal political movements, a proposal was submitted to the 
United Nati ens Security Counc 11 which was embed i ed in Re solution 435, as 
referred to above. 
The Western Contact Group submitted a settlement proposal to the Security 
Council on 10 April 1978. The Western powers based their co-ordinated 
diplomatic initiatives on a number of fundamental points of departure, one of 
them being that South African po 1 i cies of ethnic fragmentation and the 
violation of the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia should 
not be continued. In further negotiations with the South African government 
and a Turnhalle delegation, one of the points agreed upon was the holding of 
free national elections under United Nations auspices. Yet further 
negotiations resulted in the agreement to conduct these elections for 
representatives to a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution for an 
independent state, on a non-ethnic basis (Du Pisani 1986:339-340). Implicit 
in this was the acceptance of Namibia as one political entity. 
Resolution 435, passed by the Security Council on 29 September 1978, met with 
a number of objections. One was that it lent too much support and recognition 
to South Africa's administration of the territory, another that it gave no 
indication of the kind of constitution to be drafted and adopted by the 
Constituent Assembly. These objections were addressed by an initiative taken 
by the United States of America and the Western Contact Group with SWAPO and 
the internal political parties, on the principles concerning the Constituent 
Assembly and the constitution for an independent Namibia. A set of principles, 
which became known as the '1982 Constitutional Principles', emerged from these 
negotiations and were circulated as a document of the Council. 
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This resolution was preceded in 1977 by a number of ethnic elections, for 
example, a Volksraad for Rehoboth, and a Damara Representative Authority. In 
December 1978, the South African government held elections for a Constituent 
Assembly without SWAPO's involvement. As Du Pisani argues, the holding of 
internal elections was part of a process of what he terms, 'The Politics of 
Internal Consolidation and Controlled Change' (1986:426). The holding of 
internal elections was intended to strengthen the internal parties in the 
negotiating process and consolidate fragmented opinion within the territory. 
On 19 March 1979, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, in a letter 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, indicated that the South 
African government had agreed that the territory would achieve independence 
on the basis of one man one vote and that colour discrimination would be 
removed (Unisa Archives. Niehaus Collection. 73.7 Letter, 19 March 1979). 
After the adoption of Resolution 435, the South African government raised a 
number of objections to the plan, in particular the alleged bias of the United 
Nations towards SWAPO. By 1982 the removal of Cuban troops from neighbouring 
Angola had, on the part of the South African government, become a further 
cornerstone of its resistance to the implementation of Resolution 435. 
In a statement made by Mr Brian Urquhart, United Nations Under-Secretary-
General for Special Political Affairs, at a pre-implementation meeting in 
January 1981, the need for a settlement proposal to be acceptable to the 
Namibian people and thus to the international community was emphasised. The 
key to international acceptance and the transition to independence was, he 
claimed, the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and 
control for the whole of Namibia as one political entity (Unisa Archives. 
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Niehaus Collection 73.8. Statement, 8 January 1981). 
Negotiations continued with the Contact Group. A Confidential Memorandum, 
dated February 1981, contained proposals by the five Foreign Ministers of the 
Contact Group for a constituent assembly and constitution for an independent 
Namibia. The Memorandum stated that the key to an internationally acceptable 
transition to independence was free elections for the whole of Namibia as one 
political entity under United Nations supervision and control. The Memorandum 
stated, moreover, that Namibia should be a unitary, sovereign and democratic 
state, and provision should be made for elected councils for local and 
regional administration. This is the first mention by an international body 
of the idea of a unitary state for Namibia. Provision was also made for a 
declaration of fundamental rights (Unisa Archives. Niehaus Collection 73.5 
Confidential Memorandum, 31 January 1978). 
These provisions were incorporated in the 1982 Constitutional Principles, 
which were formally adopted in 1989 by the Namibian Constituent Assembly. 
7.11.2 The United Nations Council for Namibia 
On 27 October 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted 
Resolution 2145(XXI) terminating the mandate for South West Africa. The 
termination of the mandate had both legal and political implications and led 
to the formation, in terms of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2248 
(S-V}, of an eleven-member United Nations Council for South West Africa to 
administer the territory until independence. This Council, later referred to 
as the United Nations Council for Namibia, pronounced upon a desired form of 
independence for the territory. 
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Although not explicit, the Council, over the years and in various statements, 
reinforced the idea of, and placed a presumption on, the eventual adoption of 
a centralised unitary state for the territory. In a statement read, for 
example, by Kurt Waldheim to a meeting of the Council in 1977, the provisions 
of Security Council Resolution 385 were reaffirmed, calling for elections for 
'Namibia as a whole, under United Nations supervision and control, so that the 
people can freely determine their future' (Annual Review of United Nations 
Affairs 1977.I). 
In January 1984, the United Nations Council for Namibia reaffirmed, 'the 
Namibians' inalienable right to self-determination and independence in a 
united Namibia ... '(Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1982). 
7.11.3 United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization 
In a meeting of the Special Committee of 24 on Decolonisation, the Chairman, 
Mr Salim A. Salim, referred to South Africa's continued pursuit of the policy 
of apartheid and balkanisation, and its futile attempts at ensuring the 
fragmentation of the Namibian people, and the destruction of the national 
unity and integrity of Namibia (Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 
1977. I). 
The Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization, took a consensus decision 
condemning South Africa for employing tactics to destroy the national unity 
and territorial integrity of the territory. This decision took into account 
the South African government's view that Walvis Bay (an ocean port on the 
Atlantic coast) was legally an integral part of South African territory. The 
Special Committee also viewed SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative 
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of the Namibian people, and maintained that free elections and any 
negotiations must include the participation of SWAPO (Annual Review of United 
Nations Affairs, 1978). 
7.11.4 The 1982 Constitutional Principles 
The Principles, as negotiated by the Five Western powers, were transmitted to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Section B (1) and {8) of the 
document, which sets out the 'Principles for a Constitution for an Independent 
Namibia', states that 'Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic 
state .•.. Provision will be made for the establishment of elected councils 
for local or regional administration, or both' {Letter to the Security Council 
S/15287. 12 July 1982). 
When the Constituent Assembly was formed in 1989, these Principles were 
formally adopted as a framework for the drafting of the new Namibian 
con st itut ion. Accardi ng to Wi echers, they strongly influenced the various 
political parties of the territory in their drafting and presentation of the 
respective principles to the Constituent Assembly (Van Wyk et al. 1991:9). 
7.11.5 United Nations Institute for Namibia 
In terms of United Nations Resolutions, a United Nations Institute for Namibia 
was established in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1974, to train Namibians to take up 
positions after independence, and to give consideration to the constitutional 
future of the territory. 
It was asserted, particularly by the internal Namibian political parties, that 
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this Institute was an instrument of SWAPO. Although not officially so, it was 
dominated by SWAPO personnel, and its pronouncements will be taken as fairly 
reflective of SWAPO's constitutional thinking. 
In a document published in 1979 by the Institute for Namibia, Mr H.G. Geingob, 
Director of the Institute, future Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of 
the Constituent Assembly, and future Prime Minister of Namibia, explained that 
the final choice must be made from the various constitutional options by 
Namibians themselves. He, however, qualified this by saying that 
Namibia would need a strong central government due to the 
centrifugal situation created by the South African regime. 
Consequently, a federal system of government has been ruled out 
as a viable option (Constitutional Options for Namibia. 
1979:iii). 
The Document further weighed up the strengths and weaknesses of federal and 
unitary alternatives for an independent Namibia. It emphasised the high 
administrative costs of a federal system and the implications for small states 
with 1 imi ted resources, and the possibility of conflict between the centre and 
the constituent states. A federal system with a weak central government could 
be used as a breeding ground for dissention and disunity in the country. 
The Document maintained that a unitary system would be attractive to the 
founding fathers of an independent Namibia, in that the nationalism of the 
pre-independent territory would give way to nation a 1 patriotism, and an 
independent Namibia would need to guard against the fragmentation of this 
national patriotism at the sub-national level. Further, the Document stated 
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that a federal system of government in Namibia with its population of 1,25 
million would be unrealistic: for federalism to work, at least four units with 
a population of about one half million was essential. 
If a federal unit comprised the 'Ovambo tribe', which was the dominant group 
in the territory, this would lead to conflict. Under a federal system, a 
further dispute could revolve around the distribution of wealth between the 
centre and the constituent states. A federal system, the document concluded, 
would be a regressive step, in that it would accentuate ethnic differences 
built up during the administration of the South African government. A unitary 
system of government could, nevertheless, provide for decentralisation for 
administrative convenience. 
This formed the basis of SWAPO's thinking in the Constituent Assembly. 
7.12 NAMIBIA/SOUTH WEST AFRICA POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS 
7.12.I African nationalism 
The incorporation issue in the 1940s and 1950s, the new militancy in the 
United Nations in the 1950s and 1960s, the application of Apartheid policy in 
the territory and the growth of nationalist sentiment in Africa in general, 
led to the establishment of political movements and parties both inside and 
outside the geographic bounds of South West Africa. These movements in turn 
impacted upon the negotiating and independence processes in the territory to 
greater and lesser degrees over a period of time. It was, however, only in the 
late 1950s that black supported political movements emerged in the territory, 
the most notable being SWAPO and SWANU. 
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Over the years, the cultural-pluralistic pattern of South West Africa has 
given rise to a great number of political movements and parties. Some have 
become fairly large, some have remained small, and others have disbanded or 
joined fronts, alliances or umbrella organisations. Most black supported 
parties can, however, trace their roots to SWAPO and SWANU. The inputs of 
political movements to the negotiations over the future constitution for the 
territory varied. Some were so small as to have had very little impact on the 
process, whereas others, with larger support bases or better funding, had a 
greater impact. Consequently, only certain of the policies of the larger 
political parties and movements, which more particularly won representation 
in the Constituent Assembly, or were the forebears of parties to win 
representation, will be discussed. 
As mentioned above, numerous political parties and movements were formed, 
which were disbanded, or joined in fronts or alliances at various stages in 
Namibia's constitutional evolution. To greater or lesser degrees, Namibian 
political parties and movements communicated their thinking on constitutional 
issues to negotiating teams. There is no reliable way of establishing the true 
strengths of these parties or movements, as no a 11- inc 1 us i ve e 1 ect ion was he 1 d 
until 1989. However, they played a very important role in the constitutional 
evo 1 ut ion of the territory over a 1 ong period of ti me. White supported 
movements, like the National Party of South West Africa, played a role from 
early in the twentieth century, whereas black supported political movements 
have only been active since the late 1950s. Political movements supported by 
both black and white population groups, like the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 
(OTA}, have engaged in the politics of the territory since the mid-1970s. 
Some of the political parties and movements have been quite specific as to 
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their constitutional preferences for the territory whereas others have not. 
The debates within and between the main parties and political movements will 
be discussed below, as they are illustrative of trends of thought which 
impacted to greater or lesser degrees on the constitution-making process, and 
the final constitution drafted for the territory. 
7.12.2 South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) 
SWAPO has probably been the most widely supported black political movement in 
the territory since its formation. Formed as The Ovambo [sic] People's 
Congress in 1958, it became the South West African People's Organisation 
(SWAPO) in June 1960. This organisation occupied the greatest number of seats 
in the Constituent Assembly which drafted Namibia's independence constitution. 
It received most of its support from the Owambo ethnic group. 
Very little detailed material exists on SWAPO's early constitutional thinking. 
In 1959, for example, members of the organisation made an appeal for universal 
suffrage in South West Africa, irrespective of colour, creed, religion and 
national origin (Du Pisani 1986:148). One early example of SWAPO's thinking 
was contained in a statement issued by the organisation on 8 September 1970, 
to the Third Non-Aligned Conference held in Lusaka which stated: 
South Africa is now embarked on another criminal road. She has 
begun to fragment our people into non-viable bantustans in total 
disregar-d of the people's wishes and popular aspiration for 
complete national independence and sovereignty (William Cullen 
Library. A1911). 
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In an interview published in 1g73, in response to the South African 
government's policy of ethnic fragmentation in the territory, Andreas 
Shipanga, Director of Swapo's Information Service, and later a member of 
SWAP0-0 (formed in 1978}, said; 
we Namibians are one black nation. Why should we allow ourselves 
to be divided when this division simply makes it easier for the 
whites to rule over us. If all our people come together, we can 
destroy European privilege and take the destiny of our nation 
into our own hands (Shipanga 1g73:23}. 
Shipanga continued his statement by saying that the 'Bantustan policy is 
designed to reinforce the division of our people, and SWAPO has always opposed 
this racist tactic' (Shipanga 1973:23}. 
In an extract from SWAPO's Constitution, released in 1976, the organisation 
expressed itself in favour of the creation of a cohesive, representative 
political entity, and against tribalism, racism, and regionalism, thus 
suggesting a centralist tendency in its thinking (Namibia News vol. 9. no. 9. 
July 28 - August/September/1976). 
In April 1977, SWAPO received the support of the Association for the 
preservation of the Tjamuaha/Maharero Royal House, in opposing the South 
African Government's policy of divide and rule and balkanisation, and 
supported the liberation of Namibia as a unitary state (Resolution dated 4 
Apri 1 1g77). 
In a discussion paper, published in 1978 and entitled, 'The Constitution of 
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Independent Namibia', SWAPO set out some of its thinking on the unitary state. 
The document emphasised that the people would draw up the final Namibian 
constitution. In the preamble, it was claimed that Namibia's supposed 'ethnic 
problems' had been blown up by the South African government for its own 
purposes (Discussion Paper, Para. 5).It was suggested that a constitution 
based on ethnic criteria was not appropriate for an independent Namibia. In 
Paragraph 22, it was stated by SWAPO that it was in favour of a national 
system of local government, but was totally opposed to any 'national 
regionalism', which was based exclusively on tribal affiliations (Discussion 
Paper, Para.22). 
With regard to the appropriateness of a constitution for a future independent 
Namibia, the discussion paper made several points. It stated that, 'A 
Constitution must relate to the real situation in the country, as well as to 
what the people wish the situation to become ... ' (Para.41). In referring to 
Namibian realities, it said that Namibia was a large country and distances 
between the centres of population were great. There was a danger that some 
parts of the country might be isolated as a result of long lines of 
communication. The discussion paper referred to South Africa as the colonial 
power, 
which [had] sought to inflict the vicious evil of apartheid and 
bantustanisation upon the Namibian people over many years. For 
its own purposes, it [had] tried to divide the people and 
perpetuate traditional and anachronistic tribalism (Discussion 
Paper, Para.4l(ii)). 
In explaining the essential principles of SWAPO's constitution, the document 
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said the following: 
SWAPO has, over many years, repeated its essential conception of 
Namibia as an independent, unitary state .•.. Our experience of 
persecution and racial ism over many years has deepened our 
unqualified commitment to democratic rule, the eradication of 
racial l sm . . . . Moreover, we reject absolutely any notion of 
bantustans masquerading as federalism. SWAPO is pledged to the 
idea of a unitary state. Of course, that does not mean that every 
government decision, however local its effects, must be taken 
centrally. As in all systems of government, some issues will be 
decided centrally, some locally, by devolution [sic] of power 
from the centre. But devolution must come from the centre; not 
transfer from South African-inspired 'homelands' (Discussion 
Paper, Para. 42). 
The Discussion paper returned to the issue of central and local government 
relations and referred to the difficulty of dividing functions between central 
and local government. It referred to the need for efficient administration and 
the need for people to be involved in decision-making, and suggested that one 
answer might be that of regionalisation and democratisation of those 
structures to guard against overcentral i sat ion and totalitarian rule. The 
Document contrasted its own understanding of central and local government 
relations with that of the South African government. 
According to the Discussion paper: 
The South Africans in their own interests, have tried to exploit 
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tribal differences in Namibia as part of a divide and rule 
policy. They have tried to stress and to exaggerate the 
differences between so-called ethnic groups, arguing that Namibia 
can never be one because of its racial variety. Thus they assert, 
only a 'federal' or 'confederal' solution will work. In fact, the 
kinds of federal or confederal notions which they advance have 
nothing to do with the terms as accepted throughout the world, as 
they are understood, for instance, in the US, Russia, Germany or 
Switzerland. They are simply another way of advancing tribalist 
racist bantustans, enabling the privileged few to go on running 
the country .... SWAPO is thus resolutely opposed to a system of 
devolution of government to local authorities with tribal ist 
foundations (Discussion Paper, Para.83). 
The Discussion paper expressed doubt as to whether regi ona 1 and 1 ocal 
government structures needed to be enshrined in a Constitution. The roles of 
local and regional governments were rarely stipulated in the constitutions of 
other unitary states. The organisation of local government and the extent and 
manner of devolution from the centre should be established through ordinary 
legislation (Discussion Paper, Para.84). 
SWAPO's preference for a unitary state and unitarism is clearly a reaction to 
South African rule at the time. However, from the time of SWAPO's founding to 
its participation in the Constituent Assembly, it gradually became more 
amenable to second-tier government and thus more accommodative of a degree of 
constitutional decentralisation. 
With the demise in 1977 of the Namibia National Council (NNC), which comprised 
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a number of factions, including The Association for the Preservation of the 
Tjamuaha/Maharero Royal House, its former members of the NNC issued a 
statement, in April 1977, in which they condemned the policy of divide and 
rule and the balkanisation of the territory, and resolved to join SWAPO and 
continue the struggle for a true and genuine independence for the territory 
as a unitary state, thus strengthening SWAPO as the dominant external 
political movement. 
7.12.3 The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) 
In October 1977, a split occurred in the National Party of South West Africa. 
This party had been a federal component of the National Party of South Africa, 
and one of the two long-established white political parties in the territory. 
The other was the United National South West Party. Some seventy-three 
delegates to the National Party Congress held over this period left, together 
with Mr D.F. Mudge, a leading member of that party. 
The break-away from the National Party of South West Africa subsequently led 
to the formation of the OTA in November 1977. The OTA was formed from eleven 
mostly ethnically based parties, one of which was Mr Mudge's newly formed 
white supported Republican Party. The OTA rejected the division of the 
territory into geographical areas or provinces and supported the idea of the 
territory being governed as one united country with a strong central 
government (Du Pisani, 1986:376:377). 
Mr D.F. Mudge, Chairman of the OTA and a member of the Namibian National 
Assembly, describes the OTA as originally being comprised of ethnic groups. 
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However, during the early 1980s it was decided: 
Ethnic groups could not work as building blocks for a 
constitution and the OTA came round to favouring a unitary state. 
The past history of Namibia smells of Apartheid and one had to 
get away from it (Personal Interview, 18 September 1992). 
Mr A. Matjila, a OTA Member of Parliament, held that Namibia was too small for 
federal ism and that from 1978, the OTA had preached unitarism (Personal 
Interview, 14 September 1992). He maintained that 
all parties during the preceding election campaign were in favour 
of strong centralised government. All people realise that they 
must be close to the cake ... if people separate out they cannot 
benefit from the wealth of the country (Personal Interview, 14 
September 1992). 
In the DTA's Draft Constitution presented to the Constituent Assembly, it 
specifically referred to independent Namibia as a unitary state and referred 
to the establishment of Regional Councils, but no reference was made to ethnic 
groups. Thus, over a period of years, the OTA, 1 ike SWAPO, amended its 
constitutional principles. 
7.12.4 Namibia National Front (NNF) 
In response to the formation and deliberations of The Turnhalle, opposition 
forces met as the Okahandja National Unity Conference in 1975. In 1977 this 
Conference became the Namibia National Council and later the Namibia National 
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Front (NNF). In 1978 the NNF consisted of seven groupings, including the 
National Independence Party, the Federal Party of South West Africa, the South 
West Africa National Union (SWANU), the Damara Council, the Mbanderus, and the 
SWAPO-Democrats. 
Initially at the end of 1976 and the beginning of 1977, the NNF was formed 
from a number of significant black supported opposition internal groupings, 
later joined by other groupings. 
In 1977, in a document compiled by Mr Brian O'Linn, himself a member of the 
Federal Party but acting as a representative of the NNF, he maintained that 
there was more common ground between the parties to the dispute than at any 
time in the past. He referred to the consultations between the Five Western 
Powers and all interested parties in SWA/Namibia. The Five Western powers had, 
according to O'Linn, succeeded in gaining considerable support from African 
states and the international community. As a result, there was tremendous 
pressure on SWAPO and South Africa to accept these proposals. The Federal 
Party under the umbrella of the NNF, O'Linn stated, viewed itself as a 
centrist power block with the National Party, Republican Party and OTA as 
ethnic parties and alliances on the right, and SWAPO on the left. The document 
continued that the heavy emphasis from the right on ethnicity and race, and 
ethnic vetoes would result in extremely weak central government. By 
implication SWAPO was considered to be highly centralised (NNF document 
compiled by Brian O'Linn, undated). 
In April 1978, the Front issued a Policy Manifesto detailing the alternatives 
to The Turnhalle. In this document, the NNF viewed itself as a component of 
a centrist power block and, the Republican Party as a component of the OTA, 
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differing little from the National Party. The Manifesto maintained that 
massive compulsory race and ethnic classification, together with the heavy 
emphasis on ethnicity and the ethnic veto, as advocated by the OTA and 
National Party, would result in extremely weak central government, continuous 
conflict and, in due course, chaos. The NNF viewed SWAPO, on the other hand, 
as being uncertain as to its true policy and intentions and believed that its 
actual intention was to take over government by force and to retain control 
by means of a dictatorship. 
The NNF emphasised the necessity of national unity rather than ethnic identity 
and the differences between people and groups. It rejected the creation of 
tri ba 1 homelands, in whatever form they might occur, and advocated the 
adoption of a Bill of Fundamental Human Rights entrenched in a 'relatively 
rigid constitution' (Namibia National Front Policy Manifesto, April lg78), 
a uni-cameral parliament as the supreme legislative organ, and provincial 
councils which would deal with only matters of regional or provincial concern 
(Namibia National Front Policy Manifesto, April lg78). 
Although not very specific concerning its constitutional proposals, the 
presumption was in favour of a centralised unitary form of government for the 
territory. The Federal Party associated i tse 1 f with a NNF advocating a 
'unitary Namibia', despite its belief in federation. 
7.12.5 South West Africa National Union (SWANU) 
Like SWAPO, SWANU was represented both inside and outside Namibia during the 
pre-independence period. It was founded in 1959 (Totemeyer 1977:83). However, 
unlike SWAPO, SWANU did not spell out its policy in any great detail. In 1975 
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it was stated that 'the organisation stands for a "unitary, independent 
Namibia; from Okavango and Kunene River to the Orange River in southern 
Namibia, from the Namib to the Kalahari desert"' (Totemeyer 1977:85-86). 
At a National Congress held in Windhoek in June 1976, the party gave some 
1 ns i ght into its policy in a number of re solutions. SWANU rejected the 
balkanisation of Namibia according to so-called ethnic groups, and reaffirmed 
that Namibia should be independent and a unitary State (SWANU National 
Congress Resolutions, 5-6 June 1976). 
Mr V. Rukoro, Deputy Minister of Justice in a post-independence government, 
and a member of SWANU, an ally of the governing SWAPO party, described 
Namibia's preference for a unitary constitutional model as follows: 
The history of Namibia is a history of racial and ethnic 
division. There is a need to promote cohesion in Namibia. 
Federalism may lend itself to abuse. For example, there is the 
problem of secession. Under federalism the Rheoboth and Caprivi 
regi ans could secede. Al so the manpower requirements under a 
federal constitution are great. Namibia does not have the 
economic and financial resources (Personal Interview, 17 
September 1992). 
Mr Rukoro won a seat in the Constituent Assembly as the sole representative 
of the NNF. 
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7.12.6 Swapo-Democrats (Swapo-D) 
The SWAPO-Democrats were formed in June 1978 and entered into an electoral 
alliance with the NNF, which was an internal political movement. The goal of 
the SWAPO-Democrats was to unite all the people of Namibia into a single mass 
organisation, to establish a modern, unitary, republican and independent 
state. The movement stated that it rejected any form of government based on 
ethnicity or tribal groupings. The movement did provide for the creation of 
provincial councils, but again emphasised that they should represent all the 
residents in a region regardless of ethnic group, tribe or colour. 
The SWAPO-Democrats, in a policy statement, pledged themselves to the pursuit 
of national unity; the establishment of a modern, unitary, republican, 
independent state; and rejected a system of government based on ethnicity or 
tribal groupings (SWAPO Democrats. Programme and Policy. Undated). 
7.12.7 Action Front for the Retention of the Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR) 
On 17 May 1977, the 52 000 white voters of the territory went to the polls to 
vote in an all-white referendum on the question of the acceptability of the 
draft Turnhalle constitution for Namibia. Nearly ninety-five percent of the 
white voters supported the ethnic interim government as proposed by the 
Turnhalle, as a basis for final independence. Differences of opinion as to 
what these principles actually meant resulted in the formation of the DTA and 
AKTUR, which was formed in 1978 and consisted of six parties, including the 
national party of South West Africa. 
A future leader of this party, Mr J.W.F. Pretorius, was later elected to the 
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Constituent Assembly as a member of the Aksie Christelike Nasionaal (ACN), 
together with two other members. It is therefore important to trace the 
thinking of this party as regards constitutional issues. 
In response to the Five Western Powers' proposals for the election of a 
constituent assembly to draft a constitution for the territory, AKTUR argued 
that long term stability could only be attained by each of the eleven ethnic 
groups having an equal share in the composition of the Constituent Assembly. 
A constitution imposed by the numerical superiority of a particular group 
eleCted on the basis of one man one vote was unacceptable to AKTUR. This was 
a reference to SWAPO and its predominantly Owambo support base (AKTUR' s 
Comments. 29 October 1981). 
To justify its viewpoint, AKTUR referred to what it saw as a common 
characteristic of governments in Africa, that is strong centralised 
institutions in which authority is maintained by a few majority groups or 
combi nat i ans of groups. A mono 1 it hi c government structure was not an efficient 
means to maintain minority rights and civilian freedom. The only alternative, 
the party felt, was to decentralise power to the lowest level at which justice 
could be done to attain the ideal of self-determination for protecting 
minority rights and civilian freedoms. AKTUR supported the establishment of 
an umbrella institution at the central level and the guaranteeing of the 
rights of the subordinate authorities against interference by the central or 
national government. Thus AKTUR advocated a federal arrangement of the 
territory, organised along ethnic lines at the regional level (AKTUR position 
paper circa. 1980/1981). 
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7.13 NEW INTERNAL INITIATIVES 
7.I3.l The South African Government 
By 27 September 1g75, in a decision taken by the South African Cabinet, it was 
conceded that 
the people of South West Africa, in accordance with their wishes, 
would have to be given the opportunity to elect their own 
representatives to a constituent assembly. That would be done on 
the basis of universal adult suffrage, in country-wide elections, 
in order to establish unequivocally who had the right to speak 
for the people of South West Africa (Annual Review of United 
Nations Affairs, 1977.I). 
This was an early indication of a shift in South African government policy 
with regard to the territory. 
7.13.2 Multi-Party Conference of South West Africa/Namibia 
Following extensive consultations by Dr Willie van Niekerk, Administrator-
General of South West Africa, a new internal initiative was taken in 1983 to 
resolve the canst i tut ion al deadlock. A conference consisting of sixteen 
political parties and movements was convened, and it was named the Multi-party 
Conference (MPC). Of the sixteen parties comprising the MPC, eleven were 
members of the OTA. The Conference's first document of note was the Windhoek 
Declaration of Basic Principles which was adopted unanimously on 25 February 
1984. In general, these basic principles coincided with the Constitutional 
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Principles drafted by the 1981 Contact Group. 
On 18 April 1984, the Multi-Party Conference produced a Bill of Fundamental 
Rights and Objectives. The Preamble set out the following aims, 
independence and self-government ... national reconciliation .•. 
stability and progress depend on respect for the rights of all in 
the prevailing diversity of Namibian society and that unity in 
that diversity with common loyalties to one state is desired by 
all (Cleary 1988:298). 
These provisions were legally entrenched by the South West Africa Legislative 
and Executive Authority Proclamation (RlOl. 1985). 
7.13.3 Constitutional Council 
In 1985 a Constitutional Council was established by Act of the South West 
Africa National Assembly (Act no. 8 of 1985} in response to the earlier 
insistence of the Multi-Party Conference. The Council was constituted under 
the Chairmanship of Mr Justice Victor Hiemstra with an eventual membership of 
eighteen. Two draft documents were presented to the National Assembly on 
30 June 1987. Fourteen of the eighteen members of the Constitutional Council 
voted for the main draft, and the National Party of South West Africa 
presented an alternative draft. The Nati on al Party draft advocated the 
establishment of Group Councils with legislative capacity in respect of each 
of the eleven groups designated, whereas the main draft focused on structures 
based upon class and ideology. The National Party's draft was rejected by the 
Council with a two-thirds majority. 
334 
According to Wiechers, many of the features of this draft constitution were 
tabled by the parties which later became members of the Constituent Assembly 
(Van Wyk et al. 1991:12). In some respects the proposals of the Constitutional 
Council reflected the 1982 Principles. 
By this point in Namibia's constitutional evolution, the notion of a unitary 
state had been accepted. The debate which followed was concerned with the 
degree to which ethnic authorities would be accommodated. As Cleary states, 
members of the Multi -Party Conference, despite their di verse origins and 
ideological stances, felt bound by the Bill which they jointly forged. The 
Bill served also as a common frame of reference, drawing closer together from 
the extremes of the spectrum people who espoused group rights and political 
rights for minority groups (1988:342). 
7.14 DRAFTING OF NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION 
The adoption of Resolution 385 of 1976 by the United Nations Security Council, 
marked a turning point in Namibia's progress towards adopting a centralised 
unitary constitution for the territory. This Resolution recalled previous 
United Nations Resolutions and ICJ rulings on the territory and, besides 
condemning South Africa's gee-political policies for the territory, called for 
United Nations supervised elections to be held for the whole of Namibia as one 
political entity. 
Resolution 435 provided for the election of a constituent assembly to draft 
a final constitution for the territory. An election to comply with this 
requirement was held in November 1989. The results were as follows: SWAPO won 
forty-one of the seventy-two seats in the Constituent Assembly, The Democratic 
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Turnhalle Alliance of Namibia (OTA) won twenty-one seats, The United 
Democratic Front of Namibia (UDF) four seats, Aksie Christelike Nasionaal 
(ACN} three seats, the National Patriotic Front of Namibia (NPF} one seat, the 
Federal Convention of Namibia (FCN} one seat, and the Namibian National Front 
one seat (Nation Building: The U.N. and Namibia, 1990). 
7.14.l THE CONSTITUTION DRAFTING PROCESS 
As provided for in Resolution 435, a Constituent Assembly comprising those 
seventy-two members elected to the National Assembly met for the first time 
on 21 November 1989. 
In the first addresses by representatives of the political parties elected to 
the Constituent Assembly, references were made to the need to develop a 
'national culture' (SWAPO}; a commitment to the 1982 Principles (OTA and ACN), 
'reconciliation and nation-building' (UDF); a 'national feeling of 
independence'(NPF); the need to create a nation (UDF}; and maximum national 
unity and meaningful national reconciliation (NNF}. Manifest in these 
principles was a real desire for, and a commitment to, the drafting of a 
suitable constitution for an independent Namibia. According to Professor 
Marinus Wiechers, a constitutional expert who participated in the detailed 
con st i tut ion-drafting process, the whole procedure was characterised by a 
minimal amount of ideol ogica 1 posturing (Persona 1 Interview, 15 September 
1994). A number of core principles were at this stage accepted by all of the 
parties represented in the Constituent Assembly. 
On 21 November 1989, a motion was unanimously adopted, accepting the 1982 
Constitutional Principles as a basis for a final constitution for an 
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independent Namibia. A further motion was adopted providing for the submission 
of each party's con st i tut i ona 1 pri nci p 1 es to the Acting Secretary of the 
Constituent Assembly, after which they would be debated, and committees 
established to resolve specific differences between the proposals. 
On 4 December 1989, the debate commenced on the respective constitutional 
principles for the respective parties. In the SWAPO submission no specific 
reference was made to the unitary state. Oblique references were made to the 
need to avoid an all-powerful state, but no specifics were given. 
In the OTA submission, it declared itself bound by the 1982 Principles. With 
reference to their provision for a unitary state, Mr Muyongo stated that he 
understood a unitary Namibia to refer to, 'a state that abides by the 
principles of territorial integrity and rejection of secession' (Constituent 
Assembly Debates vol.I., 4 December 1989:64). The OTA supported the 
establishment of elected councils for local and regional administration, and 
referred to 'regional autonomy' (Constituent Assembly Debates vol.I., 4 
December 1989:67). In order to prevent a central government from depriving any 
region of its power 'through over-emphasised central control' (Constituent 
Assembly Debates vol. 1., 4 December 1989:67), it proposed that the regional 
authorities be effectively represented in the executive and legislature of 
Namibia. The suggestion was that regional authorities could be entrenched in 
this way. The OTA also indicated that it was not supportive of ethnic 
governments or any form of racial discrimination. 
The UDF similarly committed itself to the 1982 constitutional principles and 
a unitary state, but stated that in view of the great expanse of the country 
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a number of elected regional councils should be established, as well as local 
government authorities. 
The ACN pleaded for the greatest possible consensus to be reached in drafting 
a constitution for the territory. It referred to the great diversity of the 
territory, but the desire of the ACN was 'to achieve unity in this diversity 
with common loyalties to a single state' (Constituent Assembly Debates 
1989:100). 
The NPF was more specific concerning its constitutional proposals for an 
independent Namibia. Its constitutional ideas came from four sources: the 1982 
Principles; the constitutional draft of the former Constitutional Council; the 
election manifesto of the NPF; and the views and opinions of the supporters 
of the NPF. The NPF believed that the territory should be unitary and 
decentralised and felt that federation was not practical for Namibia. Further, 
the NPF advocated a unitary state to avoid the 'assimilation of federalism 
with apartheid' (Constituent Assembly Debates vol.1., 5 December I989:113); 
to ensure that the 'problems of tribalism are transcended and the country is 
united' (Constituent Assembly Debates 5 December 1989:113); and to avoid the 
related costs of a federation which could be expensive. The NPF went further 
and advocated a two-ti er system of government, a central government, and 
municipalities and county or village governments. This proposal was justified 
on the grounds of unwarranted expense. 
The FCN supported the adoption of a federal constitution which it believed 
would ensure the greatest opportunity for Namibians to part1cipate in 
government and thereby promote unity amongst the population. It did qualify 
this by stating that in the interests of reconciliation, independence, peace, 
338 
freedom, national unity, stability and progress, concessions would have to be 
made by all parties in order to be able to achieve these goals. 
A statement displaying a centralist outlook on a future constitution for the 
territory was made by Mr Hage Geingob. In an interview in June 1989, preceding 
the election, he said with regard to the SWAPO constitutional policy: 
We believe in a basic democratic system. We want an executive 
with strong powers but there will be checks and balances - a 
separate legislature, an independent judiciary - to check the 
president's powers ... We will allow a multi-party system. The 
problem with such a system is that you want to apply Western 
democracy in an area which does not have that political tradition 
or culture. We are having to mould a nation from different tribes 
(Leadership, vol. 8, no. 6. August 1989:108). 
It was from the above-mentioned parties that a constitutional committee was 
appointed in proportion to their relative electoral strengths to draft the 
final constitution for Namibia. 
Du Pisani describes the constitution-making process as the art of compromise, 
in that it was preceded by long weeks of hard bargaining between the diverse 
parties which included SWAPO as the majority party, the constituent parties 
of the OTA, the UDF, and the NNF (1990:199). 
The drafting of the final constitution by the Standing Committee was preceded 
by a South African Judge's collating the drafts of all the political parties 
in one single document. Final drafts of specific sections of this draft 
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con st i tu ti on were produced by three South African const i tu ti on al experts 
(Wiechers Personal Interview, 15 August 1994). 
On 20 December 1989, the twenty-one member Committee on Standing Rules and 
Orders and Internal Arrangements (The Standing Committee) reported back on its 
work to the Constituent Assembly. It stated that all substantive issues had 
been resolved in principle, and a draft document submitted to a panel of three 
constitutional experts for finalisation. In the discussion of the draft 
constitution, which commenced on 29 January 1990, very little reference was 
made to the centralised unitary nature of the constitution. The constitution 
itself was adopted within a period of two months by the constituent assembly 
elected in the previous November election. 
It was therefore necessary to determine what the policies of the participating 
parties were at the time of the meeting of the constituent assembly. The 
respective party policies were also a product of what was sometimes a long 
period of debate extending over many years, which is why it was necessary to 
trace the evolution of these parties. 
7.15 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The acceptance of a centralised unitary con st i tut ion for an independent 
Namibia was the end result of a comp 1 ex interaction between a number of 
factors, beginning with the early settlement of the territory by whites and 
their need to control a vast land area, and concluding with the establishment 
of a Constituent Assembly in 1989 and the adoption of a centralised unitary 
constitutional form. 
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Early German colonisation was accompanied by military rule, which tends to be 
centralised and hierarchical. As was pointed out above, the German colonisers 
were intent upon establishing themselves as the legitimate rulers of the 
territory. During the early colonisation period, and in view of the vast 
geographic extent of the territory, communicat i ans were di ffi cult, and 
therefore dispersed admi ni strati ve control would have been a pro bl em to 
manage. Further, resources were simply not available to allow for 
decentralisation of the admi ni st rat ion of the territory. During the early 
years of German rule there was a debate in Germany over whether the colony was 
in fact beneficial to its interests, suggesting that the allocation of further 
resources for the territory would have been difficult to justify. 
Early German rule established Windhoek as the legislative and administrative 
centre for the territory. Historical factors thus resulted in a precedent 
being established, where Windhoek was accepted by all role players within and 
outside the territory as the most important urban centre and the seat for the 
execution of legislative and administrative functions. This confirms the first 
hypothesis made above. 
The political destiny of the territory, in the view of successive South 
African governments up until the 1970s, had been that it should be 
incorporated into a greater South Africa. Although, in the early years of 
South African rule, the German population favoured an independent status for 
the territory, the preponderant view amongst the white population was in 
support of incorporation into a greater South Africa. Since the white 
population was the ruling group in South Africa and South West Africa, and 
white interests were likely to take precedence over those of other population 
groups, incorporation was strongly supported. White opinion was the 
centripetal force supporting centralisation and in turn diluted centrifugal 
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forces supporting decentralisation within the territory. The belief in 
incorporating the territory as a South African Province was given support by 
making provision in 1949 for the election of Members of the House of Assembly 
and the Senate in the South African Parliament, and taking away power from the 
white population group of South West Africa. This form of representation was 
ended in 1977, after a period of twenty-eight years. Representation in the 
South African Parliament exerted a centralising function, particularly in so 
far as white administration was concerned. This centralising function set a 
pattern for the construction of future political and administrative 
structures. The development of this relationship confirms the second 
hypothesis made above. 
As far as black administration is concerned, and following the Odendaal 
Commission Report of 1964, an attempt was made to decentralise in terms of the 
policy of creating se 1 f-governi ng territories. Although there was some support 
in the territory for this policy, the overwhelming opinion amongst the black 
population, both inside and outside the territory and amongst the 
international community, was against this policy, because it was designed to 
divide the population of the territory along ethnic lines. This opinion tended 
to reject the policy in its entirety and any constitutional forms, like 
federation, which might have resembled it or have been perceived to resemble 
it in any way. Much of this opinion was a reaction against a despised policy. 
With the growth of African nationalist movements from the late 1950s, South 
West African society became polarised between the white group, which initially 
supported incorporation, followed by various forms of separate development and 
partition, and black groupings which supported, in general, a non-racial 
independent state of Namibia. The persistence in implementing racial solutions 
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in South West Africa led to a counter reaction by SWAPO and other parties 
proposing non-raci a 1 centralised unitary cons ti tut ion a 1 so 1 ut ions for the 
territory. This confirms the third hypothesis made above. 
SWAPO was, moreover, the dominant black supported liberation movement which 
obtained its support from the Owambo population group whose members comprised 
about fifty percent of the entire Namibian population. SWAPO won the attention 
of the international community as being the group offering a more just 
solution to the Namibian dispute, and was thus able to dominate subsequent 
negotiating forums and the Constituent Assembly. Simply through numerical 
inferiority, the smaller political parties operating within Namibia had to 
accept limited concessions in favour of regional government. This confirms the 
fourth hypothesis made above. 
In the final few years before independence a remarkable degree of convergence 
in the thinking of the main negotiating parties began to occur. Individual 
parties and movements shifted from many of their original principles, 
compromised on a centralised unitary state and accepted a degree of geographic 
decentralisation. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that both sides 
reached a point of exhaustion, simply accepting compromises in order to 
dispense with the dispute. As the international community gradually gained an 
increasing influence over the nature of the constitution to be drafted for an 
independent Namibia, so the reluctance of the South African government and the 
smaller parties diminished with regard to their accepting a common destiny for 
the territory. The need to build a non-racial nation state was accepted by all 
the parties represented in the Constituent Assembly. Reconciliation was 
accepted in principle by all the parties involved, when it seemed that they 
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could no longer influence events to any great extent. 
Mr S. Nujoma, leader of SWAPO who later became the first 
President of an independent Namibia, summed up the prevailing atmosphere at 
the time of independence, when he made the following statement shortly after 
his return from exile, 'the first thing w~ have to do is pursue a policy of 
national reconciliation .... I think that we really have to forget the past 
and build a new Namibian nation' (The Namibian, 19 September 1989). This 
sentiment pervaded the thinking of all the participating parties at the time 
of the election and during the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. 
Further illustration of the prevailing mood of reconciliation is expressed in 
the foll owing debate on the draft con st ituti on in Namibia's Constituent 
Assembly. Mr M. Muyango, a OTA representative said: 
I want to believe that as we got rid of colonialism, as we get 
rid of apartheid we should not give any leeway whatsoever to 
bring it back in a different manner or what one can refer to as 
maybe using some constitutional tricks. I want to say here that 
we have seen what Africa has gone through. Some of our African 
brothers on this continent have tried a number of things in terms 
of constitutional arrangements, but all ended up in disasters 
(Namibia Constituent Assembly Debates, 29 January 1990:167). 
Over the decades, several additional factors influenced the eventual adoption 
of a centralised unitary constitutional model for the territory. Although 
Namibian independence was granted several decades after a 11 other former 
African countries had received independence, the thrust of African nationalist 
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sentiment pervaded the early black Namibian political movements, like SWAPO 
and SWANU. Highly centralised governing authorities were very much part and 
parcel of African nationalist thinking at the time. 
As the international community became more involved in the dispute, 
constitutional principles were adopted over the years and reinforced through 
successive United Nations resolutions and reports. Moreover, through 
increasing contact over the years between the international community and 
internal and external political parties and movements, certain constitutional 
principles, like the unitary state, became more accepted and other issues 
became the topics of dispute. The international community through., for 
example, the Five Western Powers Contact Group, facilitated the process of 
compromise and convergence of opinion. 
At the same time, the balance of forces emerged in favour of a unitary 
constitutional form for the territory. The belief in this type of 
constitutional form could not be completely rejected by those who might have 
favoured, for example, a federal form of government. Where there was a certain 
amount of give and take, and where thinking converged, was in the degree to 
which the unitary state should be centralised or decentralised. 
Ultimately the struggle over detailed constitutional principle lay between 
SWAPO and the OTA, as the second largest grouping in the Constituent Assembly, 
with the OTA winning a concession in the form of limited decentralisation and 
regional governments for Namibia. This confirms the fifth hypothesis made 
above. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION 
8.1 AN EVALUATION OF THE ORIGINS OF THE CENTRALISED UNITARY STATE 
As stated in chapter 1, the main purpose of this thesis is to describe and 
exp 1 a in the origins of centralised unitary con st i tut iona 1 forms adopted at 
independence, with special reference to the sub-Saharan African continent and 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia, in particular. In chapters 2 to 7, the 
identification and the diverse origins of the centralised unitary state, both 
historical and contemporary, and external and internal to sub-Saharan Africa, 
were analysed. The evolution of the centralised constitutional unitary state, 
specifically in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia, was analysed because of the 
close geographical and historical relationship of these countries to South 
Africa, but also because of the diversity of their decolonisation processes. 
Botswana was decolonised much in keeping with the pattern in former British 
Africa but later than most former colonial possessions; Zimbabwe after a long 
constitutional wrangle and a bitter war; and Namibia after a long legal 
dispute involving the international community and a bitter war. The end result 
for all three was the adoption of similar centralised unitary constitutional 
forms, despite their diversity and the availability of different 
constitutional options. 
As pointed out, a constitution is a political-legal expression of a variety 
of factors, both historical and contemporary, internal and external to a 
country. It is the dependent variable or end result of a complex variety of 
variables or factors that determine the constitution-drafting processes to 
greater or lesser degrees in different countries. There are a number of 
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general factors, as well as country-specific factors determining the 
constitutional form adopted by a state at a particular time. 
8.1.1 The theoretical and historical dimension of unitarism 
The theory, defined as thoughts, conjectures and ideas, underpinning the 
centralised unitary state has a long history and is analysed under various 
headings, including those of monism and absolutism. The general debate over 
the desirability or non-desirability of centralisation and decentralisation 
has continued for many centuries, but the preference one way or another has 
really only been embodied in constitutional documents in the past two 
centuries. 
Just as the early political leaders and theorists attempted to address the 
divisions and conflicts in their contemporary states by creating strong 
centralised governments, so African leaders, following a similar approach, 
have tried to do the same. A tradition was created, which continued into the 
twentieth century, that centralisation was the best mechanism for coping with 
potential conflict within a state. Something tantamount to a theoretical 
fixation, in fact, developed over the centuries, in the form of an enduring 
belief that a strong centralised government could best deal with the needs of 
a fragmented society. Only recently, as a response to economic crises and 
ethnic problems, have the merits of decentralised constitutional government 
begun to receive attention. 
The evolution of the centralised unitary con st i tut ion corresponds with 
Etzioni's conceptual scheme for the development of unified states, outlined 
in chapter 3 above. Each of the three case studies examined here is 
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illustrative of his four stages as modified for the purposes of this thesis .. 
Each stage is referred to in conjunction with the experience of each of the 
three case studies. 
Little ingenuity or inventiveness has existed amongst draughtsmen and elites, 
in the matter of devising constitutions to cater for the specific needs of 
diverse societies. In many parts of Africa British constitutional precedent 
played a very important role in determining the nature of con st itut ions 
adopted. What was adopted in one state was believed to be good enough for 
another, irrespective of important political and socio-economic differences. 
It was also believed by constitutional draughtsmen that the unitarism in the 
'Westminster export model', as it has been referred to by S.A. de Smith 
(1964:77) and others, could be utilised in diverse countries and conditions. 
The idea of popular participation in a constitution-drafting process has 
received very little attention over the centuries. Elites, whether theorists, 
constitutional draughtsmen, civil servants or statesmen, have dominated the 
process. The perceptions of the needs of elites and the psychological climate 
prevailing at the particular time have prevailed upon constitution-drafting 
processes. 
A belief has prevailed over decades that the integrated or unified society is 
the most desirable. Various degrees of monist visions, from abstract to 
concrete, have been predominant in the thinking of numerous theorists and 
statesmen. As a result they have advocated the adoption of centralised unitary 
constitutional forms, especially in racially divided societies, like those of 
Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, in particular, as well as in other 
former African colonies, where up until independence white minority groups 
have dominated government decision-making processes. These minorities found 
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unitary systems of government consonant with their desire to dominate and 
control and thus protect their minority status. With the rise of African 
nat i-0nal i st movements and the advent of decol oni sat ion, members of these 
movements gained the upper hand in the negotiating process largely because of 
their numbers. They opted for centralised unitary states so that they could, 
in turn, dominate and control their subordinates. The assumption was that 
ethnic diversity could be accommodated and nation-building promoted by 
adopting a unitary constitutional form. The final constitution-drafting 
exercise which preceded independence generally took place over a short period 
of time. Precedent and the colonial inheritance have weighed heavily in favour 
of the perpetuation of the unitary state, as did the perceived need to 
minimise conflict through the domination and control of the centre. The 
division of sovereignty in general, that is the creation of federal states, 
simply could not be entertained as this would not permit the sought after 
objectives to be achieved. 
The adoption of centralised institutions and unitary constitutional forms at 
independence was further reinforced by the persistence of these in one form 
or another in the three countries under study, from the earliest period of 
co 1 oni al settlement. It can be argued that these centra 1 i sed institutions were 
the 'carriers of history' ( as referred to in chapter 3) in that they evolved 
into the forms adopted at independence from similar structures which had come 
into existence in the past to achieve specific purposes. Institutions it is 
argued, go through a process of evolutionary change (David 1994). Etzioni's, 
centralisation, take-off and termination stages follow such a path 
demonstrating how history is borne from one stage to the next. According to 
his conceptual scheme, the drafters of the independence constitutions had a 
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certain amount of historical precedent to take into account when designing 
their respective constitutions. 
The unitary state has functioned as the unacknowledged political-legal device 
for attaining the objectives mentioned above: the minimisation of conflict; 
and the facilitation of nation-building and national integration. The 
centralised unitary state adopted at independence has further 1 aid the 
foundation for the increasingly centralised post-independence state which, in 
many instances, has become 'weak' or 'soft' and unable adequately to fulfil 
its functions. In many African countries, the possibilities of 
decentralisation and constitutional reform are now being reassessed, a process 
referred to in more detail below. 
Independence constitutions also provide for centralisation in the cases where 
dominant political movements or modernising leadership elites are intent upon 
mobilising all groups in society in favour of certain political, economic or 
social goals. The goal of nation-building, by which is meant the integration 
of disparate ethnic and tribal groupings, is one such example. 
Finally, a decolonising power does, in fact, decentralise authority away from 
the metropolis which awards sovereignty to the newly independent state. This 
decentralisation takes place in a horizontal direction. Horizontal 
decentralisation is unlikely to be accompanied at the same time by vertical 
decentralisation or devolution. In this process the centres tend to dominate 
while the periphery and interests in the periphery are played down. Since the 
metropolitan centre has already shed power, it is too much to contemplate 
further decentralisation to the periphery at the same time. The process of 
decolonisation and constitution drafting is driven by the centres, that is 
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either by a limited number of decision makers of the decolonising power; or 
by elites from the former colony. The process tends to be horizontal and 
centre-oriented; the periphery has very 1 ittle input into the process. 
Existing autonomous regional authorities, established under colonial rule and 
headed by traditional leaders, tend to retain their powers, which, however, 
are not augmented during the constitution drafting process. 
8.1.2 The general African experience 
Although the specific origins of centralised unitary constitutional forms in 
the African experience have not been spelled out in great detail by academics 
or political leaders, several contributory factors do emerge. The issue of 
unity and nation-building comes to the fore time and again in the thoughts of 
African leaders, as illustrated in the literature referred to in chapter 4. 
Leaders did not want to lead states and head governments containing ethnic or 
regional groupings or classes in conflict with one another. The general 
perception was that internal federation or even decentralisat1on could result 
in conflict along these 11 nes, which would threaten the security of l eadershlp 
elites. Further, to settle for a highly decentralised state would be seen as 
depriving nationalist leaders of their hard won victory. Nationalist leaders, 
like the colonial rulers before them, wanted control of the centre, and the 
perception was that a decentralised state would be seen to deprive them of 
their victory over colonial rule. As stated in chapter 4, the tendency was 
towards establishing a society that was 'focal institutional'. 
Economic development was also important and the belief was that central 
planning, in terms of Marxist and socialist thought, was necessary to achieve 
this goal, which would then be facilitated by a unitary constitutional form. 
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It was also understood by many of the leaders involved in constitution 
drafting that federal government was more expensive and slower than unitary 
government. Poor countries could simply not afford federations. Moreover, in 
poor countries of great geographical extent, where skilled personnel were in 
short supply, governmental structures were of necessity more centralised, 
simply because there were fewer skilled personnel to administer regional and 
local authorities. This was the case in early colonial Bechuanaland, Southern 
Rhodesia, and South West Africa. The early characteristics shared by these 
three former colonies correspond with Etzioni's notion of the pre-centralised 
stage. 
Decentralisation in a unitary state was seen as having similar disadvantages 
to that of federation, although a clear distinction was seldom made between 
these concepts. 'Regionalism' and 'balkanisation' were the notions used to 
label and reject decentralisation and federation. Kwame Nkrumah, former 
President of Ghana, was perhaps the pre-eminent ·leader in Africa in the 1950s 
and early 1960s. His influence on the continent steered states away from 
decentralisation and federation. Moreover, he was partially responsible for 
creating a 'climate of opinion', a psychological climate, which was not in 
support of decentralisation or federation. At the time of independence, the 
general opinion amongst African leaders, supported often by Marxist and 
socialist thought, implicit in the idea of Pan-Africanism, was that the larger 
the political unit, the better it would be for African independence and its 
preservation: existing boundaries determined by former colonial rulers had to 
be retained, but greater political associations or federations should be 
created. 
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8.2 BOTSWANA, ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA COMPARED 
Whatever the similarities and differences of the three case studies analysed, 
in terms of historical backgrounds and decolonisation processes, at the time 
of independence, all three countries opted for centralised unitary 
constitutional forms. In several respects the early historical evolution of 
the three was similar. Their later constitutional evolution, however, in 
particular that of Zimbabwe and Namibia, differed from that of Botswana and 
other African countries. What then were the over-arching factors which 
cancelled out the differences between the three countries? What led each of 
them to adopt a similar centralised unitary constitution, to reach, in other 
words, Etzioni's termination stage - the centralised constitutional unitary 
state? To answer these questions, the similarities and differences between 
these three countries during their years under colonial rule will be examined 
and comparisons made. 
All three countries were colonised at more or less the same time, that is in 
the 1880s. The British were invited by chiefs in Bechuanaland to protect them 
against land claims and in situations of conflict; Southern Rhodesia was 
colonised by the British South African Company (referred to as the 'Company' 
below) to exploit the mineral resources of that territory, as well as to 
contain conflict situations; Germany colonised South West Africa and 
established military rule, to protect the inhabitants in conflict situations. 
The nature of the administration in these three territories in the early years 
of colonisation was quasi-military, small and oriented towards containing 
situations of conflict, rather than developing the territories politically or 
economically. This type of quasi-military rule laid the foundations for later 
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administrative and constitutional developments - that is Etzioni's second 
stage - the centralisation stage. 
The resources available to the early administrators of the three territories 
for economic development were 1 imited. It was only in the 1930s that the 
British considered development issues in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The 
Company was motivated by profits rather than development considerations during 
most of its rule of Southern Rhodesia. Doubts were expressed in Germany in the 
first decade of the century as to whether it could afford the colonisation of 
South West Africa. The early administrations in all three territories were, 
because of limited resources, small, centralised and run on as limited a 
budget as possible from a particular geographic locality. In the case of South 
West Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Windhoek and Salisbury were the early 
administrative centres and became the capitals and centres of government and 
administration at independence. Once established, they continued to be 
recognised as important centres of government and administration. This 
coincides with Etzioni's take-off stage. The single administrative capital of 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate was initially located in South Africa.and moved 
to Gaborone at independence. 
The way the black population, in particular, was ruled in each of these 
territories left its mark on later constitutional evolution. Because of the 
method of indirect or parallel rule in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, a 
centralised government for both the African and white population groups only 
emerged at a late stage and was largely brought about through the initiative 
of African elites. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, with its relatively large 
but insecure settler population (as compared with Bechuanaland) and the 
necessity for Company rule, a centralised government was established at an 
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early stage, which tended to dominate the parallel administrative structures 
set up to rule the African population. Finally, in the case of South West 
Africa, military rule 1 aid the foundations for early centralised rule, 
followed by South African rule, during which one set of structures was created 
for the white population, another parallel set for the black population, the 
latter structures being dominated by local white rulers and representatives 
of the South African government. 
The debate which arose at various times in the colonial history of each 
country, as to whether it should be incorporated into its stronger neighbour, 
South Africa, since all three territories adjoined that country, was another 
important variable in establishing the foundations for centralised government 
and administration. The exceptions were the Tati district of eastern 
Bechuanaland, which it was thought, at one stage, should be incorporated into 
Southern Rhodesia, and Southern Rhodesia, which it was thought should 
amalgamate with Northern Rhodesia, and which did eventually join a federation 
with this territory and Nyasaland. The threat of incorporation constrained 
centrifugal forces which might have led to the evolution of a concrete monist 
(referred to in chapter 3) or even federalist political culture in those 
societies, which might, in turn, have resulted in the establishment of strong 
regional administrations. 
The role played by elites was a further critically important variable in the 
con st ituti ona 1 evolution of the three territories. No unified articulate white 
group of any size emerged in Bechuanaland to press either for independence for 
the territory, or for an alternative to a centralised unitary state. African 
elites performed this function. In terms of Etzioni 's conceptual scheme, 
internalisation occurred, in the form of one modernising elite organised 
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around the Khama family. This elite tended to dominate the traditionalist 
elites, and especially the tribal ones, who were less strongly in favour of 
a centralised unitary state. 
In the case of Rhodesia, White elites initially dominated the constitution-
drafting processes from the time of Mr Cecil Rhodes and the Company at the 
turn of the century, to Mr Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia in 1979. Only 
in the 1950s and 1960s did African elites emerge to challenge white dominance, 
by which time the basic constitutional form for the country had been in 
existence for some time and had set a precedent for future constitutional 
revisions. As far as South West Africa is concerned, the white population 
group was always fairly active politically, but divided within itself. Over 
time this group advocated a variety of different constitutional options for 
the territory. It was only in the late 1950s that credible black opposition 
emerged, which was eventually able to dominate the process, build on 
constitutional precedent and, through its strong local and international 
support base, bring about the acceptance of a centralised unitary 
constitutional form for the territory. 
Conflicts between settlers or whites and indigenous population groups was a 
critically important variable in shaping early and later unitarist thinking. 
In both groups these conflicts contributed to the development of a unitarist 
political culture from an early stage. Besides the conflicts referred to 
between African groups within the three territories in the early part of 
colonial rule, conflict also occurred between white settlers and black 
inhabitants. Of the three, the Bechuanaland Protectorate experienced the least 
degree of conflict between white and black, probably because land, trade and 
economic resources in that territory were of 1 ess importance to the co 1 on is i ng 
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power. The settler population was proportionately smaller there than in the 
other two territories. In Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, the 
economic stakes were far higher and the conflicts between the settlers and the 
black populations were intense, with many people losing their lives. 
The early conflicts impacted psychologically upon the white settler groups, 
encouraging them to look towards strong governments which they could control 
and which would assuage their insecurity and fear, as well as p.rotecting their 
interests. The reluctance to relinquish political control in these two 
countries later resulted in further conflict, beginning in the 1970s, which 
led to international intervention directed at solving the conflict. This 
intervention, in turn, impacted upon the canst itut ion-drafting processes. 
Because of the reluctance of the white minority groups in Rhodesia and South 
West Africa to relinquish political control, supported in the latter case by 
the South African government, the United Nations and the internat ion a 1 
community became involved in formulating independence constitutions for both 
territories. In the case of South West Africa, the international community, 
through the United Nations, determined that the territory should be a unitary 
state. In the case of Rhodesia, British unitarist political culture and 
precedent, ori gi nat i ng both from within the territory and from outside, 
determined that the independence con st itut ion should a 1 so be unitary. The 
Bechuanaland Protectorate decolonised in a more conventional way, following 
British precedent as applied in other former colonial possessions. 
The decolonising power also played a role in this process. In the case of 
Zimbabwe and Botswana, that power was Britain; in the case of Namibia, it was 
South Africa, together with the international conununity and in particular the 
Five Western Powers, who were also members of the United Nations. Britain, in 
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this case, was a less significant party in the process. In so far as Zimbabwe 
and Botswana are concerned, British unitarist notions, like those contained 
in the Durham Report (referred to in chapter 4), carried through into the 
constitution-making process, since the British Foreign and Colonial Offices 
were directly involved in negotiating and drafting the respective independence 
constitutions. In the case of Namibia, the decolonising power, South Africa, 
the United Nations and internal parties were involved in drafting the 
independence constitution. The United Nations set the parameters for the 
independence constitution, while the South African government exerted both a 
direct and indirect influence through the political party process in the 
territory, in favour of a decentralised power structure and regional 
governments. However, the unitarist beliefs of the United Nations and the 
stronger, internal, largely black supported political parties prevailed and 
a unitary constitution was adopted, with certain checks on the abuse of power, 
such as a bi-cameral legislature and the adoption of a largely ceremonial 
office of president. 
Different factors come into play at different times in the constitutional 
evolution of a country. There was approximately a twenty-four year gap between 
the independence of Botswana and Namibia. Botswana took many of its 
const i tut i ona l cues from the independence experiences of other parts of 
Africa, like the creation of single legislative councils in the former 
colonies such as Gambia, Kenya, Nyasaland and Uganda. It was also inspired by 
the ideas of Pan-Africanism, which had an influence on Africa in general. 
Above all, the need for nation-building was seen by African leaders in all 
three countries as being of prime importance. In particular, in the case of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, the political cultures of those countries had been 
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highly fragmented by white minority ruling classes, and the belief was that 
nations had to be forged out of those societies. Even within the African 
population groups in those countries, Botswana included, fragmentation had 
occurred along tribal lines, making consolidation necessary. A centralised 
unitary constitution was seen as a natural corollary to the process of nation-
building. 
The proximity to political power also determined whether a racial or ruling 
group favoured a monist or pluralist constitutional order. The early white 
settlers in Rhodesia were monist, in that they supported a strong, single, 
central authority in order to dominate the territory of Southern Rhodesia. 
When Rhodesian independence became a disputed issue confronting them with the 
loss of political power, however, they began to think in more pluralist terms 
·and in the late 1960s internal federation was actually considered. 
In the case of Bechuanaland, the relatively small, white population never 
dominated a legislative authority. It did participate in a White Advisory 
Council, with the reins of power held by British Colonial officials until 
approximately six years before independence. It was the modernising African 
elite of Bechuanaland who were monist, in that they stood to gain and retain 
political power in a centralised unitary state, whereas the traditional 
leaders of the eight major ethnic groups were pluralist, in that their power 
bases would be at risk in a centralised unitary state. 
Likewise, in Namibia, SWAPO supporters were monist in their approach to the 
state, since they were likely to gain political power as a result of their 
numerically stronger support base, amongst the Owambo, in particular, whereas 
the white group and other sma 11 er groups were more p 1 ural i st ic in their 
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approach to constitutional issues, in that they were likely to lose political 
power in a centralised unitary state. For this reason they favoured, at one 
time or another, a decentralised unitary state and variations of federation, 
regionalism and partition, in the belief that they might be able to retain 
some political power for themselves. 
The unitary state is only one of a number of device employed by leaders to 
build a nation. It operates as a latent device and it is simply accepted that 
nation-building can and should only occur under a centralised unitary 
constitutional form. It has, in fact, been underplayed as an important 
organising device in former African colonies. 
In explaining the adoption of centralised unitary constitutional forms, one 
needs to take into account the historical time period during which the 
constitution-drafting process takes place. In Africa, during the 1960s and 
after, as well as during periods of rapid transition, there was a general 
urgency to attain independence. In such circumstances little thought is given 
to major constitutional innovation. As pointed out in chapter 1, 
constitutional forms evolve as a result of a complex interplay of factors, 
both internal and external to a country. This has proved no different in the 
cases of Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia. 
In-depth case studies of the adoption of centralised unitary constitutional 
forms at the time of independence have been the focus of three of the chapters 
comprising this thesis. The three countries dealt with differ in terms of 
their history, demographic composition, geographic extent, economies, 
decolonisation processes and relations with the international community. 
However, each of these countries adopted a centralised unitary constitution 
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at the time of independence, despite the diversity of the three. 
This can perhaps be ascribed mainly to the climate of opinion prevailing at 
the time, both within the international community and among the nationalist 
movements in the three countries. It was believed that the centralised unitary 
state would address the needs of each, while providing for a just, non-racial 
democratic order. In the case of Zimbabwe and Namibia, in particular, 
constitutional forms which would favour the retention of power by the white 
group were simply rrot acceptable. A unitary constitutional form, it was 
believed, would ensure a future, non-racial, democratic political order in 
those countries. It could also be seen as a reaction against the different 
policies of racial segregation practised in Rhodesia, South West Africa and 
South Africa. 
A question which might be asked here is whether the three countries under 
discussion could have evolved along different constitutional lines. Could they 
not have adopted decentralised unitary constitutional forms? Of the 
alternatives available to them, partition was not acceptable, since it might 
have suggested an approach akin to South Africa's separate development policy 
as applied at the time and reviled in most African states and throughout the 
world. Federation was also unacceptable for the reasons mentioned above, but 
primarily because of the possibility of state disintegration. All three states 
had been characterised by degrees of decentralised government in their early 
years. Increasingly, however, centralised government became inevitable, as the 
need for and belief in integrating their respective societies arose. The 
termination stage, in the form of the centralised unitary const ituti ona 1 form, 
was probably inevitable in the light of the climate of opinion and 
circumstantial factors prevailing at the time. It was seen as a virtual 
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guarantee against discriminatory racial pr act ices within the territories 
concerned. 
Two further questions arise - but these are matters for further study. Has the 
centralised unitary constitutional form, in fact, served the interests of 
these countries? What constitutional form might more appropriately be 
implemented? The literature on Africa in the 1990s (referred to in the 
Postscript below) seems to suggest that the centralised unitary constitutional 
form and the lack of democracy have failed to promote economic prosperity in 
many countries on the African continent, and some are advocating a process of 
constitutional reassessment. This might reflect a change in the climate of 
opinion, that could usher in constitutional forms providing for decentralised 
decision-making in many states in the future. 
The connection is currently being made between constitutional form and 
economic performance, in particular. The earlier belief in centralised 
planning for economic development is now being questioned. Despite the lapse 
of twenty four years between the independence of Botswana and that of Namibia, 
little correlation was made during that time between the two factors. Even by 
1990, the connection between constitutional form and the lack of economic 
performance had failed to be made in a very coherent or compelling manner. 
Unitary constitutional forms were first and foremost directed at solving 
political issues. The lack of economic performance (as opposed to centralised 
economic planning), was therefore not a factor in the drafting of centralised 
unitary constitutions in any of the three countries under consideration. 
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8.3 SOME PROPOSITIONS 
In conclusion, the following can be taken as a few general inductive 
propositions which determine under what conditions an African state is likely 
to adopt a centralised unitary constitutional form, in preference to a 
decentralised one, a federation or partition. It is important to note that 
these propositions hold true for the case studies under consideration. Another 
set might emerge from further such investigations. 
1. When a territory decolonises or severs its legal ties with the 
metropolis, it is likely to opt for a centralised unitary 
constitutional form and a minimal degree of decentralisation of 
power; and certainly no more than that which already exists in 
the colony concerned. This is explained by the fact that the 
central authority in a newly independent state is likely, during 
the first few years of its existence, to want to concentrate on 
consolidating its hold over its territory and population. Since 
a centra 1 authority assumes 1ega1 authority and power from a 
foreign government, it is unlikely at that time to entertain the 
possibility of distributing its authority and power to a lower or 
higher tier of government. 
2. Where a state's boundaries are not final and a closer political 
or legal relationship either as a member of a greater unitary or 
federal state is possible or probable, the state is 1 ikely to 
retain, or opt for, a centralised unitary constitutional form. 
Moreover, where there is a possibility of secession of a 
geographic or ethnic entity from a larger governmental authority, 
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the latter authority is also likely to support the retention or 
adoption of a centralised unitary constitutional form. In these 
circumstances, if a central authority feels insecure or could be 
deprived of some of its power and authority, it is unlikely to 
want to distribute any of it to a lower or higher tier of 
government. 
3. States which have the potential for conflict along ethnic lines 
are then likely to opt for a centralised unitary constitutional 
form. The decentralisation or devolution of power to authorities 
which could challenge the power of the central authority cannot 
be considered here. The decentralisation or devolution of power 
to geographic entities which could coincide with ethnic 
identities is particularly feared as this could result in ethnic 
mobilisation against the central authority. This fear is 
reinforced when former colonial powers have recognised ethnicity 
in their political and administrative systems of rule. 
4. Where leaders of nationalist movements have been in the forefront 
of the removal of colonial control and stand to govern the former 
colony after independence, they will tend to favour a centralised 
unitary constitutional form. After possibly a protracted period 
of nationalist activity or even conflict with a former colonial 
power, a leadership elite is unlikely to want to surrender any 
authority or power to a lower or higher tier of government. The 
longer the period of nationalist activity and the more intense 
that activity, the less likely the leadership elite will be to 
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concede any po 1itica1 power to a 1 ower or higher ti er of 
government. 
5. Where the dominant perception in a former colony amongst 
1 eadershi p e 1 it es is that there is a need to embark upon a 
process of modernisation and nation-building, the leaders will 
opt for a centralised unitary constitutional form. The perception 
is 1ike1y to be that a strong centra 1 authority wi 11 be in a 
better position to achieve these goals. The leadership elite 
which is to assume power must be entrusted with sufficient 
authority to override centrifugal forces and promote centripetal 
ones, so achieving its goal. 
6. Aspirant leaders in states which have been or are in a 
decolonisation phase wi11 perceive centralised unitary states as 
being more powerful than federal states, and will attach greater 
prestige to a strong, centralised constitutional form rather than 
to a decentralised one, or to a federal constitutional form. This 
perception is partly derived from the view of the former ruling 
elite in the unitary colonial state and in the metropo1 is, as 
being all powerful, and able to make decisions and execute policy 
at will. 
7. Where one group stands to gain or retain political power at the 
expense of another, it is likely to favour a centralised unitary 
constitutional form. Where one group outnumbers other possible 
competitors for power, that group is likely to favour a 
centralised unitary state so as to limit or deny power to others 
369 
who may challenge it. The converse of this is that if one group 
is likely to lose power at the central level then it might 
support decentralisation or devolution under which it could 
retain a degree of power and authority. 
8. When a constitution is being drafted for a new state, the climate 
of opinion and ideology prevailing at the particular time, 
determining whether it should be unitary or federal, centralised 
or decentralised, or focal institutional, will dominate. The 
ideology imparted by leadership elites schooled in such ideas 
whether it be monist, pluralist, Marxist or of a socialist 
orientation, would carry through into the constitution-drafting 
process. 
9. If a country has had a strong history of centralisation, for 
example, this inheritance is likely to influence the 
constitution-drafting process and the nature of the resulting 
constitution. This is explained by the fact that it is difficult 
to modify or radically alter institutions which have evolved over 
a period of time and have established a momentum of their own. 
8.4 POSTSCRIPT 
8.4.l CONSTITUTIONAL REASSESSMENT IN BOTSWANA, ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA 
Since independence and up until the mid 1990s, neither Botswana, Zimbabwe nor 
Namibia had undertaken any meaningful constitutional reform or 
decentralisation of political power, such as might have occurred in other 
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parts of the continent, and certainly no devolution of power, as is understood 
by the concept referred to in chapter 2. 
8.4.1. l Botswana 
In Botswana in the 1980s the emphasis was on deconcentration rather than 
decentralisation of central government administrative functions to district 
admi ni st rat ion. No pro vi nci al level of government exists between that of 
national and district. The four main institutions at the district level are 
the district administration, district council, land board and tribal 
admi ni strati ons, which are predominantly elected authorities. These local 
government institutions have persisted and been fairly stable throughout most 
of the post independence period (Gasper in De Valk et al. 1990:224-225). 
District Councils have persisted during this time, probably because of their 
lack of association with the colonial era and a political culture which 
tolerates a degree of opposition (De Valk et al. 1990:234). The attitude of 
central government is that the reform of District Councils should be 
administrative, that is, more training and resources should be given to 
personnel; and that continued or even strengthened central control is 
required. 
De Valk (1990:245-246) puts forward several views as to why no further 
decentralisation is contemplated. Amongst others is the reduction in diamond 
revenues, which has meant less money for allocation to local authorities; the 
need to keep councils weak in case they become centres of strong opposition; 
fears of a centralised elite concerning security; and the belief that the 
centre performs better than district and local authorities. 
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8.4.1.2 Zimbabwe 
The role of ideology, and particularly that of ZANU(PF), has been an important 
factor in determining the degree of centralisation or decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe. Over the years, the role of ideology in the organisation and 
operation of the state and its functioning has, in fact, been of paramount 
importance. Primacy during the early years of independence was given to the 
consolidation of state power by ZANU(PF), the creation of a centrally planned 
economy and a dominant state sector (Gregory 1987). In 1987 former Prime 
Minister, Robert Mugabe, described the ruling ZANU(PF) party as having a 
democratic centralist structure and procedure. Power was further concentrated 
at the centre through the introduction in 1988 of an executive presidency. 
At the district level, the Zimbabwean government concentrated in the post-
independence period on the consolidation of the Rural Councils and the African 
Councils into new District Councils. These Councils had great symbolic 
significance and important legal responsibilities, but in practice their 
capacity was quite limited. Staffing and financing remained under the control 
of the central government. Periodically, during the 1980s, the issue of 
increased decentralisation was raised. For example, in 1988 a call was made 
for the allocation of budgets to provincial governors. This proposal was 
rejected on two grounds: the introduction of independent budgets would make 
accountability more difficult; and there was a need to restrain fi seal 
expenditure (Helmsing 1991:35). 
Decentralisation in Zimbabwe in the 1980s and beyond was seen in relation to 
the need for national integration and integrated planning and the tendency was 
towards centralisation to achieve these goals. It was felt that a small 
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centralised unitary state which was inherited in 1980 could more easily be run 
from the centre (Helmsing 1991:33). 
Following the 1995 general election in which the ruling ZANU(PF) party won 118 
out of the 120 elected seats in the legislature, calls were made for the 
holding of a national conference to draft a new constitution for the country 
(Chakaodza 1995). These calls were made by academics, church leaders, 
opposition politicians, human rights activists and cabinet ministers. Much of 
the criticism of the 1980 constitution was directed at the need to reform the 
electoral system which was heavily biased in favour of the ruling party. 
8.4.1.3 Namibia 
Since the Namibian Constitution was only negotiated in 1989/1990, no 
consideration is being given to the reconstitution of the unitary.state in 
that country. Probably the most important constitutional issue under 
consideration in the post-independence period is the allocation of powers to 
the thirteen newly created Regional Councils. 
In terms of chapter 12 of the 1990 Namibian Constitution, provision is made 
for decentralised administration which, as was pointed out above in chapter 
7, was a concession to opposition groupings in the Constituent Assembly. It 
was only after independence in 1990 that the President of the Republic of 
Namibia, in terms of Proclamation no. 12 of that year, appointed the first 
Del i mi tat ion Cammi ss ion for the country to delimit regions and con st i tu enc i es. 
The Delimitation Commission's report on 30 June 1991 made provision for 
thirteen regions in the country. This was followed by the passing of the 
Regional Council Act no. 22 of 1992 which allocated functions or tasks to 
373 
these Councils. Elections were held in the thirteen regions in November 1992, 
to elect ninety-five councillors and forty-five local government authorities. 
It was thus only in 1993 that these Councils came into being. In practice few 
functions have been allocated to the regions since their establishment. There 
are a number of factors constraining the allocation of functions to the 
regions. Some of these are as follows: 
the silence of the Constitution on the scope of power and 
authority to be allocated to the regions; 
the insecurity of Regional Councils in relation to the 
government hierarchy. They have no back-up traditions nor is 
there a culture of regionality in the country; 
a scarcity of financial resources and a lack of human capacity; 
an association at the central government level of Regional 
Councils with the former Apartheid Bantustans; 
and also a fear by traditional leaders of a loss of autonomy 
(Totemeyer 1996). 
No enthusiastic support was shown by SWAPO representatives in the 1989/90 
Constitutional Committee for decentralisation. This lack of enthusiasm has 
probably carried over into the post-independence period of government where 
it is feared that regional government wi 11 erode the power of central 
government. The national government, conscious of the unitary system, it is 
argued, will be selective in the powers which it allocates to Regional 
Councils (Totemeyer 1995). 
The centralised unitary state it appears, is therefore highly prized amongst 
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Namibian elites and it will probably take some time before the fear of 
centrifugal forces in the greater society are overcome and meaningful 
decentralisation takes place. 
8.5 THE REASSESSMENT PROCESS IN AFRICA 
The post-independence African state, its organisation and functions are very 
much in a state of flux at the present time. Numerous commentaries and 
analyses have appeared in the 1990s suggesting the restructuring of the public 
domain and promoting political reform. The performance of institutions, 
including constitutional forms, is being called into question in the 
literature. Some examples of this literature are: Wunsch and Olowu 1990; 
Rimmer 1991; Governance and Development 1992 (World Bank Report); Widner 1994; 
Olukoshi and Wohlgemuth 1995; Zartman 1995; Mamdani 1996; Havnevik and Van 
Arkadie 1996; Ellis 1996; Munro 1996; Leftwich 1996; and Hope 1997. These and 
other commentaries have been inspired by the declining competence and 
performance of African governments; and more specifically by Africa's economic 
decline. This, in turn, has led since the 1980s, to the implementation of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank economic structural adjustment 
programmes. 
The commentaries and analyses have dealt more particularly with questions of 
democratisation, individual freedoms, rights and responsibilities, 
liberalisation, governmental accountabi 1 i ty, decentra 1 i sati on, governance, 
leadership, the legal framework for development and, only in a peripheral 
manner, with the fundamenta 1 con st i tut i ona 1 order within the state. The 
reassessment of the African state and its role and relationship to society has 
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been in progress for some time. Yet, practical fundamental change or reform 
on the ground has been slow to materialise. As in the pre-independence period, 
limited mention is made specifically of unitary or federal constitutional 
forms. The closest and most frequent references to unitary and federal 
constitutional forms are those made to the notions of centralisation or 
decentralisation. The fundamental constitutional order in the African state, 
as is pointed out below in reference to some of the recent literature on the 
topic, is only gradually coming into focus. 
According to Tordoff, writing in 1994 on decentralisation experiments in sub-
Saharan Africa in general, the majority of the states in the region up until 
the late 1980s tended to reinforce central control rather than enhance local 
autonomy. However, since the late 1980s, a number of states have, encouraged 
by the democratisation process sweeping the continent, attempted to promote 
meaningful decentralisation. The centralising trend of the 1980s, he 
maintains, was checked as African states became subject to the 'democratic' 
wave sweeping across the continent (Tordoff 1994:558). 
As stated in chapter 1, the notions of the unitary constitution and unitarism 
are embedded in various ideas like the search for political stability and 
nation-building. This applies also to Africa's post-independence period. The 
pro bl ems which afflict the African continent are described in various ways and 
include references to 'Africa's economic crisis', 'political instability' 
'poor governance' and 'economic decline'. References to political solutions, 
include amongst others, the advocacy of democratisation, multi -partyi sm, 
decentralisation, accountability and good governance. As stated in chapters 
land 4, the role of constitutions and constitutional ism has been downplayed, 
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even ignored in the colonial period and the first two or three decades of the 
post-colonial period in Africa. 
8.5.l Some references to the literature 
With increasing frequency, authors writing on the economic plight of Africa 
are suggesting either institutional or structural reform (referred to in a 
broad sense and interchangeably) and occasionally constitutional reform, as 
a necessity for the return to prosperity and stability. The literature is now 
suggesting a linkage between institutions, structures and constitutions and 
economic development. A number of examples are referred to below. 
An argument taken up by Aron for example, is that the future prospects for 
growth in Africa are strongly circumscribed by its political, economic and 
legal institutional foundations (Ellis (ed). 1996:96). For effective 
performance of institutions, oversight or monitoring structures are necessary 
complements. Aron further argues that for oversight structures to be 
effective, 'deep-seated con st i tut i ona l change' is probably necessary. An 
effective constitution would assume the existence of a strong civil society 
which could challenge governments and would, moreover, have to be accompanied 
by reforms such as the decentralisation of power to assist in this process 
(Ellis (ed). 1996:114). Taking this argument further, she maintains that the 
prospects for Africa's growth are circumscribed by the lack of constitutional 
reform. 
Drame writes in a similar vein about the crisis of the state in Africa. He 
refers to the crisis of confidence between the state (governments) and society 
in Africa. The state (government), he argues, has monopolised key positions 
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and roles in economic activity and public life. It has, in addition, played 
a key role in the redistribution of national wealth and the development of the 
middle classes which have benefited from this process. With the decline in 
economic well-being and the increasing repression in many African states, 
these classes have come into conflict with central governments and are ca 11 ing 
for a redi stri but ion of power. State (government) structures need to be 
reformed and the 'principle of devolution of responsibility to the grassroots 
communities and their institutions' (Ellis (ed).1996:210) will have to be 
taken into account. 
Clapham refers to limits of state (government) power and the need to reconcile 
the partial autonomy of different regional, ethnic or religious sections of 
the community by means of a mechanism to ensure their access to central 
political institutions (Rimmer (ed) .1991 :103). He proposes that, with the 
advent of multi-partyism, opposition groups which were formerly repressed may 
be accommodated in regional arrangements and de facto federalism becomes more 
practicable. 
Munro (1996:112-148), in his study, Power, Peasants and Political Development: 
Reconsidering State Construction in Africa, argues in support of state centred 
analyses rather than analyses focusing on, for example, the fragmentation of 
politics, processes of economic disengagement and areas of social life which 
fall outside the ambit of the state. He argues that the state is pivotal to 
the political futures of African countries, maintaining that one cannot make 
proper sense of political power and development without examining a regime's 
attempts to forge state (government) authority and concept i ans of citizenship. 
For a proper understanding of state politics in Africa, he says, one must use 
central institutions and structures of the state as a starting point for 
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arialysis. This is suggestive of the additional need to analyse constitutional 
forms in the African state. 
Mamdani, in an analysis of contemporary Africa and the legacy of late 
colonialism, typifies the pre-independence African state (colony) as being a 
decentralised despotic state (colony) (1966:25). But in the pre-independence 
period, the decentralised despotic state (colony) exacerbated ethnic tensions, 
so the solution seemed to be centralisation. The colonial state became the 
centralised despotic state. In the post-colonial period, centralised 
despotism, however, exacerbated the urban rural divide, and the solution, 
according to Mamdani, now again appears to be decentralisation (1996:291). 
Zartman's work, Co17apsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of 
Legitimate Authority, is another suggestive of the plight of the post-
independence African state. He proposes four areas which might be focused upon 
in the reconstitution of the African state: power; participation; resources; 
and external assistance. With regard to power he says that state (government) 
structures need to be reconstituted from the bottom up, through the use of 
some temporary agent at the top so that the state (government) can return to 
the centre of social and political organisation in civil society (1995:269). 
As regards participation, legitimacy must also be restored through 
constructive, freely expressed support on the part of society. Structures for 
institutionalised participation need to be created through the holding of a 
national convention in which a constitution would be designed to provide the 
foundations for a normative and legal political order. Resources need to be 
allocated from both internal and external sources in order to assist in the 
reconstitution of the state (Zartman 1995:270-273). 
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The World Bank (1992) refers to such concepts as good governance, 
accountability, a legal framework for development, information and 
transparency. It stops short, however, of suggesting constitutional reform or 
the reconstituting of the state as a panacea for the Third World's economic 
crisis. These notions in order to function successfully, it is argued below, 
require a state based on constitutional ism. 
Leftwich maintains that in Western circles democratic good governance is now 
considered to be a necessary condition for development (1966:4). From a 
developmental point of view, he argues that it is the primacy of politics, the 
character of the state (government) and the institutional ideal of good 
governance which are necessary for development (1966:18). 
Finally, Hope writes on the restructuring of the nation-state as a 
prerequisite for growth and development in Africa. He claims that political 
power should be fairly distributed among all communities, while decentralised 
political, administrative and fiscal structures should be components of the 
restructuring of the nation-state (1997:183). 
8.6 CONCLUSION 
8.6.l The prospects for constitutional reform in Africa 
The African state and its performance, or lack of performance, are viewed by 
the above-mentioned authors and others from a number of different 
perspectives. The conunon thread which runs through this body of literature is 
the need for reform of the African state and the suggestion that 
constitutional reform, which includes lesser reforms but also that of 
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centralised unitary constitutional forms, could be important in this process. 
The belief in vertical integration (referred to by Shils 1982, chapter 3 
above) and high degrees of centralisation is also likely to be questioned with 
increasing frequency. The reassessment of the performance of post-independence 
African governments, which in many cases do not function constitutionally, is 
likely to gain ground for the reasons mentioned below. 
Broad based nationalist sentiment as an integrating force which drove the 
independence process is now of little significance in the African state. 
Regional and ethnic loyalties can and do periodically assert themselves, 
demanding special accommodation in new constitutional forms. Since nation-
building processes in many parts of Africa have not obliterated regional and 
ethnic loyalties, a different approach could be taken, as argued by Selassie 
(1992), which acknowledge and accommodate these factors in new constitutional 
forms without impairing national unity and stability. 
Further, the demise of many of the original nationalist leaders and the 
emergence of new leadership elites educated in the post-independence era could 
result in a different view of constitutional alternatives, since there is no 
longer an external colonial enemy nor have post-independence expectations 
materialised. New leadership elites are therefore likely to relate to the 
political processes in their respective countries in different ways, and to 
create the space for con st i tut ion al innovation supported by a new world 
ideological climate. The world in general has entered this climate, referred 
to as 'nee-conservatism' or 'neo-1 iberal ism', which emphasises markets, 
deregulation, privatisation, supply-side economics, individualism, competition 
and the 'enterprise' culture (Leftwich 1996:13). Traditional Marxist and 
socialist doctrine has greatly diminished in importance. It is maintained then 
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that for 'nee-conservative', free market principles and the political 
conditionalities being insisted upon by international financial institutions -
1 ike the IMF and World Bank - and western governments to survive and prosper, 
stable, predictable and legitimate institutional and constitutional forms are 
necessary. Required also is constitutional ism, which means that governments 
and decision makers in those governments must function in terms of a clearly 
defined set of rules. Market forces cannot function adequately in an 
environment dominated by the whims of an a 11-powerful authoritarian or 
personal ruler. 
Technical, administrative and managerial requirements for the promotion of 
free market principles and good governance are some of the conditionalities 
of the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes being insisted upon 
and adopted in varying degrees by many African countries. Western governments 
have been stressed democracy, multi-partyism, free and fair elections, a free 
press and an independent judiciary (Leftwich 1996:15-16). In view of their 
poor economic growth rates, African countries have 1 i ttl e choice but to accept 
the conditionalities being imposed by these institutions and governments. Of 
the three case studies in this thesis, Zimbabwe is the only country with an 
IMF/World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programme in place. Both the 
technical, administrative, managerial and political conditionalities must, in 
turn, result in the reassessment of constitutional forms so that they can be 
successfully implemented. Zimbabwe could be affected by this relationship. 
Besides the role of the international financial institutions and western 
governments referred to above, the dynamics of globalisation, in which is 
individual states become increasingly subject to global forces, are pushing 
African governments into a more subordinate relationship to market forces 
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(Falk 1996). This process of globalisation must, in turn, result in a 
reassessment of institutions and constitutions to ensure that they effectively 
support the functioning of market forces. 
As a necessary coro 1 lary to the accommodation of market forces and the 
promotion of values, such as accountability and democracy, the state requires 
institutions and constitutional forms which are responsive, predictable and 
which ensure minimal degrees of order and stability. For free market forces 
to survive and promote economic development, it is argued (Leftwich 1996), 
democracy is necessary. To implement real democratic rule in place of 
authoritarian rule, which is the norm in many African countries, a fundamental 
restructuring of institutions and constitutions would, however, need to be 
undertaken. The political forces in the African state therefore need to be 
harnessed to devise legitimate and functional institutions and constitutional 
forms so as to accommodate democratic rule. 
No substantial restructuring of the African state has taken place in the post-
independence period; the exception being South Africa. Constitutional 
conferences which have been held, particularly in West African states, have 
come the closest to a fundamental restructuring of governments and 
institutions, but nothing has occurred on the scale of the South African 
constitution-drafting process which took place between 1990 and 1996. Unitary 
or federal constitutional forms and their varying degrees of centralisation 
or decentralisation have not been revisited and reconsidered to date in any 
great depth. As argued above, the literature points in this direction, 
suggesting that this is a problem area which needs to be addressed by 
Africans, international institutions and foreign governments. The question of 
decentralisation has been revisited and various practical attempts have been 
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made to decentralise, but with varying degrees of success and enthusiasm. 
Constitutions drafted in a different 'climate of opinion' are unlikely to be 
suited to the 'neo-conservative' or 'neo-liberal' era in which global and 
local market forces dominate. Constitutions drafted at the turn of the 
twentieth century, in a different international political and economic climate 
will have to take into account prevailing notions like good governance, 
accountability, decentralisation and democracy. 
The process of constitution drafting is being given limited recognition as is 
mentioned above. The problem of the constitutional order in the African state, 
which in most cases happens to have taken a centralised unitary form is being 
given limited recognition and could filter through and promote the 
constitution-drafting process on the ground. 
Many of the issues being faced by African countries seem to suggest a new 
recognition of the importance of the role of institutions and constitutions 
in the performance of political systems. This could result in a revival of 
interest in the issue amongst political scientists and others in related 
disciplines. Allied to the new interest in institutions and constitutions 
(which was advocated by Rivkin (1968) referred to in chapter 4 above) an issue 
for consideration might be, what is the best constitutional design and process 
for drafting constitutions for specific African countries. 
In chapter 3 it was mentioned that the centralised unitary state had evolved 
over a long period of time. To reverse the process will take time. That 
institutions are the 'carriers of history', is a fact that is difficult if not 
impossible to ignore. If South Africa's 1996 federal, partly decentralised, 
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constitution proves workable, this could provide a further incentive for the 
reassessment and redesigning of centralised unitary constitutional forms in 
other African countries and act as a benchmark in the process. The South 
African example could have a demonstration effect, taking the debate on 
governmental organisation and institutional design one step further, to a 
reassessment of centralised unitary constitutional forms in a number of 
African countries. The basic unitary constitutional forms in the countries of 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia probably serve the needs of those countries, 
whereas a federal constitutional form might better suit a large country like 
Za1re (Democratic Republic of Congo) which, at the time of writing, is 
undergoing a regime change. The search for appropriate political institutions 
and constitutional forms for the African state is far from complete on the eve 
of the twenty-first century. 
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